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ABSTRACT
Courts, Councils and Citizenship: Political culture in the
Gezira Scheme in Condominium Sudan
Anna Clarkson
The Gezira Scheme of northern Sudan has been consistently portrayed as a totalising
institution which imposed a distinctly new form of social and economic organisation
upon a tenant body. This study reassesses the impact of the Gezira Scheme, suggesting
that the changes brought by the Scheme were of degree rather than type, and did not
disrupt the cultural values at the heart of society. It credits the Sudanese actors within the
Scheme with an agency previously denied to them, and looks holistically at the region's
experience of governance. The Scheme is thus seen not as a controlling and oppressive
institution, but rather as a tool used by a flexible and forward-looking society to improve
personal circumstances. To these ends both the economic and administrative structures
of central government were embraced and adapted to meet pre-existing cultural values
whilst retaining the existing flexible forms of community authority.
Tenants used a system created as a result of a flawed government imagination of Gezira
society to pursue existing aspirations that had formerly been attainable only by a small
wealthy elite. In this way, a tenant elite was created that defined itself economically and
ethnically in relation to a majority non-tenant population. With devolutionary policies
responding primarily to the needs of the Scheme, this economic dominance of tenants
was reinforced by their political dominance of institutions of local governance.
Experienced in mediating with central state structures, the tenants who controlled courts
and councils were able to control their own experience of governance. Tenant elitism
was ultimately revealed through the establishment of a self-identified interest group that
was organised institutionally from the 1940s. Embracing both government and Scheme,
tenants campaigned in defence of stated financial 'rights' based on a notion of elevated
citizenship. However, the inability of all tenants to attain these universal aims split the
tenant body and established a future pattern of instability within the Gezira Scheme.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation
from it should be published in any format, including electronic
and the Internet, without the author's prior written consent. All
information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged
appropriately.
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GLOSSARY
Sorghum vulgare. A food crop grown in the Gezira Scheme's
rotation.
Title of address for Western-educated non-European man. Collective
noun - effendia.
Unit of land measurement. One feddan equals 1.038 acres.
A man considered to have holy powers.
A territorial unit of administration below the level of districts.
A territorial unit of administration below the level of gisms.
Dolichos lablab. A nitrogenous fodder crop grown in the Gezira
Scheme's rotation.
A movement led by the self-proclaimed Mahdi ("the rightly guided
one"), Muhammed Ahmed. In 1885, he and his followers gained
control of Khartoum and established a central state which lasted until
the Anglo-Egyptian 're-conquest' of 1898.
A district office official, generally Egyptian or Sudanese.
A process of communal consultation within a community.
The district office run by central government.
Title given to a leader of a tribal section.
Administrative title for the head of a group of villages.
Unit covered by an omda's jurisdiction.
Judge in the Islamic law courts.
Institution of mortgage, generally of crops.
IV
Sheikh
Sufism
Sulta
Tariqa
Turkia
Ulema
Wakil
Title used widely as a demonstration of respect, but also directly
incorporated into the administrative hierarchy referring to identified
administrative leaders.
A form of Islam, emphasising the role of Sufi Sheikhs as providing an
avenue or path to God.
Inherent authority.
The hierarchical organisation led by a Sufi Sheikh.
The period, 1821-1885, in which the Turko-Egyptian regime, headed
by Muhammad Ali of Egypt, controlled most of Sudan. I have
adopted this form of transliteration for purposes of consistency.
Religious leadership within the orthodox Islamic hierarchy. Singular,
alim.
Agent or manager. Particularly used in the context of wakil sheikhs,
promoted by the government to mediate between tenants and
agricultural management.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of the people along their natural lines, is the
Government believes, essential; and organised improvement of
material conditions will not be allowed to result in the loss or
debasement of the traditional ideas which form the basis of the
character of the people. 1
Such was the key point of the speech given by Lord Lloyd, the British High
Commissioner for Egypt, as he presided over the opening of the Sennar Dam on 2\
January 1926. Nearly two miles across and supplying over 600 miles of canals, the
Sennar dam irrigated an initial area of 300,000 feddans, and was gradually extended to
reach a total of one million feddans by the end of the Condominium.2 As a feat of
engineering it was almost without parallel in colonial Africa. However, although it was
duly celebrated as a symbol of modern progress, especially by the investors and cotton
producers in Britain who were hoping for significant financial reward, there was also
considerable unease within political circles. Lloyd reflected this uncertainty in his
speech, which found common resonance within official circles that were newly
enthralled with extreme versions of the policies of Indirect Rule. Planned and operated
I Lord Lloyd quoted in Leo Weinthal and James Finlay (eds ..) "Special Sudan Number Commemorating
the Official Opening of the Scnnar Dam", Atncan World, (1920). p. 3~
2 Ihid.. and Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira. A Story otDevelopment in the Sudan. (London. 1959I. pp. 9~, :!lll.
One feddan is equal to I.03S acres.
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in response to the government's financial needs, the Gezira Scheme stood as a beacon of
modernity in an otherwise administratively conservative landscape. Driven by economic
motivations, the social outcomes of the Scheme were rather less well considered, and
Wasey Sterry, the Legal Secretary spoke for central government when he stated in 1923,
that "until the thing has developed more it is not clear what we want".' Reliant upon the
Scheme for providing state revenues, social organisation was primarily dictated by
management considerations of agricultural efficiency. In this way the Scheme became
an anomaly within the Sudan, viewed as a unique region of social and economic
experimentation.
In light of the Unique SIze, organisation and supervision patterns introduced to the
region, it has been the structure of the Scheme that has dominated written accounts of
the area. Colonial states throughout Africa had attempted to introduce agricultural cash
crop production into existing economies, but none invested so heavily in infrastructure,
supervised production so thoroughly, or were as dependent on anyone scheme for
national revenue. As early as 1904, Sir William Garstin, the irrigation engineer noted
the suitability of the Gezira plain lying between the Blue and White Niles, south of their
confluence at Khartoum, for gravity irrigation." In response to the Sudan government's
need to support itself financially, the Scheme was designed in 1911 to produce cotton as
an export cash crop after the British Cotton Growing Association pledged to lobby the
British government for financial support for its construction.' Still unable to finance the
management costs of the Scheme, the government approached the Sudan Plantations
Syndicate, managers of a pump irrigation scheme at Zeidab in Dongola Province to
become partners, thus establishing a unique private-public model of enterprise."
.~ National Record Office Khartoum, (NRO) ICivsec 2/13/57, Wasey Sterry. Legal Secretary to C.S Lyall.
Civil Secretary, 12 November 1923. .
~ William Garstin, Report Upon the Basin of the Upper Nile witli Proposals for the Improvement oj that
Ri~'er, (Cairo, 1904). , .
5 The British Cotton Growing Association. Memorandum on the Development of Cotton Growing in the
Sudan, (British Cotton Growing Association, series no. -1-3, November 1910). .
(, Leigh Hunt had been granted 10,000 Ieddans of land as a concession i~ 19~. Hunt managed tht'\
concession under the name of the Sudan Experimental Plantations Syndicate from that date. but In 1907.
after considerable losses, the company was reorganised and renamed the Sudan Plantations Syndicate
under the direction of D.P. Mact.lillivray and Alexander Macintyre. See Gait-kcll. Gezira. pp. 51-2
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In 1911, the Syndicate was given control over the experimental cotton station at Tayiba
in the Gezira. Tenancies of thirty feddans were created, in which tenants cultivated a set
rotation of ten feddans of cotton, five feddans of both durra [sorghum vulgare] and the
fodder crop lubia [dolichos lablab], and ten feddans fallow. This was later changed to
forty feddan tenancies, allowing for a double fallow period. These original experiments
at Tayiba worked on the basis of tenants renting plots at a fixed annual rate from the
Syndicate in return for control over the crops grown. However this soon proved
unprofitable for the Syndicate, and a new profit-sharing arrangement was established in
1913, which became the basis of the concessionary agreement with the government
providing for Syndicate management of the Gezira Scheme for an initial period of ten
years.' The government agreed to pay for all infrastructure costs in return for 35% of
cotton profits. The Syndicate was to manage the Scheme, including the cultivation and
selling of cotton for a 25% share of profits, while the tenants - responsible for the labour
on the Scheme - gained the remaining 40%.8 This was to prove to be the economic
model of the Scheme until 1950, when the Syndicate's concession was ended and the
nationalised Gezira Board took over the management of the Scheme.
Delayed by the First World War, the Scheme was not fully operational until 1925, when
the Sennar dam was completed. In 1927, the smaller sister company to the Syndicate -
the Kassala Cotton Company - was relocated to an early extension of the Gezira
Scheme. Although technically a separate company, with its own shareholders, it was
run on the same lines as the Syndicate, and henceforth both companies will be referred
to by the single name of the Syndicate." The size alone made the Gezira Scheme unique
as an irrigation scheme, but it was in its organisation that the real impact of the Scheme
was felt. In order to retain effective control over the Scheme, the land was compulsory
rented from owners who were paid a flat rate of ten piastres per feddan. Tenancies were
then distributed to Gezira inhabitants based partially on pre-existing landownership
patterns. Those landowners with more than 80 feddans were provided with two standard
7 Gaitskcll, Gezira, pp. 59-71.
!l Ibid., p. 70.
l) Ihid., p. n I.
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tenancies, and allowed to nominate tenants for up to two additional tenancies. Those
owning between 40-80 feddans were given one tenancy, and the remaining tenancies
were distributed among residents.
Having gained a tenancy, a tenant had to follow a strictly controlled cultivation regime,
which placed the growing of cotton in a tight eleven month timetable of sowing.
weeding, picking and clearing. In order to ensure that this cultivation was done to the
high standards expected from the Syndicate and government, the Syndicate arranged a
system of intensive agricultural supervision. In every year from 1924 there were over
one hundred British field inspectors employed by the Syndicate to directly supervise
each tenant's cultivation, and in the late 1920s, when at a height, these figures were
much closer to two hundred.!" This contrasts starkly with the numbers of government-
employed staff in the province, which in 1924 stood at twelve. I I With approximately
20,000 tenants in the Scheme, a direct relationship was formed between an agricultural
block inspector and tenant in ways that were not possible between government staff and
individuals in any region of Sudan. 12
The economic structure and the organisation of the Gezira Scheme was so unique, so
controlled and tied so directly to the financial fortunes of the country, that it has been the
focus of all subsequent works on the Gezira region. 13 This primary concern with the
structure of the Scheme has inevitably created a top-down analytical approach that has
emphasised the motives and power of the dominant partners of state and Syndicate. It
has also focused attention upon the tenant population at the expense of the extensive
non-tenant population. The result of this bias has largely been to produce entirely
economic, Scheme-centred commentaries that have ignored non-economic activities also
10 The Sudan Gezira Board, The Sudan Gezira Board British Staff Register: incorporating the defunct
Sudan Plantations Syndicate and Kassala Cotton Company, (Khartoum, 1953).
11 Sudan government. Quarterlv List (Khartoum), 1924.
12 Anthony Kirk-Green, "Thin White Line: the Size of the Colonial Service in Africa", African A.hairs. 79,
314, (1980) pp. 25-44, at p. 29.
13 For example; Gaitskell, Ge iira; Anthony Barnett, The Getira Scheme: An Illusion of Development
(London, 1977); Victoria Bernal. "Colonial Moral Economy and the Discipline of Development: The
Gezira Scheme and 'Modem' Sudan", Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropologv, 12,4, (1997) pp.
447-479.
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existing within the region. To be fair, this assessment has reflected the documentary
sources left by British administrators, who were themselves preoccupied by the
structures of the Scheme. However, in reproducing Condominium biases. historians
have failed to understand how the Scheme interacted with other influences including
governmental administration and existing cultural and authority structures.
Arthur Gaitskell's book, Gezira; A Story of Development in the Sudan, published in
1959, remains the most comprehensive survey of the Gezira Scheme. As an employee
of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate from 1925, and manager from 1938-1952, Gaitskell
was a prolific writer and thinker, who left an invaluable description of the growth and
management of the Scheme. Gaitskell made a significant critique of the management of
the Scheme, and throughout his work, sympathy for the tenant having to adapt to the
new stringent working conditions is apparent. A product of his time and position he
remained wedded to the idea of development and modern progress being brought
through the structure of the Scheme. From the 1970s a more radical perspective
influenced by the theories of underdevelopment took a more critical stance. In
particular, Anthony Barnett in his 1977 monograph The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of
Development, described the Scheme as an authoritarian system of exploitation.!"
Barnett's work was important in shaking up the rather self-satisfied air that had come
about through an uncritical acceptance of the Scheme's success, especially in
developmental circles. By challenging accepted wisdom, a belated reappraisal of the
Gezira Scheme was made, in which the tenants rather than government or Syndicate
became for the first time the primary focus. However, by looking to place blame for
what he saw as a crisis in the 1970s, Barnett oversimplified relationships within the
Scheme during the Condominium and narrowed the economic analysis of the Scheme
even further to rest on the perceived exploitative relationship between government and
tenants.
Victoria Bernal has more recently re-explored the issues of state exploitation of tenant,
within the Gezira Scheme. Influenced by both Barnett and Foucault, Bernal has
14 Barnett. The Gezira Scheme. pp. 161-2.
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described the Scheme variously as a "disciplinary institution", "a system of domination",
and "a system of forced labour".15 This approach has allowed her to explore the "legal
fiction" of the partnership agreement and the increasing restrictions tenants faced under
strict supervision." Bernal also emphasised the minutiae of the changes established
within the Scheme, detailing the effects of new physical boundaries, and the impact of
new agricultural timetables on Gezira inhabitants. 17 However, in portraying the Scheme
as a "conflict between the colonial order and its Sudanese subjects", Bernal was again
guilty of oversimplifying relationships within the Scheme, and failing to recognise what
was in fact a largely positive response by tenants towards both the Scheme and the
government.
Bernal's work crucially ignored a raft of studies that had throughout the 1980s explored
economic relationships within the Scheme. Mark Duffield and Jay O'Brien in particular
widened the horizon beyond the state-tenant relationship to investigate the crucial role of
permanent and semi-permanent labouring populations within the Scheme. In focusing
upon the distinctive West African communities within the Gezira region, Duffield
demonstrated the economic importance of seasonal labour within the Scheme and
examined the links between cultural identity and economic position to provide
invaluable insights into the relationships both within and between West African/Takari
and riverain Sudanese communities.l" These ideas were developed by Jay O'Brien in a
series of articles exploring the relationships between tenants and the wage-earning
agricultural labourers employed by tenants." In doing so, O'Brien exposed once and for
all the fallacy of the tenant-cultivator image, and showed tenants to be the supervisors of
15 V. Bernal, "Colonial Moral", pp. 447.460,468.
16 Ibid., p. 449, 463.
17 Ibid., pp. 447, 462-3.
18 Mark Duffield, Maiurno: Capitalism and Rural Life in Sudan. (London, 1981); Idem., "Change among
West African Settlers in Northern Sudan", Review ofAfrican Political Economy, 26, (1983). pp. 45-59.
19 Jay O'Brien, "The Political Economy of Semi-Proletarianisation Under Colonialism: Sudan 1925-50",
pp. 121-147, in B. Munslow and H. Finch (eds.,) Proletarianisation in the Third World: Studies in the
Creation of a Labour Force under Dependent Capitalism. (London, 1984); Idern., 'The Social
Reproduction of Tenant Cultivators and Class Formation in the Gezira Scheme. Sudan", Research in
Economic Anthropology, 6, (1984), pp. 217-241; Idern., 'Toward a Reconstitution of Ethnicity: Capitalist
Expansion and Cultural Dynamics in Sudan", American Anthropologist, 88,4, (1986) pp. 198-907. Idern..
'The Calculus of Profit and Labour-Time in Sudanese Peasant Agriculture", Journal of Peasant Studies.
14, 4, ( 1987) pp. 454-468.
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a huge seasonal labouring force - in large part made up of West African seasonal
migrants. Not only did he show that lines of class conflict were more complex than
simply lying between tenants and government/management, but that the varying
economic means of tenants created an internal class structure, most visible in their
variable ability to hire labour. Emphasising the different levels of tension in both class
and ethnic terms, O'Brien contended that capitalist penetration into the Gezira created
numerous lines of conflicting class interests. More support for a class model of social
relationships in the Gezira Scheme has been provided by Tim Niblock. His study Class
and Power in Sudan, remains the best socio-economic survey of Condominium Sudan,
and like O'Brien, Niblock examined the lines of inequality existing within the tenant
body between those who were able to benefit from the colonial-sponsored economy and
those who were not. 20 Most importantly, Niblock recognised the importance of the
previously ignored tenant-managed institutions; the Tenants' Association and the
Tenants' Union which developed in the early 1950s, although he was not able to engage
fully with the social implications of these institutional developments.
Other minor works on the Gezira exist, but often these have perpetuated misconceptions,
and have done little to advance the cause of research. For instance Anthony
Cheesboro's disappointing thesis "Administration and Change in the Gezira Scheme and
the Sudan, 1938-1970", restates existing ideas of exploitation and class formation, but
with the additional contention that a tenant class joined forces with an educated urban
official 'effendia' class to oppose the common enemy of government." Without
providing any compelling evidence, this theory rests on poor supposition and contradicts
many tenant assertions of quite a separate identity. In general though, studies of the
Gezira Scheme have made important contributions to the understanding of the
importance of wealth and the control of tenancies to social relationships within the
Gezira Scheme; clearly demonstrating that economic relationships between tenants,
state/management and labour were a crucial element of Gezira social life. However, as
20 Tim Niblock, Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics ofSudanese Politics, /898-/985 (Albany.
1987).
21 Anthony Cheesboro, "Administration and Change in the Gezira Scheme and the Sudan. 1938-1970",
(unpuhlished Ph.D thesis. Michigan State University. 1993), p. 48.
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analyses of the wider role that the Scheme played within the region they have significant
weaknesses. The exclusive focus upon the economic and structural elements of the
Gezira Scheme has resulted in a portrayal of the Gezira Scheme as a totalising institution
controlled by state-led policies, and fundamentally altering the social and economic
landscape. This intensely narrow focus upon economic change has been at the expense
of understanding important aspects of continuity.
The degree to which the colonial states were able to impose structures and change upon
African societies has recently been much debated, and within this debate the Gezira
Scheme provides an interesting case study. Studies of the Gezira which focus on the
transforming power of the colonial state fit closely with a trend in the wider African
historiography that has focused upon the changes brought by colonial states. In part
these changes have been have been described as the result of coercive state-driven
policies. The ability of the colonial state to implement and direct controls over its
subject population, albeit in an often unobtrusive manner is at the centre of Timothy
Mitchell's sophisticated retelling of the story of colonial dominance within Egypt. By
emphasising the "phenomenon of the rule of the institution" Mitchell introduces the
notion of "techno-politics", by which unfamiliar Westemised structures of power
dominated colonial society and created new measurable and thus controllable social and
economic boundaries.v'
But studies elsewhere in Africa have increasingly questioned the novelty and power of
colonial institutions - whether 'techno-political' or 'nco-traditional' .23 They have
presented twentieth century African developments as not solely controlled by the state,
and have analysed the partnerships that emerged between the state and certain privileged
members of society. Martin Chanock has in this way examined the role of community
elders in providing a definitive form of customary law, which was then fixed in writing
22 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt. Techno-Politics, Modernity, (Berkeley, 2(02) pp. 9-10.
~~ Terence Ranger. "The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa", in EJ. Hobsbawrn and T. Ranger
(eds.i) The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983) pp. 211-62: Thomas Spear, "Nee-Traditionalism and
the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa", Journal of African History. 44, (2003), pp..~-27.
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by the state in Malawi and Zambia.i" Mahmood Mamdani has proved particularly
influential in positing the idea that the colonial period led to an increase in what he has
termed 'decentralised despotism'. He is persuasive in suggesting that the colonial state' s
desire for 'big men' to administer regions was seized upon by various local power
brokers to increase their own power base at the expense of other authority figures. Over
time this state reliance upon specific individuals created local despots, and undermined
what had previously been multi-focal authority structures.f
If these studies have emphasised the power of the state (and co-opted African elite) to
change the basic fluid nature of African society by creating more static structures, other
works have emphasised continuity of basic social structures and cultural values
throughout the colonial period. Sarah Berry and Keletso Atkins have both examined the
comparative weakness of the colonial state, and its inability to impose unwanted changes
upon the societies over which they had nominal control. Suggesting that colonial
governments were in fact limited by among other things, inadequate personnel, their
own ideological uncertainty, and the necessity of cooperation with colonial populations,
Berry argues that social institutions retained their pre-colonial fluidity within the
colonial state. This is not to say that new structures were not introduced, but that
African societies proved adaptable, frequently able to appropriate those new structures
to their advantage and fitting them into an existing cultural value system." Thus while
Berry acknowledges that "farmers have not been able to escape the presence of the
state", she adds that "nor have they necessarily wanted to: gaining access to resources
and opportunities often means working through as well as round the system." 27
Modernity, although challenging and often difficult for colonial regimes, was fully
embraced by Africans when it suited their aspirations. But while the imposition of
economic and administrative changes proved at least superficially successful and were
24 Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia,
(Portsmouth. NH. 1998).
2S Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legan of Late Colonialism
(Princeton, N.J '. 1966).
26 Sara Berry. No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics ofAgrarian Change in Sub-Saharan
Africa, (Madison, Wisconsin, 1993). p. 6; Thomas Spear. "Neo-Traditionalisrn".
~7 Berry. No Condition is Permanent, p. 64.
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often appropriated by Africans in positive ways, the attempt to change cultural values
proved much more difficult." This is not to say that African societies remained
unchanged or static, rather that African societies proved able to adapt and respond to
changed circumstances without losing the inherent cultural qualities that were central to
self-identification.
It is this new raft of Africanist literature looking at relations between state and society
that influences this study. By placing African actors, both tenants and non-tenants at the
centre of the study, and analysing the local motivations that allowed the Gezira Scheme
to function, the Gezira Scheme area has been viewed in its totality rather than as a
totalising institution. Although the coercive state approach provides an attractive
framework for the study of a region in which new economic structures were so
dominant, this approach invests the state with too great a power, and fails to recognise
that the supposedly coerced population were in fact active collaborators in the creation
of the Scheme. By understanding that the structures of the Scheme were able to be
moulded to fit closely with pre-existing (and consistently misjudged) cultural values and
aspirations of Gezira residents, the Gezira Scheme can be viewed as providing
opportunities as well as limitations and resulting in continuities as well as changes.
Such an approach is of course inevitably limited by the available source material.
Reliant upon the same documentary sources used by previous studies, the official bias
towards the structure of the Scheme and towards the male tenants within the Scheme is
all too evident. However, armed with a distinct set of questions, it has been possible to
derive important insights into non-Scheme structures, particularly the development of
judicial and administrative systems. Focusing upon both government and community
use of institutions, the unique nature of the Gezira region is explored. In this way it is
demonstrated that despite the very obvious measures taken by the state to intrude into
the administrative and economic life of Gezira inhabitants, that this intrusion did not
result in radical change and was itself only partially successful. Although Scheme
~x Kclctso Atkins. The Moon is Dead! Girl' us our Money! - The Cultural Origins of an African Work
Ethic. Natal. South Africa. 18.J3-1900. (London. 199~). chapter six.
10
Introduction
structures have been deliberately kept in the background for much of the study. it is the
Scheme that influenced all other regional developments, and in doing so created a new
elite of tenants, who controlled all local state apparatus. This dominant tenant
population embraced the state as a means of furthering their existing cultural values, and
narrowly channelled its impact to retain a large degree of space free from state
interference. However, this is not to ignore the economic structures of the Scheme itself.
and it is an active battle at the very centre of the Scheme that provides the climax of this
story. For this purpose, previously unused source materials from newspapers, the
Scheme's headquarters and personal memoirs have been employed to present in detail
the story of the conflict between two rival bodies claiming to represent tenants. It is this
conflict (over the best means to present universally accepted demands) that clearly
demonstrates the fact that rather than opposing a state that imposed a unpopular and
restricting economic structure upon them, tenants in fact embraced both the Scheme and
the state as a way of meeting culturally established aspirations.
In suggesting that what has to date been viewed as a centrally-imposed and largely
unpopular alien economic structure was in fact fully embraced by tenants, this study also
demonstrates that government understanding of the cultural values and socio-economic
organisation of the society they governed was flawed. In chapter one, the British
imagination of Gezira society throughout the Condominium is at once shown to be of
crucial importance in developing government policy, and at the same time founded on
the most uncertain, fragile and changing notions. The only consistency lay in the theme
of past dislocation through war, migrations and famine which accounted for the
fractured state of twentieth century society. Although this understanding of Gezira
society allowed the government to see the region as a blank sheet suitable for economic
development, it overlooked the fact that the Gezira was historically a sophisticated and
complex hierarchical society that was accustomed to mediating with central state
authorities and demonstrated considerable structural continuity. Revealing far more
about government ideology than about Gezira society, this British imagination masked
important continuities in Gezira values and structures. The resulting discrepancy
between social reality and government imagination created a situation in which the
11
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government failed to understand local motivations. This pattern of government
misunderstanding created space for local inhabitants to take advantage of economic
structures that were introduced by the government, using them in ways that challenged
the government's own ideological designs.
With a simplified imagination of Gezira society, the actual complexity of the social
structures of the region was largely ignored. Chapter two explores the ways in which
the government set about forming a simplified and fixed administrative hierarchy. The
government's imagination of past dislocation provided the freedom to impose the
structures the government wished, and sheikhs, omdas and Khuts were introduced,
replaced or abolished in order to create a 'rational' administrative structure. However, it
cannot be assumed that this administrative tinkering and Mamdani-esque centralisation
process was able to alter society fundamentally. This would accept too readily the
government's rhetoric of change and ignore the considerable continuities that the
government itself worked hard to achieve. Craving stability, the government made great
efforts to work through existing figures of authority, resulting in a continuity of
administrative personnel within identified patrilineages from the previous Turko-
Egyptian and Mahdist regimes and into the Condominium. It would also confer upon
the government a greater degree of authority than it actually had, and deny the effective
resilience of Gezira society to change. Communities had long experience of living
within central state structures, and saw the benefits of mediating through identified
gatekeeper figures. In fact, despite the official centralisation of authority that occurred
through the creation of administrative specialists, the flexibility and multiplicity of
authority structures including religious figures and informal councils of elders remained.
As shown in chapter three, this administrative flexibility continued throughout the first
two decades of the Condominium, as the government relied upon informal and dispersed
means of administration within communities. Largely concerned with judicial procedure
in the first years of British rule, and with no formal or supervised procedures of dispute
settlement away from government centres, officials were pragmatic in using whatever
figures of community authority were most effective. This flexibility and ambiguity of
12
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judicial settlements reflected the government's own uncertainty about the most suitable
form of judicial procedures, resulting in a central role for undefined 'custom' both
within the government-controlled merkaz; and within unsupervised community
settlements. It also provided for considerable continuity in the use of multiple figures of
authority, which together with the considerable choices of formal and informal means of
judicial settlement meant that flexibility remained the hallmark of early Condominium
authority structures.
Chapter four explores the response of Gezira communities to the increasing
regularisation of judicial administration from the 1920s. For although custom remained
central to the content of settlements, procedures were increasingly regularised and
Indirect Rule policies established a centralising tendency as traditional authority was
interpreted as residing in a single patriarchal figure. Despite the language of tradition
and devolution these policies actually brought the state ever closer to the population as
identified sheikhs became extensions of the merkaz; presiding over bureaucratised
courts, whose powers were sanctioned directly by the government. These developments
occurred at the same time as the Gezira Scheme was fully opened, and courts, first seen
by the government as bulwarks of tradition in a landscape of potentially corrupting
modernity, soon became viewed as potential vehicles for administering that modernity.
These emblems of the state were soon embraced by Gezira inhabitants who saw in them
enormous potential to settle disputes in a complex and mobile society, in which large
numbers of relationships were formed outside an individual's community. Although
these new structures were actively used for external dispute settlement, the lack of
internal community disputes brought to these courts suggests that other informal
mechanisms remained important. Despite attempts to centralise and formalise authority,
flexibility remained central to administrative procedure, and the institutions themselves
were adapted by both the communities and the state to fulfil a wide range of
contemporary needs.
Chapter five follows the government's promotion of both local government and
agricultural council structures: a development that illustrated the government's changing
13
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imagination of the past and the increasing reliance upon Sudanese bodies to provide
front line administrative services. Although bringing far fewer changes that the
government's rhetoric would suggest, councils were uniquely controlled by agricultural
inspectors and by executive officials; and conciliar devolution brought the state ever
closer to communities, in an aim of establishing modern universal bureaucratic
institutions of governance. This trend which encompassed the whole of northern Sudan
was particularly enhanced within the Gezira, as 'modem' governance was introduced to
keep pace with 'modem' economics. As a unique area of economic experimentation, so
the Gezira Scheme region became an arena of administrative experimentation which was
directed firstly by the needs of the Scheme, and then by the considered social needs of
its 'sophisticated' population.
In chapters six and seven, it is shown how the devolutionary experimentation came to
specifically benefit the lives of tenants within the Gezira Scheme at the expense of non-
tenants. All councils were controlled by tenants, despite the fact that they were not the
numerically dominant section of the population and developments such as devolving
duties of agricultural supervision, and the creation of village and block councils were
explicitly aimed to improve the lives of tenants. In this way, citizenship, in the sense of
having access to and control over structures of governance, was directly associated with
tenants status. Although the established patrilinages might have maintained the control
over the leading positions on councils, a gulf was increasing between an identifiable
tenant population and those who did not have tenancies, which was expressed not only
economically, but within the very structures of local government.
Not only did the Gezira experience an unprecedented expansion of local government
structures, but it also embraced those structures in ways very unlike other areas of
Sudan. Councils might have been government-controlled institutions. but mediation
with the government was viewed by the tenant-dominated bodies as beneficial,
providing access to government-controlled resources and as a way of controlling their
own experience of central governance. Fitting with pre-existing notions of multi-focal
authority, councils were popular among tenants in the Gezira. and seen as a means of
14
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potentially empowering the individual as well as the community. The tenant population
of the Gezira which dominated councils thus proved able to adapt to what were
considered by the government to be highly significant structural changes within the
institutions of governance. In fact, despite the government's emphasis upon change, and
its creation of intensely regulated elected bureaucratic institutions based upon new units
of administration, the continuities are striking. Community representatives had long
mediated with the state, and the formalisation of this process provided ever more
opportunities, while also channelling state intervention away from other parts of
community life.
The last three chapters of the thesis return to the familiar ground of econormc
relationships within the Scheme. Rather than being an exploitative and unwelcome
economic structure, chapter eight demonstrates that the Gezira Scheme was welcomed
by tenants who saw in it the potential to achieve culturally embedded aspirations. The
Gezira region was a hierarchical society, which highlighted control over labour as a
social ideal and looked down upon manual labour. Wealth and control over land were
the necessary prerequisites for attaining this cultural ideal and subsequent status, and it
was these things that the Scheme appeared to offer. The Scheme was therefore
embraced by those who became tenants. Despite rather vague initial British aims of
establishing a broadly egalitarian peasantry, tenants proved able to adapt the structures
of the Scheme to reflect the existing cultural values of Gezira society and in the process
place themselves at the apex of that society.
As explored in chapter nine, it was the distinction between tenants and labourers rather
than any differences within the tenant body that were culturally most significant, being
directly linked with notions of citizenship and rights. This was in part a reflection of the
growing economic divide between tenants and non-tenants, as profits from tenancies
rapidly increased throughout the I 940s. With the franchise based upon property
requirements that tenants automatically met, this economic dominance was also
translated into the political dominance of tenants within the Gezira. This dominance of
tenants was also articulated in nationalistic terms, as tenants proclaimed an Arab
15
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'ownership' of the Scheme and opposed any non-Arab infiltration of tenant holdings. A
concerted campaign in the late 1940s against non-Arab and non-Sudanese tenants
succeeded in weakening the position of the large communities of West African labourers
within the Scheme. Making a direct association between ethnic status, economic status
and citizenship, non-tenant populations and West African populations in particular were
socially and politically alienated, while tenant status automatically brought privileges.
Within chapter ten it is shown that these privileges became increasingly couched in
terms of rights, as from the mid 1940s tenants began to reassess their relationship with
state and scheme management. This relationship should not be seen as being based on
opposition. At no time did tenants question the premise of the Scheme, for the social
defects of the Scheme were passed onto those who were employed to labour on the
tenancies. Rather, tenants aimed to improve their individual circumstances and
consolidate their position as landlords through gaining greater control over the financial
management of the Scheme. Accustomed to mediating with agents of the state and the
Syndicate, tenants saw those structures of governance as a potential source of support
and consistently embraced institutional and governmental mechanisms as a way of
achieving their aims. This is demonstrated in the most dramatic event in the period; the
split of the tenant body between those who supported the established figures and
structures of mediation within the Tenants' Association, and those who supported the
more radical institution of the Tenants' Union.
It is easy to emphasise the differences between these two groups. The Tenants'
Association was made up of the existing administrative elite, barely unchanged
throughout the Condominium. The Tenants' Union used a language borrowed from the
labour movement, of exploitation and oppression. However, to take these differences at
surface value is to miss the essential similarities that defined the tenants' movement as
distinctive from any other social movement within the Condominium. Behind the
language, both bodies aimed to achieve exactly the same demands which revolved round
gaining greater profits from the Scheme, and both attempted to control their own
experience of government through institutional mediation. The aspirations of both
!h
Introduction
bodies were identical and reflected the long-term cultural values of Gezira society. It
was the differential ability to achieve this aspiration that proved the divisive element.
The different economic resources within the tenant body identified by O'Brien and
Niblock are thus key to understanding the unstable 'political' climate within the 1950s
Gezira Scheme, which continued to effect the post-independence landscape. However.
these differences were one of degree on the same spectrum, and were consistently
distinct from the aspirations of other groups in Sudan, whether urban labour or rural
'tribal' movements.
What was occurring within the Gezira Scheme was the development of a particular self-
defined elite. Although quite distinctive as it reacted to the unique conditions of the
Scheme, this development was part of a wider movement that saw the consolidation of
an Arab riverain northern Sudanese elite. This phenomenon has been well documented
within the literature upon Sudan. After independence, a body of northern Sudanese
scholars wrote a series of political histories celebrating the independence of Sudan."
The story of Sudanese history was presented as a nationalist struggle in which northern,
urban, educated and ethnically Arab parties dominated the movement to gain
independence for the entire nation and subsequently controlled the future shape of the
nation. More recent scholarship has identified this cultural narrowness as a fundamental
weakness, consequent on an uneven 'development' during the Condominium which
created dominant and periphery regions, identified along lines of religious, ethnicity and
economy. 3D The same point has been made by Douglas Johnson in direct reference to
the cultural, economic and political alienation of the southern regions of Sudan from the
north?'
This phenomenon of Arab riverain dominance existed pnor to Condominium rule.
Ahmad Sikainga describes the increase of non-Arab slave ownership among northern
29 See for example, Muddathir'Abd al-Rahirn Tayyib, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Studv
in Constitutional and Political Development 1899-1956 (Oxford. 1969); Mohammed Orner Beshir.
Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan (London, 197-J.).
~o Peter Woodward. Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism (London. 1979); Idem .. Sudan: The
Unstable State, 1898-1989 (Boulder. Colorado. 1990).
'I Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes ofSudan's Civil Wars (Oxford. 20(3). p. xviii.
17
Introduction
landowners under nineteenth century Turko-Egyptian rule, while Anders Bjerkelos
study of nineteenth century Shendi demonstrates the degree to which riverain Sudan
became the focus of colonial administrative and economic life.32 However, this
dominance of the centre increased disproportionately during the Condominium. as
social, administrative and economic developments focused upon the riverain region.
With the isolated example of Port Sudan, all agricultural and industrial investment was
made in the central riverain region. With the Three Towns acting as the economic and
political hub of the nation also based upon the Nile, the dominance of that region was
complete. Thus although this region was not politically homogenous, it was its shared
ethnic, religious and economic background that dominated the national agenda. Heather
Sharkey demonstrates this most forcefully in her study of culture and nationalism in
Condominium Sudan, in which she describes the "narrow social construction of the
Northern educated elite.,,33 Suggesting that those chosen to gain a secondary education
came predominantly from the northern riverain regions. Sharkey portrays the resulting
nationalist movement led by educated Sudanese as representing a narrow range of
interests that "define[d] the Sudanese nation in their own social image't."
The Gezira Scheme was at the centre of this narrow form of Nile valley elite
development. It established a vocally riverain Arab tenant population in a landscape in
which all those without tenancies held an ambiguous position in relation to the state.
And yet despite riverain-centred nationalism gaining support throughout the region,
tenants consistently saw themselves as distinct from other riverain elites including the
skilled working elites affiliated to the Sudan Workers' Trades Union Federation
(SWTUF), and the educated effendiya. Viewing themselves as a new class of landlords,
tenants straddled the rural and the urban, the traditional and the modern in ways that
provided them with a unique self-image. This in turn allowed tenants to react towards
the state in quite distinct ways. By embracing rather than opposing the Scheme and the
'e Ahmed Alawad Sikainga, Slaves into Workers: Emancipation and Labor in Colonial Sudan, (.\U\IIO,
Texas, 1996). Anders Bjerkelo, Prelude to the Mahdivva: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region.
1821-1885 (Cambridge. 1989).
:n Heather Sharkey. Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
(Berkeley, 200~), p. ~9 .
.'4 Ihid., pp. 8, 19.
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state, and becoming fully involved in the institutions that mediated with those structures,
tenants were able to defend their specific economic interests while retaining their pre-
existing cultural values. By demonstrating flexibility, and seizing opportunity. tenants
moulded the structures imposed upon them by the state to ways that proved greatly
advantageous. Colonial dominance, even in the Gezira Scheme with its unique
structures and high degree of supervision was thus never as complete as has been
considered.
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1IMAGINING THE PAST
"To have knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it", so
Said summed up the importance of knowledge of 'the subject' by colonial powers.'
The European search for 'truth', together with the practical necessity of ruling an
unknown and potentially subversive population, motivated colonial governments to
try and understand the culture, social structure and condition of the society in which
they found themselves. In doing so, Said argues, the coloniser established a
particularised and Euro-centric vision of the colony that tells the observer more about
the colonial state than about the society of study." Bendedict Anderson and Timothy
Mitchell have both explored the ways in which colonial governments attempted to
gain this knowledge of 'the other'. Labelling and categorisation were powerful ways
of mapping the subject, making it "picture-like and legible, rendered available to
political and economic calculation." 3 Censuses, maps, and at a later date,
ethnographies were further tools by which colonial powers dominated and reordered
society, making it intelligible to Western thought. In this way, the colonial subject
became objectified as a set (and intrinsically fixed) museum piece in a European
construction of exotic society. In the Sudan, a well documented past going back to
the seventeenth century, was understood as a succession of clearly defined regime
changes. It was these distinctive regimes (and the assumed social dislocation that
coincided with the regime changes) that became the focus of much Condominium
1 Edward Said. Orientalism (London. 1978). p. .~2.
1 Ibid ~1~ I '. p. - _. . . .
'Timothy Mitchell. Colonising Egypt (Cambridge. 19S5). P .:n: Benedict Anderson. Imagined
Coml1I1I1l'ities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationnlisin {London. 144 I I. Chapter ten
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study, and consequently of Condominium understanding of northern Sudanese
society.
Colonial understanding of the subject was not just an intellectual conceit. it was
central to the policies that were implemented and the experience of colonial
governance. It affected every level of administration, influencing the government' s
identification of viable and 'suitable' local leaders, and conversely the undesirable
elements of social organisation. However, knowledge is subjective; it is formed
through the framing of certain questions, through the context of one' s background.
and the vagaries of fashion. As Donald Reid has demonstrated, no colony was ever
really a blank page to an official, "the question is which preconceived filters one
used and how these clarified or distorted encounters with ... realities". -+ Seen as
objects of study, commentators categorised 'the other' in ways that supported
government policy. This too frequently resulted in a simplistic and static vision of
African society based on "public perceptions of the indigenous population which
were based on a set of misguided assumptions and foregone conclusions'L' As Sara
Berry has stated:
For much of the colonial era, many Europeans assumed that
African communities consisted of mutually exclusive
sociocultural units - tribes, villages, kin groups - whose customs
and structures had not changed very much over time."
This conception of African culture allowed commentators to make sweeping
generalisations and conclusions, based upon a conception of society that existed in
bounded patriarchal units with clearly identifiable leaders that suited the needs of
colonial powers.
Reflecting contemporary concerns and social ideals, the interpretations of Sudan' s
pre-Condominium past were based upon a series of official narratives, each of which
failed to understand the structural complexities of Sudanese societies and consequent
motivations of the population. Immediately after the establishment of the
.t Donald M. Reid, "Cromer and the Classics: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Green-Roman Past 111
Modern Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies, _~2. 1. (1996) pp. 1-29. at p.I.
5 Atkins, The Moon is Dead.'. p. 3.
6 Berry, No Condition is Permanent. p. 27.
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Condominium, criticism of nineteenth century regimes was used to justify Anglo-
Egyptian rule. By the 1920s Indirect Rule policies dominated government analysis.
developing a tribal-centred understanding of the past, while a rejection of this
tradition from the 1930s led the way for a feudal approach to past social relationships.
The vision of social organisation may have been uncertain, but all focussed upon the
differences between past regimes, emphasising dislocation and change rather than
continuity. Although British officials within the Gezira had a more sympathetic
understanding of the region, local voices were unable to change that central dominant
VISIon. Colonial interpretations had the effect of fixing Sudanese history in the
government's mindset and this vision of past disruption in the Gezira region was
particularly useful in establishing the notion of a blank sheet upon which pragmatic
administrative and economic policies might be imposed. However, by seeing
uncertain and changing Condominium imaginations as revealing far more about
Condominium ideology than about Gezira society, many of the accepted 'truths'
about the region; for instance that it was depopulated at the end of the nineteenth
century and that the Gezira Scheme was an unwelcome and oppressive institution,
can be reassessed.
The Creation of an Enemy
Sudan had been highly visible within the British public imagination throughout the
nineteenth century. It was the backdrop against which a series of Europeans had
exerted their dominance of the exotic, through highly publicised explorations along
the Nile. 7 In contrast with the light and civilisation that these explorations were
deemed to represent, Sudan stood as a symbol of barbarity and Eastern despotism.
being famous as a centre of the slave trade so actively opposed by British interest
groups. 8 However, it was the fall of Khartoum in 1885, and the death of General
7 See for example John Petherick, Travels in Central Africa. and Ex~lorations of the. ~\estenl Nile
Tributaries (Famborough. 1968); Samuel Baker, lsmailta: a Narrative of the Expedition to Central
Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade. Organized by ls"!ail. Khedive oj Egypt (London. 1~74 L
John H. Spcke, Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the NiIe. (Edinburgh. 18(3)". i, . •
8 Gabriel Warburg discusses the pressures of British anti-slayCf): Interest .groups on B~.llIsh pOIH':;' ..
makers in "Some Social and Economic Aspects of Turko-Egyptian Rule In the Sudan . Belietin don
avda bir cikar. 53. (19~9). pp. 769-795 at p. 770.
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Charles Gordon, that propelled Sudan to the centre of British national consciousness.
His demise at the hands of the Mahdis 'dervish' forces, became an emblem of
tragedy and an outpouring of hagiographic literature emerged to mythologize Gordon
and push Sudan's 'suffering' to the forefront of British imperial consciousness.f
This dramatic style became the template for all observations upon the Mahdia, which
as Norman Daniel has stated "was presented - or presented itself - in a series of
particularly vivid scenes from melodrama.v'"
Despite Gordon's death, the immediate reaction to the Mahdist uprising in Britain
was sympathy towards a nation throwing off "the odious yoke of the Egyptian
Government". 11 William Gladstone, in his awkwardly anti-imperialist stance
believed the Sudanese were a people "struggling rightly to be free", while Henry
Russell described "flagrant instances of corruption, incapacity, oppression, and
plunder" of the Turko-Egyptian regime as justified motivation for the revolt. 12
However, British sympathy for the underdog could not survive the latter making the
transition to government. As the Mahdist regime under the rule of the Mahdi' s
successor, the Khalifa Abdullahi, became established from 1885, earlier sympathetic
interpretations "receded as notions of despotism, of fanaticism and of cruelty took its
place".':'
Reginald Wingate, as director of military intelligence of the Egyptian Army during
the period leading up to the Anglo-Egyptian invasion of Sudan, was the central
figure in a propagandist portrayal of the Mahdist regime and painted a picture of a
tyrannical Mahdist government conducting "a reign of terror" in a ruthless mission to
maintain power. 14 Wingate also compiled and translated the works of two well-
9 See for example Gerald Graham. Last words with Gordon (London 1887); Henry William Gordon.
Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon from its Beginning to its End (London. 1886): Archibald
Forbes, Chinese Gordon: a Succinct Record ofhis Life (London. 188'+).
10 N. Daniel, Islam. Europe and Empire (Edinburgh. 1966). p. .+ 16.
II J. Morley. First Viscount, speaking in the Commons. February 1885. quoted in: Daniel. Islam,
Europe and Empire. p. '+21. " .
12 Gladstone. speaking in the Commons. May 1884. quoted in Daniel, Islam. Europe and Empire. p.
.+n; Henry Russell. The Ruin of the Soudan: Cause. Effect and Remedv: a Resume oiEvents. 1883-
1891 (London. 1892).pp. 1'+-15.
13 Daniel, Islam, Europe and Empire. p. '+2'+.
14 Francis Reginald Wingate. Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan: Being all :\CCl.JliIlt ill the Rise ~lfId
Progress ofMahdiism. and ofSubsequent Events in the Sudan to the Present Tune (London. IX41). pp.
227-228.
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known European prisoners of the Mahdi, Father Joseph Ohrwalder. and Rudolph
Slatin Pasha. IS Bringing together the romance and trials of adventure travel in exotic
lands with a frisson of brutality and drama, the Mahdist leaders were portrayed in
these writings as randomly brutal, despotic and hypocritical. Slatiri' s testimony was
used as the basis of an official report in 1895, which concluded; "immorality of every
description prevails throughout the Soudan".'? Depopulation was frequently used as
symbol of this degeneration, and Slatin's statement that "at least seventy-five per
cent of the total population has succumbed to war, famine, and disease, while of the
remainder the majority are little better than slaves", became accepted as fact. 17
While the Mahdia was the immediate concern of the late nineteenth century
European agenda, there was also significant focus upon the Turko-Egyptian regime
as providing the historical context to the Mahdia. In 1821, Ismail Pasha, on behalf of
his father, Muhammed Ali, Khedive of Egypt, invaded Sudan and established a
colonial government that was to last until the fall of Khartoum in 1885.18 Slatin, in
his condemnation of the Mahdia, portrayed the Turkia as a civilising experiment,
subsequently destroyed by the Mahdia:
Nor can I recall any other instance in modem times of a country
in which a semblance of civilisation has existed for upwards of
half a century, falling back into a state so little removed from
absolute barbarism. 19
More moderate assessments portrayed the regime as progressive and civilising in
intent - bringing centralised justice, education and a bureaucratic administration -
but as fundamentally flawed in practice.i" Inefficiency, corruption and excessive
taxation were seen as the hallmarks of the Turkia; a regime viewed as a failed
Oriental imitation of European systems of bureaucratic government, and condemned
all the more for its failure to match those systems.
15 Joseph Ohrwalder, Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's camp. 1882-18<)::'. (ed., .F.R. W~ngate.
London, 1892); Rudolph Slatin. Fire and Sword in the Sudan: a Personal Narrative of Fighting and
Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895. (trans .. F.R. Win~ate. Lo.ndon. 1896). . . . .
16 Sudan Government. Reports on the Finances, Administration. and Condition oj the Sudan \SGR\
1895. pp. -L 9.
11 Slatin, Fire and Su·ord. p. 62.l
IK For a narrative history of the Turko-Egyptian regime, see Richard Hill. Egvpt in the Sudan. /,,::'0-
1881 (London. 1959).
19 Slatin. Fire and Sword. p. 622.
~() Russell, The Ruin of the Soudan, pp. 4-1:'
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The Turkia was known by the Condominium government as "the old government".
and officials were clearly aware of the close parallels between the two colonial
regimes. However, despite acknowledging the structural similarities, it was
portrayed as but a faint image of a true modern European government, for although
in Winston Churchill's words, "it preserved the magnificent appearance of Imperial
dominium", including representatives of other nations, international trade and
bureaucratic reporting, "yet all was a hateful sham". 21 Colonialism was at once
defended as a positive marker of social progress, while being marked as the preserve
of European powers. The perceived result of Ottoman misrule in Sudan was viewed
to be social and economic dislocation, highlighted by, among others, Samuel Baker,
who in the 1860s described the areas around Khartoum as deserted and depopulated:
The rich soil on the banks of the river, which had a few years
since been highly cultivated, had been abandoned... Villages
once crowded had entirely disappeared; the population was gone.
Irrigation had ceased. The night, formally discordant with
creaking of countless waterwheels, was now silent as death.
There was not a dog to howl for a lost master. Industry had
vanished; oppression had driven the inhabitants from the soil. 22
A Lost Kingdom
While the focus of assessment at the end of the nineteenth century remained on the
immediate past and its destructive nature, there was also an attempt to describe the
indigenous tradition of Sudan prior to nineteenth century colonial rule. Educated in
the classical tradition, European commentators sought to root a culture in past
civilisations as a way to understand the present. Such a background provided
Sudanese culture with status and pedigree, and emphasised the destructive qualities
of the more recent regimes. The Fung kingdom based on the city of Sennar, had
2\ Winston Churchill, The River H'i/r: All Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (London.
1900). pp. :21-:2:2,
2:! I '1' .,., ., ~Baker. smat lao pp. ----. ,
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attracted European visitors from the seventeenth century who wrote accounts of an
exotic kingdom. These visitors had held an uncertain position within the kingdom: at
times courted with favour, at others held virtual prisoner, on permanent display and
profoundly isolated from all that was familiar. As a result, their accounts of their
experiences were ambiguous and frequently contradictory.
Poncet visited the Fung kingdom of Sennar in the 1690s, becoming the King' s
physician, and wrote the most enduring image of the kingdom at its supposed height.
He emphasised a central state presided over by a divine and powerful monarch.
Although his original manuscript contains much that suggests this was far from an
extravagantly wealthy or grand city, describing the palace as "nothing but a confused
heap of buildings", later interpretations of his work emphasised the accounts of
riches, and elaborate rituals.i'' By the 1770s, when James Bruce visited Sennar, his
observations compared unfavourably with the image he had built up from Poncet's
writings. He concluded "Sennaar was in ruin and was not like it once was. ,,24 These
and similar travelogues were the main sources for late nineteenth and early twentieth
century writers, and created a perception of decline that became the template for
European understanding of the past. If the accounts of travellers were themselves
contradictory, then early Condominium officials drew from them selectively to paint
a picture of a glorious past that had all the hallmarks of a powerful centralised state -
wealth, divine monarchs, and an army - which underwent a process of decline until
there was no longer any visible evidence of this past. This image was all the more
powerful for having only the slightest evidence. The idea of an African state within
the harsh plains of Sudan was intoxicating; it flourished in a European imagination
that throughout the nineteenth century had fed on the tales of the Arabian Nights and
the Arthurian legend.
Russell was the first European observer to fit this early Sudanese history into a
chronology that led directly to the Turkia and Mahdia. He set out a vision that was
to become the foundation for Condominium attitudes towards the past. He described
an influx of Arab tribes under the guidance of a single chief, Beni Ommia, migrating
~.1 Charles Jacques Poncet. A VoyaRe to Aethiopia, Made in the Years /698, /699, and 1700 (London.
1709). pp. 19-23.
~.j James Bruce. Travels to Discover the Source ofthe Nile (Edinburgh, 17(0). p. ·B6.
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into Sudan during the seventh and eighth centuries and intermarrying with the
original "negro tribes of Fung and Hamagh".25 An Arab identity was thus imprinted
upon the Fung kingdom. Sennar, as the seat of the Fung king, was the focus of
Russell's work; "a centre of attraction for men of learning", with a "worldwide
reputation". 26 The seventeenth century kingdom epitomised the golden age of
Central Northern Sudan, and stood as an era in which order prevailed, and the
structures of an indigenous centralised state (the most attractive, because familiar,
form of governance to British colonial officials) flourished. However, the rot of
decline was already set: "Strange to say, however, this exceptional prosperity seems
to have been doomed to almost immediate collapse.,,27 This collapse was attributed
in part to the inherent flaws within that indigenous kingdom, and in part to the
degenerative tendencies of the subsequent centralised oriental regimes.
Condominium Assessment
This broad outline of events was to remain at the centre of Condominium
interpretations of the past, by which the government was able to present itself as the
salve to the condition of decline. In this way the portrayal of the past lent legitimacy
to the latest colonial encounter. Once in power, British officials attempted to
understand the past within the present. This was a task that Cromer (albeit with
unintentional irony) showed was full of difficulties for the administrator with
preconceived opinions:
No casual visitor can hope to obtain much real insight into the
true state of native opinion. Divergence of religion and habits of
thought; in my own case ignorance of the vernacular language;
the reticence of Orientals when speaking to anyone in authority;
their tendency to agree with anyone to whom they may be talking
the want of mental symmetry and precision which is the chief
distinguishing feature between the illogical and picturesque East
25 Russell. The Ruin of the Soudan, pp, 2-3,
26 Ibid ~ 10I ., pp .. - ,
27 Ihid., p. 3.
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and the logical West... and the fact that the European and the
Oriental, reasoning from the same premises will often arrive at
diametrically opposite conclusions - all these circumstances place
the European at a great disadvantage when he attempts to gauge
Eastern opinion.i"
The attempt to know 'the other' through this haze of potential misconception resulted
in broad categorisation with little useful content, particularly before the
Condominium began when sources were limited. Wingate in 1892 divided the Sudan
into five ethnographic classes based on ethnicity and economy, from the 'great camel
owning Arab tribes' to 'cattle owning negroes' .29 However, the present was always
seen in terms of the past, and the theme of decline was constantly repeated. The first
examinations of the country under Condominium rule detailed ruined towns,
abandoned saqias [irrigation devices along the Nile], and huge declines in population.
The 1903 Governor-General's annual report estimated that the population of Gezira
province prior to the Mahdia was 550,000, which was reduced over the sixteen years
of Mahdist rule to only 150,000, figures that were in line with the evaluation of
population decline throughout the country'" As Daly suggests, such exaggerated
statements of population decline "went unchallenged because they confirmed the
worst", and thus legitimated the new administration. 31 Evidence of Sudanese
prosperity did not fit into the government's image of a war-tom country redeemed by
British rule. William Garstin's description of Wad Medani as "the most prosperous
town in the whole of Sudan", with many areas in the region growing good crops, was
therefore a rare exception to the general vision of g100m. 32 Instead, the theory of
decline and dislocation was propagated at the highest levels, with Wingate as
Governor-General from 1900 to 1916 justifying the official statistics demonstrating
drastic population decline:
That the loss of life ... should represent upwards of 75 per cent of
the total population seems almost incredible, but, from my own
personal experience, I can vouch for the comparative correctness
2H Earl of Cromer. Modem Egypt (London. 1911). p. 6.
29 F. R. Wingate. The Sudan Past and Present (Woolwich. 1892 l. p. 2.
30 SGR 1903. p. 3.
.'1 Martin Daly. Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Stu/an /898-/93..J (Cambridge. 1(86). p. 19.
.'2 Ibid "1 1 1It .. pp .... --_.
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of these figures. One has only to travel through the country to
realize the terrible ravages of Dervish misrule, of which there is
such painful evidence in the wholesale destruction of towns and
villages, and the enormous tracts of once cultivated land now
either a barren wilderness or overgrown with thorns and high
grass. 33
The Gezira plain itself was popularly seen as an empty wasteland. In 1898, Albert
Gleichen concluded that the Gezira was "thinly peopled and little cultivated", a fact
directly attributed to the previous Turkia and Mahdist regimes:
It could be made to produce three times what it does at present,
but they themselves say that the old Egyptian rule totally
suppressed all habits of industry.34
The idea of the Gezira being abandoned was a powerful image. Previously
understood to be the "granary of the Sudan", the Gezira was now described as "a
sterile waste.,,35 For the majority of the year the Gezira plain was a dry, utterly flat
and featureless plain stretching as far as one could see in any direction. It was
understandable that this landscape aroused dismay in the European observer. It
neither offered the obvious fertility of green Europe, nor the picturesque harshness of
the desert; this was emptiness at its most dismal.
Tribal Beginnings
By the early twentieth century, the idea was firmly established in British thought that
a succession of centralised regimes had existed within northern Sudan, all of which
were associated with eventual decline and disaster. Although the focus remained on
the central state, the understanding of local society was centred on the patriarchal
leadership of organised units of population. It was clearly understood that below the
level of the state, there were hierarchies of power, with distinct leaders and subjects .
.1\ SGR 1903, p. 4.
.1-1 Alhcrt Gleichcn, Handbook (!f the Sudan (London. 1898). p. 91.
.15 Ihid., p. 90.
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George Hoskins, travelling up the Nile north of Khartoum in the nineteenth century
had described his meeting with "Sheakh Sayd, the chief of the Adabes... [whose]
family have held this title from time immemorial: the stamp of nobility is marked
upon his high forehead; and there is an expression of dignified mildness in his
countenance which commands respect". 36 This idea of innate noble and autocratic
Arab leadership being contained within specific families or lineages continued into
the twentieth century. The identification of such seemingly bounded political units
as 'tribes' was also to become highly influential.
The terminology of 'tribes' had become a favoured description of African society,
promulgated by nineteenth century Europeans struggling to understand the fluid and
unfamiliar societies in which they found themselves. Originating in the descriptions
of pre-Christian Europe, it brought with it connotations of evolutionary delay, and
was vague enough to mask the real lack of European knowledge of African social
structure in their infinite variations. By 1900, 'tribe' was an important (if
dangerously undefined) ideology of colonial administration, and John Maxwell,
Governor of Khartoum wrote to Wingate about the importance of province
boundaries being "left vague until we survey it piecemeal and know tribal
boundaries". 37 Recent works have exposed the weaknesses of the fixed tribal
categories favoured by colonial administrations:
Africa was not... composed of tribes or ethnic groups with distinct
boundaries. On the contrary, the dominant characteristics of pre-
colonial 'societies' ... were mobility, over-lapping networks, multiple
group membership and the flexible, context-dependent drawing of
b dari 38oun anes.
Crude though it was, the ideology of tribes became an increasingly important
tool of social analysis and administrative understanding and the Compendium
of 1905 had devoted an entire section to the detailed labelling of Sudanese
'b I ~9tn a groups.'
36 George Hoskins. Travels in Ethiopia. above the second cataract of the Nile (London. 1835). pr· ..+s-
6.
37 Sudan Archive Durham. (SAD) 270/1/"+2-"+3, Maxwell, Governor Khartoum Province to Wingate.
Governor General. 10 January 1900 .
.18 Carole Lentz. "'Tribalism' and Ethnicity in Africa; a Review of Four Decades of Anglophone
Research", Cahiers des Sciences Humaines. 31 (t 995). pp. 303-2S at p. 3 t9.
.19 Albert Gleichen (ed.v). Compendium (~f the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (London, 1905).
30
Imagining the Past
Early Condominium reliance on devolution to identified patriarchal leaders was
synthesised with the existing grandiose vision of the central state of the Fung
kingdom within H.C. Jackson's monograph on the Fung in 1912. Relying on Poncet
for details regarding the richness of the kingdom at its supposed height, Jackson
detailed an Arabian Nights fantasy of a strong, central and wealthy monarchy, and
juxtaposed images of opulence and brutal oppression, hospitality and treachery. But
onto this fantastic tapestry was woven a more prosaic tale of administrative
organisation. With an emphasis upon co-opting existing 'tribal' structures, he made
clear parallels with contemporary Condominium rule:
Like the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan of to-day, it was a
conglomeration of many different tribes, very loosely bound
together by self-interest, under the suzerainty of a more powerful
people. There was, however, this difference: whereas to-day the
Government exercises definite tangible authority over the people
under its charge, the influence of the old Kings was of a rather
shadowy and undefined character, limited to the imposition of a
more or less nominal tribute on the tribes within the boundaries of
their kingdom.t"
Although centralised under a monarchy, the administration of Fung society was
described by Jackson as being left in the hands of tribal chieftains, or vassal chiefs,
who had "considerable latitude in the choice of methods they might employ for the
administration of their respective districts"." By these means Jackson attributed the
success of the Fung kingdom in ruling a large swathe of Sudan, to a policy of
devolution by which "they made a point of ruling by means of the local chieftain
instead of introducing some carpet-bagger from Sennar";" This 'tradition' appeared
to 'prove' the historical existence of political and economic tribal units throughout
central northern Sudan, and thus was used to justify Condominium practices of
decentralised rule.
.fO H.C. Jackson, Tooth of Fire: Being Some Account of the Ancient Kingdom of Sennar (Oxford. 1(12),
~. 2.
I Ibid., p. 89 .
.j~ Ibid., p. 89.
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The Condominium government's increasing focus on simplistic tribal forms was
encouraged by the nature of rural society in northern Sudan. Away from the Nile,
communities remained largely nomadic, organised in close-knit patriarchal clan
lineages that identified themselves socially, politically and economically by tribal
names.f Such communities became understood as the norm and any deviation from
this ideal type was viewed as an aberration. Greater confusion was created by the
universal use of tribal names throughout Sudan, including settled riverain areas.
Sudanese self-identification patterns included lineages and sections within larger
'tribal' units, which were presented as the basis of social organisation structure. Just
as the British found the categorisation of people useful, so did the populations
themselves, and the 'creation' of common histories and genealogies was an
established technique of establishing distinct groups against 'the other'. Thus
Herbert St. George Peacock who was in charge of the land surveys in Gezira from
1906-1910 was able to identify twelve different 'tribal' groups within the single
district of Messellcmia.f" As Carole Lentz has stated, "precolonial 'ethnic'
ideologies of a common ancestor and history were also invented and propagated by
cultural specialists to establish new 'we' groups"." British officials all too often
took this self-evaluation at face value, describing an 'ideal form' of tribal
organisation as being social reality rather than observing actual social interaction. In
reality an "asserted ideology" was a way in which a community was able to maintain
a value system and create a set of (sometimes only nominal) relationships and
obligations that formed an inclusive group." The failure of image and reality to
match, led to a running problematic throughout colonial discussions on tribal
organisation. The terminology of lineage and tribe was too blunt an instrument to
define the complexity and variations of African social reality, but despite this, it
remained the key analytical tool for British observers when describing 'traditional'
African society.
43 Harold MacMichael, A History of the Arabs in the Sudan: and some account of the people who
preceded them and of the tribes inhabiting Darfur (Cambridge, 1922). . . .
44 Herbert St. George Peacock, A Report of the Land Settlement o] the Gezira (Mesellemia District)
(London, 191), p. )6.
45 Lentz. '''Tribalism' and Ethnicity in Africa", p. ) 19.
46 Phillip Carl Salzman, "Ideology and Change in Middle Eastern Tribal Societies" . .vlan, 1.~ ( 1975)
pp. 618-6~7,atp. 625.
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With the emphasis upon tribes, commentators found it difficult to understand society
in other ways. Nonetheless those officials living and working in settled riverain
northern Sudan on occasions provided a more subtle study of society, providing clues
as to the distinctiveness of riverain society. The result was an analysis of the Gezira
as being a hierarchical village-based society, divided by differential access to
resources between those who controlled access to land, and those who were
dependent on gaining access to this land. Gleichen, in 1898 identified two groups of
noblemen and commoners; "upper classes [who] spend a life of indolence and
dissipation", and "abject slave[s], whether of a private master, or of a despotic
king". 47 J.G. Matthew writing in 1909 agreed that there was a clear distinction
between those who owned land, and those who did not, and described the
relationship between these two economic groups, as being articulated through a
system of rents and tenancies. This according to Matthew resulted in "a system of
hereditary landlords owning large areas which they let to the cultivating classes; the
small freeholder being almost non-existent.r" Peacock reinforced this vision of
private landownership through his work on the land settlements of the Gezira, which
in contrast with predominantly pastoral regions, concluded that private and unequal
landownership had formed the basis of the past Gezira economy;
[P]rivate ownership in the Gezira had been recognized in the past
as long as living man remembered. It had been recognized by
decisions in land cases and by previous land commissions during
the present government and it had been recognized during the
Mahdia, during the Turkia and during the period of the Fungs.
There are old documents in existence proving grants by the Fung
Sultans to individuals and documents of title have passed between
the parties from ancient times until the present day. Land has
been cleared and cultivated by individuals, land has been sold and
mortgaged until the present time and a determination not to
recognize private ownership would have been not only unjust but
1· · I d 49a po mea anger.
017 Gleichen, Handbook of the Sudan, pp. 91-92.
48 J.G. Matthew. "Land Customs and Tenure in Singa District", Sudan Notes and Records. -L ( 1921 )
pp. 1-19, at p. I, (although not published until 1921, the author states that the paper was first wntten
in 19(9).
019 Peacock. A report of the Land Settlement ofthe Gezira, p. 36.
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Peacock had to defend his analysis of private ownership by untangling the multiple
identity markers used by individuals, for although he acknowledged that land "may
be spoken of as [tribal]... in fact the individual owner is known and resents
encroachment by a member of the tribe as much as by any outsider.v'"
For Matthew, private landownership, and the economic imbalances that it created,
was the base for all pre-Condominium riverain socio-political organisation. He saw
villages as dominated by landowners; either the sheikh of the village himself, or
more commonly by a large estate owner. The latter would manage his land through
the appointment of a village sheikh who brought people to settle the land and
collected their rents; "The sheikh is in fact the land or estate agent, and by his means
the cultivation of the land is assured, and consequently the landlord's rent roll
increased.?" Land title was achieved through grants by the Fung Sultans to either
vassal chiefs of 'tribes' , or holy men building religious estates. Title to land was also
achieved under the Turkia, when land use and ownership was encouraged in an
attempt to increase tax revenues. However, Matthew noted a distinct preference by
those he spoke to, of titles granted under the Fung, which were perceived as holding
greater legitimacy than more recent claims.Y According to his work, it would seem
that the Sudanese population in sedentary northern Sudan had a particular preference
for the manner in which they represented their claims. Historical continuity of
access to land and the direct link with the Fung monarchy that landownership
represented were powerful symbols of authority and legitimacy.
The Gezira might have been seen as an aberration, but for the first twenty years of
the Condominium it was an aberration that was able to be contained in a government
policy that provided considerable leeway for regional difference. By the 1920s, in
the face of nationalist pressures in both Egypt and Sudan, and increasing fears of the
'modernised' educated sectors of colonial society, increasing emphasis was put on
the 'tribe' as a moderating and traditional institution. In a more considered way than
before, the tribe became the prism through which both the present and the past were
explored. Under Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General 1917 to 192'+. tribes were
50 Ibid., p. 50. ,. " ...
51 Matthew, "Land Customs and Tenure In Singa DIstrict, p. I,
s' id ")'-Ibl .. p.~.
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officially incorporated into the administration with the 1922 Power of Nomad
Sheikhs Ordinance providing legislation for 'tribal' leaders to wield defined powers.
However, it was under the governorship of Sir John Maffey, between 1927 and 193.+,
that the highly fashionable policies of Indirect Rule were formerly adopted within
Sudan, by which tribal structures were highlighted as the administrative base of
Condominium rule. Presenting less of a distinct change in policy than some have
argued, this new rhetorical direction did nonetheless become highly influential within
the Sudan Political Service.
Harold MacMichael was at the forefront of the tribal presentation of Sudanese
society, and his 1922 History of the Arabs in the Sudan, became one of the key texts
for British officials during the Condominium. MacMichael analysed the history of
the Sudan through population movements from the Arabian peninsular and the
establishment of working societies based on descent lines originating in these
movements. 53 Unlike many other areas of Africa, the tribal distinctions within
northern Sudan were not considered to be based upon ethnic differences; all of
MacMichael's subjects were considered 'Arab', the implication being that there was
a more fundamental distinction between Arab and non-Arab populations. However,
despite this perceived tie of ethnicity, there also existed an undercurrent of debate
that saw hierarchies of 'Arabness', in which the noble nomad was portrayed as the
'true' Arab, "their tribal system unimpaired from generation to generation", while
settled town and village dwellers were "idle, dissolute, drunken [and] demoralised".5-t
The supposed aberration of the lack of tribes in the settled Gezira could thus be as
seen as due to the population being 'failed' Arabs.
Highly influential, MacMichael's work affected the understanding of the indigenous
Sudanese society prior to colonial rule. In the early 1920s a proposed (but never
completed) provincial handbook collated a history of the Blue Nile Province, which
emphasised the idea of the tribe as the central political structure of the past:
It is easy to exaggerate the degree of organisation and civilisation
of the Fung Kingdom. Not withstanding the statements of
53 MacMichael. A History a/the Arabs ill the Sudan. pp. 195-196.
'I Ibid., p. '2.n. See also Wingate The Sudan Past and Present, p. 2.
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authors of enormous sums paid in gold as tribute to the Fung
kings, it is more probable that they obtained a nominal tribute
from those provinces whose de facto rulers were prepared to pay
a reasonable sum for a free hand in their own affairs, protection
from interference from outside, and support in case of need
against internal troubles.55
The emphasis had slightly but significantly changed. Rather than celebrating past
monarchical and city-state structures, the Fung kingdom was now looked to as an era
in which "tribal organisation was highly developed and universal'V"
The idea of dislocation and disruption since the Fung period remained a powerful
impulse. Just as the Turko-Egyptian and Mahdist regimes had been deemed
responsible for the economic devastation of Sudan, so too were they blamed for the
undermining of tribes in the Gezira, through large scale artificial tribal movements.
As the province handbook stated; "The disintegration of the Gezira tribes was part of
the policy of the Khalifa", conducted by drafting tribesmen into the army and
transplanting large numbers of Gezira inhabitants into the Khalifa's capital,
Omdurman, while members of his own tribe were given the resulting land.57 The
handbook concluded:
To these causes it is to be attributed the tribal disorganisation
which we find in the Gezira to this day, and which distinguishes it
from any other part of the Sudan except perhaps the southern end
of Kassala province.58
In a climate of post First World War doubt, the tradition of the colonial administrator
as amateur historian and anthropologist begun by Jackson and MacMichaeL
flourished within an environment that idealised a reinvented past. With 'the tribe' as
a framework to understand African social organisation, no matter how diverse, and
surrounded by populations eager to share genealogical stories that fitted into that
broad all-encompassing model, multiple analyses of Sudanese society in the form of
'i'i National Record Office Khartoum (NRO). 1Civsec 57/31/12. "Compilation matter for Blue \ile
I II 1nY)')"Province (BNP) Handbook, vo. . ':1 __ . • _ .
'i6 Sudan Government, Memorandum - General :\dministrati\'e Policy, (Khartoum. (l)26) (fIrst printed
in 1922). ."
57 NRO 1Civscc 57/31/12. "Compilation matter tor BNP Handbook. vol.. 11 .
58 Ibid..
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tribal and genealogical surveys were produced. In the early 1930s, administrators
within the Gezira picked up on these trends, and despite reservations, attempted to
apply them to the sedentary 'tribes' of the regionr"
However, although using the accepted tribal terminology, the social surveys of the
Gezira did not describe the ideal tribal forms outlined by MacMichael. In studying
the sedentary populations of the Gezira, it was found that within the same villazeb
people would identify themselves as belonging to several different tribes. Despite
the ideological self-identification of the Gezira population with the structures of
lineages, sections and tribes, it was in practice an unwieldy terminology of limited
use. Tribes were not a primary identifier within a society as fractured as the Gezira,
and this fact was recognised by commentators including Arthur Huddleston, the
province Governor, who described the Gezira as being "very mixed tribally", with
many areas unable to be categorised as part of any tribe.?" Thus although unable to
shake off the language of tribes, the Gezira surveys in fact provided a more subtle
picture of social organisation, wedged uncomfortably within the established idiom.
In this picture, the village loomed large as a unit of both genealogical and social
organisation, and the holy man gained a pre-eminence as the founder of both village
and tariqa.
According to Henderson, Assistant District Commissioner (ADC) Wad Medani, the
founder of the Arakiin tribe was Amud wad Ahmed, who arrived from the Arabian
peninsula in the early l500s. He established a 'university' and 15 khalwas [religious
schools] within the Gezira, and became a powerful figure both in the temporal and
secular worlds. The direct descendants of Amud succeeded to his position of
religious and secular leadership, while other male lines of the family established
separate sections and lineages through their autonomous foundation of new villages.
yet remained tied together through the bonds of blood and ancestry." It was clumsy,
59 See NRO lCivsec 66/2/18. K.D.D. Henderson "Arakiin Tribe", 1930; NRO BNP In 112'+2. W.F.
Crawford "Note on the Khawalda", 28 December 1930; NRO BNP 1/301222, R.Y. Bardsley "NOles
on the Halawin", n.d. (1930s); G.B. Tame "Legends of the Halawin of Blue Nile Province" Sudan
Notes and Records, 17, (193'+), pp. 201-216: J.A. Reid (ed.,) Notes on the Tribes and Prominent
Families in the Blue Nile Province (Khartoum, 1935).
60 NRO I Civsec 1/16/50. AJ.C. Huddleston, Governor BNP to \lacMichael. Civil SL'(retary, II
March 1927.
61 NRO ICivsec 66/2/18, K.D.D. Henderson "Arakiin Tribe", 1930.
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but such works did attempt to amalgamate the ideologies of Arab migrations and
lineage descent, with the complexities of Gezira village life. However, emphasis on
the tribe accentuated differences rather than similarities, and stopped potentially
fruitful research into the existing structures of influence and authority that did not
rest on a tribal base.
Reinterpreting the Past
Thus at the height of the tribal analysis in the 1920s and early 1930s, Gezira
administrators were facing the realisation that local society did not fit into the
archetypal tribal model. One response to this problem was to see the existing
situation as a distinct break from the past, and to place the blame for this dislocation
onto the Turkia and Mahdist regimes. Now in addition to the existing moral and
economic crimes of those regimes came the accusation that they had destroyed the
central tribal structures of the indigenous population under the Fung:
Up to the advent of the old Egyptian government, the different
tribes had kept their property and boundaries distinct. Since then,
however, chiefly to counteract the power of the Gezira tribes
when united together, tribesmen from the north were encouraged
to come in; and influence and power was given often to officials
who were not natives of the place. 62
G.B. Tame described the result of Ottoman occupation among the Halawin as being
tribal disarticulation. In reaction to the new regime, the existing Sheikh of the
Halawin, EI Feki Mohammed el Dau, was said to have run away and two sheikhs
appointed in his place over different sections of the tribe, upsetting established
personnel and structure.P' This idea of change and social disruption was articulated
at the highest levels, and was presented publicly. The official publication on the
opening of the Sennar Dam in 1926 played upon these images of tribal disarray and
(>~ NRO ICivsec 57n.VI2. "Compilation matter for BNP Handbook vol. I. I92-'!".
b.l G.B. Tame "Legends of the Halawin". p. 2m~.
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destruction when it stated; "In 1886 the Khalifa summoned the inhabitants of the
Gezira to Omdurman, so that in 1886 and 1887 the country was deserted."?'
This analysis of tribal structures having been recently disrupted was too simplistic.
The Gezira had long been an outward looking society in the centre of trade routes
and in touch with urban centres and modern ideas. A history of private land
ownership and complex pre-scheme relations between landlords, sharecroppers,
tenants, and smallholders, together with multiple forms of profit-sharing accounting,
had established a hierarchical society based on unequal access to resources." It had
been settled by sedentary populations for several hundred years, and politically, it
had been villages rather than large tribal confederations that were the dominant focus
of identity, even though genealogical identities based on 'tribal' lineages continued
to exist. Villages along the Nile were based upon ancient patterns of settlement,
while the use of the rainland hinterland has been documented from the early
seventeenth century, when fully functioning villages emerged with close economic
and administrative ties to older river bank settlements.66 Within the village, different
patrilineage, tribal and tariqa [Sufi religious groupings] identities played a role in
village interactions, and thus tribal identity was only one identity among many. In a
1960s study of Bashaqra villages (an area integrated into the north-eastern part of the
Gezira Scheme), the trend towards residential zoning on the basis of these multiple
forms of identity was clearly identified." However, despite these overt distinctions,
the same study concluded that "one of the characteristics of the villages... is
precisely their unitary structure, in spite of being tribally and religiously
h " 68eterogeneous .
The ethno-tribal terminology so popular in the 1920s and 30s thus failed to engage
effectively with the existing social structures of the Gezira region. Rather than view
the Gezira as a distinctive region in which tribes had never played an important
economic or political role - an argument that would have undermined the entire
M Sudan Government, Notes on the Gezira Irrigation Project (London, 1926), pp. -1--5.
65 Georges Brausch, "Change and Continuity in the Gezira Region of the Sudan", International Social
Science Journal, 16, 3, (1964), pp. 3-1- 1-356.
66 G. Brausch, P. Crooke and J. Shaw. Bashaqra area settlements, 1903: a case study in village
de\'elopment in the Gezira scheme (Khartoum, ll)o-1-), p. 18.
67 Ibid., p. 80.
68 Ibid.. p. 80.
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premise of Indirect Rule policies - it was easier to view the tribal structures of the
Gezira as effectively destroyed by the policies of coercive nineteenth century
regimes. Thus the ethnographic study of the region concentrated largely on the Fung
era. The migration thesis popularised by MacMichael was enthusiastically applied to
the ethnic origins of the Fung, and a lively debate on this subject occurred within the
pages of Sudan Notes and Records from the 1920s with no less than ten articles or
notes of correspondence entitled "Fung Origins". 69 The debate revolved around
geographical (and thus ethnic) origin of the Fung Sultans, with southern Blue Nile,
(Shilluk), West Africa and the Arabian peninsula being the identified as the potential
origins of tribal migrations.
However, these studies, while tied to a tribal language, continually refuted the idea of
neat bounded political, economic and social tribal units existing at any time in the
Gezira's past. As early as 1930, J.D.P. Chataway was writing that "Fung is not the
name of a tribe so much as of a ruling family", and Leonard Nalder agreed,
describing the Fung rulers as a "small aristocracy who imposed their rule on alien
subject populations";" In this way, the Fung were cast as the head of a 'feudal'
society. This trope of feudalism fitted directly into the European understanding of
pre-modern European nations and was as romantic a vision as was the oriental
kingdom or the nomadic camel-riding Arab. Nalder painted a picture of a glorious
feudal past:
These paladins with their armour and armoured horses, their
excaliburs and troubadours, their puntilios, their challenges and
single combats, strangely recall our own Middle Ages or the
Border Ballads.7 !
In explaining why these structures were "so unlike anything found in the Sudan
today", the Turkish and Mahdist regimes were once again convenient scape-goats,
and the nineteenth century described as a period that saw "the break-up of a feudal
69 See for example, L.F. Nalder "Fung Origins", Sudan Notes and Records, 1.+. (1931). pp. 61-66:
l.P.D. Chataway "Fung Origins", Sudan Notes and Records, 17, (1934), pp. 111-117; :\.1. Arkell
"More About Fung Origins", Sudan Notes and Records, 27, (1946) pp. 87-98.
70 l.D.P. Chataway "Notes on the History of the Fung", Sudan Notes and Records. 13. (19.,0),2'+7-
258, p. 2.+9; Nalder "Fung Origins". p. 62.
71 LF. Naldcr 'Tales from the Fung Province", Sudan Notes and Records. 1'+, (1931 ), pp. 67-104, at p.
67.
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system, of misgovernment, anarchy and bloodshed.t':' The inference was unchanged;
social dislocation and destruction from external regimes had destroyed the social
structure of the indigenous society. This basic premise gave theorists freedom in
exploring the distant past, with no need for the past to correlate with the present. It is
no surprise therefore, that explorations of the past, and theories about the 'real' form
of indigenous Gezira social structure were subject to fashion and trend.
Upon Stewart Symes becoming Governor-General in 1934, the emphasis of central
government policy moved away from the tribe as the focus of social organisation.
Recognising the inefficiencies of Indirect Rule, Symes returned to a dual system of
government, which at its heart made a distinction between the needs of rural and
non-rural regions. Symes introduced a programme of local government, in which
educated Sudanese and 'traditional' leaders would work togetber.f In this context,
administrators were freed from the requirements of viewing society through a tribal
lens. It subsequently became increasingly possible to understand the contemporary
non-tribal nature of Gezira society by acknowledging that tribes had never formed
the primary social identifier of the Gezira population.
Study of the past became less focussed on the ethnic identification of members of the
population and increasingly concerned about their position within an economic
system based on what were imagined as feudal relationships. These relationships
reflected what were described as unequal and hierarchical systems of land ownership
and use, and channels of tribute. This was no less a form of classification than
ethnicity, and fitted directly into the British preoccupation with economic functions
within the Gezira. This interpretation combined the great state and tribal models of
the past, assuming there to have been a central hierarchical system imposed onto
subsidiary tributary tribal areas, which were themselves organised in a hierarchical
and feudal mould. Gaitskell took the opportunity this new political atmosphere
offered to articulate a socio-economic history of the Gezira in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. It might not have been couched in the full terms of
feudalism. but it looked to that past as the heritage of the Gezira, resulting in a "static
72 Ihid.. p. 67.
7] Sir Stewart Symes. Note on :\dministrati\'e Purposes in the Anglo-Egvptian Sudan (Khartoum.
193R).
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society", in which wealth was concentrated in "the hands of a few large landowners
and merchants on whom the general population were more or less dependent
clients.v'"
The feudal ideal was the central focus of the work of O.G.S. Crawford, who in 1951,
wrote an authoritative account of the Fung era, drawing all previous European writings
together in one volume. The most important innovation of Crawford's work was to
expand on the detailed workings of the political structures of Fung society. Writing
within the context of government policy that was increasingly concerned with
administration, local politics and bureaucracy and coinciding with the passing of the
1951 Local Government Ordinance, Crawford provided a thorough analysis of the
bureaucratic workings of the Fung administration. In contrast with earlier idealistic
images of tribal authority, Crawford instead looked favourably to the urban centre of
Sennar, in which a Council of State assisted the king in decision-making, and a "cadi"
[sic] administered justice.75 The devolution of authority to the provincial nobility was
portrayed as a central element of Fung administrative organisation, and "except for the
purchase money paid for accession and occasional presents he [a Mek] was entirely
independent and governed as an absolute ruler.,,76 This hierarchy, Crawford argued,
continued to the village level, with each provincial Mek appointing district officials,
who in turn appointed village sheikhs, and a clear link was made between the local and
the central in the organisation of taxation and tribute. Even if circumvented by
payments of bribes, the concept that provincial leaders were appointees of a central
government was important in suggesting the existence of a hierarchy of authority
emanating from a central body.
The image of the Fung kingdom had turned a full circle, returning to the vision of a
centralised state overseeing a hierarchical society that had been current in the earliest
years of the Condominium. In the seventy years of British commentary on the social
structures of northern Sudan the official 'knowledge' of the society that they ruled
repeatedly changed. A series of tropes reflected past Gezira society as based upon a
74 SAD 418/6/12-35, A. Gaitskcll. "A proposal for the future development of the Gczira Scheme"
(Khartoum, 1938).
75 O.G.S. Crawford, The Fling Kingdom of Sennar: with a Geographical ACCOll/lf of the vliddle Nile
Region (Gloucester. 1951), p. n2.
76 Ihid .. p. 62.
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central state, upon a tribal confederation, and upon a feudal hierarchy. Each
successive vision was presented as the true reflection of the past. There was not here
the confident espousal of a single grand narrative of the pre-colonial past assumed by
Said to be part of the colonial authority structure. Knowledge and power were
clearly connected but both were uncertain and shifting, responding to expectations
and contemporary political policy as much as to structures on the ground. In part, the
inability of colonial administrators to paint a consistent picture of the Gezira' s past
was a response to its considerable complexity as a society. The Gezira failed to live
up to the ideal image of Arab tribes of large homogenous units with patriarchal
leaders found in other areas of Sudan. Instead identities were many and overlapping,
and power was equally diffuse although generally related to economic wealth.
Nonetheless, even if the colonial 'knowledge' project was indecisive, Mitchell and
Anderson have demonstrated the importance it had to the colonial state. Large
quantities of time and energy were expended in the search for the 'truth' about the
society over which they ruled and the conclusions drawn were central to the way in
which northern Sudan was ruled.
The one abiding theme of all visions of the Gezira's past was that of recurring
dislocation as the successive Fung, Turko-Egyptian and Mahdist regimes weakened
and fell during the nineteenth century. By dividing Sudan's history into periods
correlating with distinct central regimes, Condominium analysis of the past
consistently assumed the primacy of the central state, even when discussing non-state
structures. Central policies and ideals were counted on to accurately reflect social
reality, and so regime change was believed to result in social change and dislocation.
Thus it was the differences between the regimes and the supposed disruptions
brought by political take-over that were highlighted, and not the continuities at the
local level. This approach to the past remained at the heart of all Condominium
attitudes, no matter what model of 'indigenous' social structure lay behind it. As the
last word on Condominium attitudes towards Gezira's past, Jackson in 1955, used a
language indistinguishable from that used by Wingate at the start of the
Condominium:
For seventeen years, until the battle of Omdurman, the fires of
war had rushed across the Sudan: they overleapt mountains,
bestrode the spongy swamps and sped unhindered through the
-B
Imagining the Past
peaceful cultivation. The havoc that they wrought cannot be
measured merely by the ruined crops, the starving cattle, the
devastated homes and the famished remnants of the population.
Nearly six and a half million men, women and children perished
in the flames."
Nineteenth century dislocation remained a working template for understanding the
twentieth century throughout the Condominium. In this context, the Geziras
difference from both the perceived 'golden age' of the Fung kingdom and the more
obviously 'tribal' areas of northern Sudan was viewed as an aberration resulting from
past disruption. However, state power was rarely so effectual and there are enough
clues to suggest that continuity rather than dislocation was the more important theme
of Gezira history. The work conducted by Gleichen, Matthew and Peacock all
suggest the stable and long-term nature of social and economic relationships in the
Gezira, while a re-reading of the ambiguous accounts of Poncet and Bruce cast doubt
on the idea of there ever being a 'golden age' of a glorious centralised state.
Post-Condorninium studies, although often rernaimng focused on regimes and
continuing the series of historical tropes based upon contemporary understandings of
society (most notably within Jay Spaulding and Lidwien Kapteijns studies of class
formation) have provided increasing understanding of the continuities at the heart of
northern riverain Sudanese society. 78 In particular, Anders Bjerkelo, and Neil
McHugh have demonstrated the degree of continuity of personnel in positions of
authority, both within and outside of the administrative hierarchy." These and other
works have demonstrated that the Gezira was an area that had long been socially
organised within multi-tribal settled villages in which numerous patrilineages vied
77 H.C. Jackson, Behind the Modern Sudan (London, 1955). p. 76.
78 Lidwein Kapteijns and Jay Spaulding, "History, Ethnicity and Agriculture in the Sudan", pp. 8'+-100
in G.M. Craig (ed.,) The Agriculture of the Sudan (Oxford. 1991); J. Spaulding "Farmers, Herdsmen
and the State in Rainland Sennar", Journal ofAfrican History, 20, (1979). pp. 329-3'+7: 1. Spaulding
"Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class in the Northern Turkish Sudan", International Journal o]
African Historical Studies. 15. (1982), pp. 1-20; See also Hill, Egypt in the Sudan; Peter Holt, The
Mahdist state in the Sudan. 1881-1898: a Study ojits Origins. Development and Overthrow (Oxford.
1958): Farah H. Adam "Agrarian Relations in Sudanese Agriculture: A Historical Rev iew", Sudan
Journal of Development Research :Y, 2. (1977). pp. 33-'+'+. at pp..~5-36.;Mohammed Hashim :\ \\ ad.
"The Evolution of Landownership in Sudan". siu.n. East Journal. 25. 2. ( 1(71). 212-228.
79 Bjerkclo, Prelude to the Mahdivva; Neil Mcl-lugh. Holvmen of the BII/(' Nile: The making ofan
Arab-Islamic Community in the Nilotic Sudan. /500-1850 (Evcston. Illinoi-. 199.+).
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for power in both secular and non-secular arenas. Economically, private
landownership had formed the basis of wealth and status throughout all regime
changes, and was the structure around which hierarchical relationships formed. This
was a complex society, with diffuse power structures and multiple identities
gradually evolving over centuries. Regime change may have brought some changes,
but it did not bring about the far-reaching disruptive effects so commonly assumed
throughout the Condominium. In attempting to reduce the past to simplistic forms,
the colonial state consistently failed to understand the structure or the motivations of
the Condominium Gezira. The subsequent chapters of this study will show that this
flawed British imagination of the past masked a reality of substantial continuity in
social structures and social values.
2FINDING LEADERS
Suggesting that "an absence of ascribed social positions in an open-ended egalitarian
society" allowed any member of a society to potentially hold a position of leadership,
Charles Lindholm claims that diffuse power was an essential element of settled Arab
society. I Certainly within the Gezira, authority structures of the early twentieth
century were distributed widely and were "intrinsically... difficult to measure". 2
With multiple social contacts arising within networks of villages, there was no
overarching position of leadership. There was frequently more than one recognised
sheikh in a village, and merchants, holy men, landowners and administrative
functionaries all existed alongside one another. Nonetheless, although power
structures were potentially open to all, in fact the influence brought by positions was
nurtured over generations to create family lineages in communities throughout the
Gezira that were intimately associated with power and authority. With the income
potential of rents, trading profits or religious gifts, these positions of influence were
closely tied to monetary wealth and could be consolidated through reinvestment in
land, new irrigation techniques and slave labour. 3 Moneylending using the mortgage
institution of shayl was another method in which those with some capital were able
to consolidate their position of authority and elite status.' This correlation between
wealth and socio-political status has frequently been made by commentators on the
Nile valley. Tim Niblock has argued that "Personal wealth ... buttressed an existing
I Charles Lindholm. The Islamic Middle East: Tradition and Change (Oxford. 2002l, p. 2hI.
2 Ihid., p. 2h1.
1 Spaulding "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class", pp. 13-17.
" Martin Wilmington. "Aspects of Moneylending. in Northern Sudan", Middle East Journal, 9,2 (1955)
pr, 139-1.+6.
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position of social influence or social control", and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga remarks
that village hierarchies and social differentiation were based upon land ownership."
With wealth (together with the less measurable attribute of personal charisma) acting
as a key indicator of authority, power was not the preserve of anyone category of
persons. In effect, religious leaders, merchants, state-sponsored administrators and
landowners were all influential figures throughout the Gezira region. There was no
single pattern or rule, and different communities were organised upon different
principles. Communities such as Tayiba, which were founded by holy men in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, remained under the personal authority of the
religious founding family." Trading centres such as Messellemia, were dominated by
numerous and competing landowning merchants. 7 Other settlements were
themselves more diffuse and recognised multiple forms of authority based upon
knowledge and upon identities such as tribe and patrilineage. For instance, the
village Udeid el Bahaqra had four recognisable factions organised by patrilineage,
while most villages recognised the authority of the local feki and those who had
expertise in 'knowing' land rights."
This complexity of multi-focal authority relationships gave considerable flexibility
and choice to the population, but proved inimical to the interests of governmental
administration. Desiring to find 'big men' to whom administrative tasks might be
delegated, this diffuse elite failed to correlate with the government's patriarchal
image of authority and was viewed as a result of past dislocation. Seeing the
Condominium as a new beginning, the government applied a pragmatic policy of
administrative centralisation. Using a pick and mix approach to existing structures of
authority, the government created a simplified administrative hierarchy, which
responded to the perceived needs of administrative efficiency and 'political'
suitability. Looking for the most 'suitable' local leaders based upon criteria
including loyalty, local influence, community acceptance and administrative ability,
~ Niblock, Class and Power. p. 50; Sikainga, Slaves into Workers. p. 116.
6 McHugh. Holvmen of the Blue Nile. pp. 176-179.
7 Anon.. "A History of the Sudan. 1X22-1 R41", in 0" the Frontiers ofIslam - Two Manuscripts
Concerning the Sudan Under Turco-Egyptian rule /822-/845 (trans.. R. Hill. Oxford. 1970). p. 2l).
~ Brausch. Crooke and Shaw. Bashaqra Area Settlements. p. 1"2-73.
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colonial governments moulded local administrative structures to form clear.
organised and understandable points of mediation between the government and local
communities." Within the Gezira, this attempt at administrative centralisation, while
viewed by the government as bringing significant changes, in fact resulted in
considerable continuity of administrative function and personnel from past regimes.
Other continuities were also striking, and the ability of communities to work with
both the centralised administrative specialists and other forms of pre-existing
authority demonstrate the familiarity that Gezira communities had with mediating
with central state structures. This experience of mediation meant that communities,
individuals and the state all involved themselves in negotiating the form which
administrative centralisation would take, and demonstrated the considerable ability
for communities to control their experience of governance.
A Template of Authority
The idea that British officials ruled in a direct manner in the first years of the
Condominium has been popularised in many histories of the Condominium.l" In fact,
the limited personnel and resources of the government, together with the considered
importance of stability meant that from its inception the government relied upon
local allies to fulfil administrative duties and maintain basic security at the local
level. II Herbert-Horatio Kitchener outlined the framework for devolved
Condominium administration in his 1899 "memorandum to Mudirs" [provincial
governors] :
The task before us all, and especially the Mudirs and Inspectors,
is to acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their
resources, and to raise them to a higher level. This can only be
affected by the district officers being thoroughly in touch with the
9 Marshall Clough. Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918-N..JO (Niwot. CO. 19l)O).
Pt. 1.+.
o See for example. J.S.R. Duncan. The Sudan: A Record ofAchievement (Edinburgh. 1952). p. 101.
11 Martin Daly. The Sidir: Sir Reginald Wingate and the British Empire ill the Middle East
(Philadelphia. 1997). p. 139.
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'-
better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to
influence the whole population. 12
It was judged that a stratum of indigenous leadership was required to help direct the
colonial enterprise, but the definition of this 'better class' was deliberately left vague,
providing space for the varied social conditions found throughout Sudan, and
allowing for significant flexibility in Condominium administration.
Both efficiency and stability were at the heart of this government policy. Believing
their own propaganda about the destruction brought about by the wars and
supposedly corrupt regimes of the nineteenth century, the primary objective of the
British-led administration was
The replacement of the chaos of the past by an orderly system
which should give justice to all and lead to the development of
the country, social and economical, for the benefit of its
inhabitants, without detriment to Egypt. 13
As conquering and alien rulers, British officials were understandably fearful of
inciting an antagonistic response from the newly subjected population. However, the
task of establishing a working administration was frequently viewed as an uphill
battle. Jackson, in his memoirs wrote of the slow
transition from war to peace... All administrative channels had,
like those of navigation, been blocked during the Turkiyya and
the Mahdia. The authority of the sheikhs and tribal leaders had
been broken down and the rebuilding of native administration
14
was a long and gradual process.
Although bewailing the destruction of past authority (or perhaps because of it), the
government was also keen to appropriate structures of authority that already existed.
Thus it was that in the very face of rhetoric emphasising destruction there was
considerable continuity in the authority personnel of northern Sudan.
Continuity of official power was however dependent upon a specific image of power
established within the colonial mindset. While past administrators, and secular
12 Kitchener quoted in Harold MacMichacl. The Sudan (London, 195-l). p. 75.
13 MacMichacl. The Sudan (London. 195-l), p. 7:'.
1·\ Jackson. Behind the Modem Stu/an. p. 85.
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'notables' were supported and promoted, religious leadership in the form of Sufi holy
men or [ekis, was actively side-lined. Despite recognising the "enormous power.
wealth and influence" of religious figures as "spiritual guides of the people and the
teachers of the young", they were consistently seen as a negative influence. I:' Russell
talked of holy men as an "invasion", while Wingate described sedentary villages as
being "over-ridden by a most shameless set oifekis or religious teachers". 16 Much of
this suspicion of Sufism came from its perceived association with the leadership of
the Mahdia, as Muhammed Ahmed who declared himself to be the Mahdi in 1881,
had been taught by several acknowledged Sufi teachers including Sheikh Ghorashi of
the Halawin in the Gezira." In fact once having gained power, Muhammed Ahmed,
and his successor the Khalifa Abdullahi proved hostile to any rival powerbase
including Sufi tariqasF"
Nonetheless, the connection was made, and then repeatedly reinforced through a
series of 'religious' uprisings during the early Condominium." Although never the
danger they were perceived to be, the government, still unsure of its own position,
saw these uprisings as a considerable threat to political security, especially after the
government inspector Scott Moncrieff was killed in the 1908 Haboba uprising in the
Gezira." Despite the fact that such uprisings tended to be the work of individuals
and were not related to organised tariqas, the link between unorthodox Islam and
political instability was firmly established. Suspicion continued to set the tone of the
government's relationship with Sufism until the end of the First World War; a period
which in contrast saw the official face of Islam headed by the Ulema receive
government sanction and support. 21 Officially therefore, village-based holy men
were not part of the Condominium administration, but the government was not able
to regulate the unofficial role that they undeniably had. As Gabriel Warburg has
stated, "the functions of these leaders far exceeded the teaching of Islam", and their
customary roles as the keepers and teachers of religious knowledge, literacy and
15 Russell, The Ruin of the Soudan, pp. 24-25.
16 Ibid., pp. 24-25; Wingate, The Sudan Past and Present, p. 2.
17 NRO BNP 1/30/222, R.J.H. Hillard, DC North Gczira to Robert Mayall. Governor BNP. 14 August.
1936.
18 Holt. The Mahdist state in the Sudan. p. 106.
19 Daly. Empire on the Nile. pp. 119-129.
20 For more details on the Haboba incident. sec SGR 1908. pp. 4-).
21 Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan Under Wingate: Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. /899-
/9/6 (London, 1971). p. 95.
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genealogical tradition meant that they remained central and powerful figures within
communities, particularly within those communities that were historically built upon
religious foundations.f
The Sheikh
The government, however, was concerned with identifying and establishing a secular
leadership. Conceptualised primarily in terms of patriarchal authority, the figure of
the 'sheikh' lay at the heart of the British imagination of Arab authority structures.
Never defined, the term 'sheikh' passed as a title for all types and levels of authority.
From village headmen and respected elders to influential 'tribal' and urban-based
religious leaders, the expression 'sheikh' was widely used as a term of respect and
general authority. 23 Slatin, while governor of Darfur, made no terminological
distinction between the recognised leaders, and "issued orders to all Sheikhs, both
great and small," while in Khartoum, qadis, the Mufti, the president of the Ulema
and a Professor of Science all signed a petition using the title 'sheikh'. 24 In its
flexibility and ambiguity such terminology was useful in denoting a general sense of
authority and leadership; however it failed to fulfil the needs of the British
administration in defining a hierarchy which they could incorporate into a colonial
administration. As the Turko-Egyptian regime had done before them, extra terms
were gradually introduced by the government, through which the different levels and
types of sheikhs could be identified.
Sheikhs became associated with a specific position in a hierarchical administration
and were recognised by the government as the primary (if not sole) figures of
community authority. By 1912, nazirs had been appointed as paramount chiefs of
large tribal areas, and omdas nominated as the leaders of village groups in sedentary
22 Gabriel Warburg. "Popular Islam and Tribal Leadership in the Socio-Political Structure of North
Sudan". p. 23-L in Menahem Milson (ed.i) Society and Political Structure in the Arab World (New
York, 1973). For a more detailed analysis of the customary importance of holy men within the Gczira,
sec Mcl-lugh, Holvmen of the Blue Nile.
23 Sharkey, Living with Colonialism. p. 145.
2~ Slatin, Fire and Sword in the Sudan. p. 91. Charles Gordon, General Gordon" J..:IUlrtOU11I Journal
(cd. Lord Elton. London. 19(1). p. 420.
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areas." Khuts were also re-established as territorial units in riverain areas, whose
sheikhs had jurisdiction over omdas and village sheikhs. The process by which these
terms were appropriated by the Condominium remains unclear. They were Turkish
titles and were creations applied to northern Sudan in the 1850s.26 Whether British
officials saw them as 'traditional' terms, or realised their recent origin, whether there
was government memory of the terms, or whether they relied upon Sudanese self-
portrayal, remains moot. Whether British, Sudanese or Egyptian led, the effect of
using these terms was to fix the terminology of leadership and create an
administrative and hierarchical bureaucracy staffed by appointed Sudanese leaders.
With only one recognised sheikh per village, the Condominium government
eliminated any ambiguity that the former flexibility of the term 'sheikh' had
established, and undermined the competitive egalitarianism that had previously
existed among a wider elite body. This fixing of titles - each with its defined
meaning and place in a hierarchy - became an important element of British
knowledge of and dominance over Sudanese society. Focusing upon specific
individuals as the embodiment of community leadership at the expense of other
figures of authority within communities, this established a process in which a fixed
and increasingly centralised bureaucracy was created.
The correct usage of titles was an issue that repeatedly surfaced in administrative
debates in an attempt to rid the system of ambiguity. Within the Gezira the correct
terminology for the highest level of indigenous leadership remained contentious.
Given the uncertain British awareness that the Gezira was not tribally organised, the
overtly 'tribal' title of 'nazir' was deemed inappropriate. Instead, the pre-existing
territorial terminology of khuts was promoted; a distinction that was outlined by C.S
Lyall:
The title of 'Sheikh of Khut' should denote roughly the
equivalent of Nazir in standing but be applied, as the Arabic of
the term clearly suggests, to the head Sheikhs of certain large
Districts, irrespective of whether all the people under him are one
tribe or not, e.g. in sedentary provinces such as the Blue Nile
Province, where the term was in fact in use some few years ago
~5 SAD 299/2/1 ~ ..L "List of Sheikhs and Notables of the Sudan. Present at Port Sudan", 1912.
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but where it was for a time and without any particular warrant,
replaced by the quite inapplicable title of Nazir."
Although the Gezira was understood to be territorially rather than tribally organised.
the sheikh of khut was still viewed as a patriarch, with considerable social and
political influence over the population of 'his' territory, and the ability to represent
the interests of 'his people' to the government.
The sole exception to the relative insignificance of tribal identity in the Gezira was
the Halawin tribe. Due to the driving personality of Mohammed Imam Haboba in
the nineteenth century, the Halawin had developed from "a wandering harmless tribe
content to pay customary dues ... to their overlords, the Shenabla", to "the most
powerful and most closely-knit tribe in the Gezira.,,28 Cohesive and distinct, the
Halawin conformed to British expectations of an Arab tribe, and were particularly
favoured by the government who saw their tribal values as the basis for their
reputation as the best and most prudent cultivators in the Gezira?9 Elsewhere, the
government found tribal boundaries confused, frequently finding two or more tribal
groups based in the same village." 'Tribal' authority however remained the template
upon which other forms of authority were modelled, and khuts throughout the Gezira
were known by the tribal identity of the sheikh of khut's lineage. The idea remained
that even outside of functioning political tribal units, authority resided in particular
lineages, in which were to be found leading sheikhs with the qualities of personal
influence, good character and knowledge of leadership from hereditary experience.
An Administrative Elite
Without clear territorially defined tribes, the administration was unable to promote
men on the basis of their leadership of established tribal units. Instead they relied on
men who had proven administrative ability within both the previous Ottoman and
26 Bjerkelo, Prelude to the Mahdivya. p. "+6.
27 NRO BNP 1/.:B/253. "Extract from Civil Secretary's comments on the Governors' meeting 1923"'.
2S NRO BNP 1130/222. anon.. "Notes on the Wad Haboba Incident". 191 [?]; R.Y. Bardsley. "~\)tes on
the Halawin" 193[?l,
24 NRO BNP 1130/222. anon., "Administrative note on the Halawin". 1..+ November 19"+"+.
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Mahdist regimes, although by using Turkish terminology at the expense of Mahdist
terms a political repudiation of the Mahdist regime was made. This use of past
administrative structures was highly selective. Figures of large scale authority did
exist in the pre-Condominium Gezira, most notably in the person of Ibrahim Ahmed
el-Sunni, who was the chief administrator or Aamil of the Gezira during the Mahdia,
and "virtually ruled" the region; a fact recognised by the Condominium authorities,
but not replicated." It was not that as a member of the former regime el-Sunni was
distrusted; his family in fact remained highly influential as omdas of Wad Medani
town. It was rather that the government's focus on tribal unity meant that purely
territorial autocracy was seen as inappropriate. Smaller units became the focus of
leadership within the Gezira, and subsidiary Ottoman and Mahdist Sudanese officials
and their families were cultivated and given the trimmings of tribal authority. The
sheikhs of khut therefore came from established administrative families and at this
level, the centralising of official authority under the Condominium only replicated
the actions of previous centralised administrations. In this way, Sheikh Musaad
Mohammed, the sheikh of the Shenabla Khut, in Hassaheissa district came from a
wealthy landowning family of 'nazirs', while Mohammed Hamadnalla of Kamlin,
who was a sheikh of gism during the Turkia and an emir under the Mahdia, became
successively a sheikh, an omda and a sheikh of khut during the Condominium.32
The government was thus able to identify a number of well established families,
whose combined interests in positions of official administration, trade and
landownership meant that they were in a prime position for incorporation into the
Condominium administration. Continuity was key, just as John Lonsdale has stated
of colonial Kenya at this time:
[The same] men of power have enjoyed control over the same
unchanging key assets of land in the locality and access to the
wider institutions of the state. they have learned to exploit, co-
opt, or, in the last resort, to accommodate themselves to social
30 NRO Civscc 1/16/5 I. Bardsley. Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 22 May 1929.
.'1 SAD 661/4/.B. K.D.D. Henderson. 'The Forgotten Generation". n.d ..
'~NRO l Civscc 1/16/50. Bardsley. Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 9 June 1928:
NRO ICivsec 1/16/52. J.A. Reid. acting Governor BNP to MacMichacl. Civil Secretary. 27
September 19)().
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and econonuc change and in so doing subject change to the
authoritative audit of the past."
The influence of such families over the local community was highly regarded by the
government, and their support was cultivated by giving members of the family
administrative positions and titles which incorporated them into the administration.
Even if not always living up to administrative expectations, the government
continued to recognise the administrative position of those leading families and thus
the lesser abilities of men like Sheikh Mohammed Musaad of the Shenabla were
accepted in return for his local influence. As J. Richardson, Assistant DC of
Hassaheissa admitted of this sheikh: "he is not a very clever man and to Englishmen
he is all things to all men, but he is excellent at dealing with his own people and the
many outsiders"."
This local influence and power of particular lineages was highly regarded by the state,
and all efforts were made to recognise particular sheikhly families, even if
individuals were dismissed. Authority was seen as being contained within the wider
patrilineage rather than simply being hereditary; a perspective that was justified by
the historical example of the Arakiin family in which "the succession of an elder son
of a senior branch has been the exception rather than the rule"." Thus it was that,
unimpressed with the immediate heirs of the nineteenth century Halawin leader
Mohammed Imam, they appointed Abdulla Musaad from the family of Imam's
cousin to act in the official capacity as leader of the Halawin. 36 This practice
replicated the theory of competitive egalitarianism engrained within the multi-focal
power structures of the Gezira, but did so in a very narrow manner. No individual
was ever entirely secure within a position, which might (if inefficiency or corruption
could be proved) be withdrawn, but the family from which sheikhs of khut and other
leading administrators were chosen might be confident of retaining the position
within the lineage. As Paul Dresch has stated, "almost always a Shaykh comes from
a family of shaykhs", but that within each such family "there is an important element
D John Lonsdale, preface of Clough Fighting Two Sides, p. xiii.
3-1 NRO BNP 1/1/1, J. Richardson. ADC Hassahcissa to Huddleston, Governor BNP. II Februarx
1927.
Vi NRO 1Ci \SCC 66/2/18, Henderson. "Arakiin Tribe", 1930.
,It> NRO BNP 1/301222, Bardsley. "NOICS on the Halawin" 193[?].
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of choice". 37 In following this model, the government reinforced the idea of
patrilineal and patriarchal authority, and the validity of an unequal society.
In return for providing administrative duties and a vital point of mediation, those
families incorporated into the administration gained significant advantages. As
Marshall Clough has remarked of Kenya:
As principle mediators and avenues of access, chiefs occupied a
crucial position. They kept ambitious men and men with
grievances from direct contact with the British. They controlled
what their people knew and expected of them. Successful chiefs
became local institutions after a period of years, regulating the
response of the people of their areas to the changes brought about
by the Europeans.r"
In addition, many of those men chosen to be sheikhs of khut came from lineages that
controlled Sufi tariqas, extending their influence in fields beyond the government's
reach. Such lineages spread their interests by placing different individuals from the
same family in positions of secular and religious authority. Thus Mohammed Ismail
Isa, the religious khalifa within Masid village, Laota block, was the brother of
Ahmed Ismail Isa, the Sheikh of Khut. 39 Consistently fearful of the uncontrolled
power of Sufi leaders, the government claimed that leading families put forward their
man "of most character" into the channels of religious authority, while producing
"for Government requirements the less important member of the famil y.,,40 Whether
lacking character or not, this policy allowed certain families within the Gezira to
consolidate their power base by investing in multiple forms of authority.
37 Paul Dresch "The Position of Shaykhs Among the Northern Tribes of Yemen" ..\1<1/1 19. I. (l9H-l).
~p. 31-.+9. at p. 36.
. R Clough. Fighti/lg Two Sides. p. 18.
W NRO BNP 1/1/1. W.P.D. Clarke. ADC Kamlin to Huddleston. Governor B:"P. 25 February 1927.
-to NRO lCivscc 1/16/50. Bardsley. Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 4 June !42X.
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Community Gatekeepers
Below the level of the grand Gezira families that provided the administration with
the sheikhs of khut, the identification of authority structures proved more difficult.
Whereas the ability to mediate between groups was widespread within the
community, the Condominium government (as had centralised regimes before it)
wanted a simplified official face. It was deemed essential for the government to
identify certain individuals within every village who would mediate between the
government and the wider population. Official administrative power was thus
centralised in the figures of administrative specialists. Government-recognised
sheikhs were the public face of a community and "a necessary link to the state
bureaucracy" for both communities and government." The mutual benefits from this
mediation were strong. The government had someone on the spot with (if chosen
correctly) local respect to enforce orders, collect taxes and disseminate information.
The community had a person to defend them from the excesses of the state and to
negotiate a favourable position.
Identifying such figures however, proved more difficult than at the higher echelons
of power. Not only was the Mahdia blamed for forced tribal mass migrations, there
was also believed to have been a concerted attack on the basic structures of
community authority throughout the Mahdia. Wingate described a "reign of terror"
conducted by the Mahdist leadership against existing sheikhs:
The court sat day and night, hearing trumped up charges and false
witness against petty sheikhs, and many lost their heads and were
succeeded in their power by their slaves."
Even if not personally displaced, communities were portrayed as facing upheaval as
sheikhs transformed themselves into "the commander of an unruly contingent of
freebooters instead of being the leader and arbiter of a peaceful communi ty." 43 III
other communities, the sheikh was believed to be a scapegoat, shielding the
4\ Robert Fernca. Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns ofAut!lority among the El Shubana of
SOllth(',." Iraq (Camhridgc. Mass, 1970), p. 1."'-+
41 Rl-. WingalL', Mahdiism and the Egvptian SIUJan, p. 227-~.
4.\ Sudan Gl)\Crnmcnl. Mcniorandum - General /vdministrative Policy, p. 2.
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community from the excesses of corrupt nineteenth century regimes." Thus while
stability was important and leading families were backed up by the administration,
the notion of destruction freed the government from sticking to all structures of
authority that they found.
This mind-set allowed the Condominium government to follow a pragmatic approach
in the recognition of leadership and the development of social policy. The perceived
destruction of the past permitted a pragmatic 'pick and mix' attitude to social
administration, allowing the government "to adopt or adapt whatever was found
good and to reject or modify whatever was found bad". 45 In this climate the
opportunity was taken to assess the personality and past record of individual sheikhs,
and change, especially among village sheikhs was acceptable, so long as it brought
administrative benefits for the central government. As a memorandum first
published in 1922 stated:
The crux of the matter lies in the character of the individual
Sheikh, and here our policy is clearly defined. So long as the
Sheikh remains loyal to the Government, carries out its orders
with reasonable expedition and efficiency, and retains the respect
of his people, he is supported. If he proves himself disloyal or if
from moral failure he ceases to retain the respect of his people he
is replaced. If he is merely inefficient he is given every chance
and is only deposed if his failure is complete - in which case he
would almost certainly have also lost the respect of his people."
Empowered and bound to maintain social order, collect taxes and to make summons
on behalf of government officials, village sheikhs and omdas became agents of the
government administration, to be appointed and dismissed at government will. As
administrative adjuncts to the central government, the qualities of leadership prized
by the government were thus centred upon administrative ability, and an
administrative elite emerged, directly sponsored by the state. Doing what central
state structures had done before them, the British administration incorporated
~~ NRO BNP 1/'+1/307, Crawford, Commissioner Gezira Area to Clarke. Governor B;\JP. 1.+ July 1l).~2.
~5 Sudan GO\'l.~rnmcnt. Memorandum. p. 2.
.to Ibid ,I ., p.,.
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members of local communities to act as mediators between the population and the
government, based on their ability to communicate between these spheres, and to
extract taxes and maintain order." Although looking back to the past, this policy
was openly pragmatic, based upon ideas of management efficiency rather than
inherent custom, and placed the government at the apex of the hierarchy, with the
power and willingness to change individuals who did not meet the government's idea
of leadership.
However, sheikhs were not simply government lackeys or local despots. Instead,
those recognised as sheikhs relied upon local support, balancing local wishes with
government requirements. 48 Some managed to walk this tightrope, many others
failed. Between 1903 and 1912, out of approximately eight hundred villages within
the region, 94 village sheikhs resigned and another 199 were dismissed throughout
the Gezira, "for various reasons'L'" These changes were not necessarily substantial
for, as suggested, positions tended to be reallocated within the same 'sheikhly
family'. However, the high turnover does suggest a substantial period of negotiation,
before community gatekeepers suitable to both government and local communities
were situated throughout the region. Many of these dismissals were directly related
to their administrative failures, such as that of Ahmed Mohammed EI Zein of Wad el
Zein village, dismissed for the embezzlement of funds. 50 However, for the
government, local influence and community respect were central requirements of
sheikhs, and these criteria were consistently highlighted over other qualities. Thus,
other than in cases of gross negligence, community support (or lack of) was the most
compelling factor in securing a sheikh's position. A sheikh whose community did
not support him was unsatisfactory; it was administratively inefficient, and laid the
seeds for the growth of discontent.
The intersection of interests between government and local communities, as to who
were suitable figures for this mediatory position was strong. Both were looking for
strong and influential individuals, and "the Government was. generall y speaking,
47 For details of the incorporation of Sudanese into the Turko-Egyptian bureaucracy. sec Bjorkclo.
Prelude to the Mahdivva.
4~ Clough. Fighting Two Sides. p. 16.
49 SGR 1903-1912.
50 NRO BNP 1/33/253. Personality sheet on Ahmed Mohammed EI Zein. 7 December 192:'
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content enough to accept the choice of people in this matter and prepared to
adjudicate in cases of doubt.t' " With the government encouraging a policy of
popular consent, villages retained a certain power over their administrative sheikhs.
This had little impact upon the higher echelons of established authority, and Sheikhs
of Khut and omdas demonstrated considerable ability to retain their position. At the
lower level of villages however, leadership was less fixed and disputes for
sheikhships, occurred frequently, as MacMichael stated, "in inverse relation to their
importance". 52 That village support for the centralised position of an individual
could be taken away at any time is suggested by MacMichael who described the
numbers of villages that "lost no time in rejecting men who had misused their
authority or whom they regarded as usurpers.r''"
Sheikhly power was therefore neither entirely invented nor entirely despotic.
Administrative power was indeed officially centralised through the government's
recognition of individual sheikhs, but this was not a new development, nor was this
power complete or permanent. When competing alternatives existed and centralised
power was contested (even if only from within the same family lineage) then the
power of community leaders was to an extent restrained. With the position of
administrative sheikh bringing with it honour, power and the ability to control
resources, competition for the position of sheikh was often fierce. Certainly the
segmentary nature of lineage society within the Gezira allowed groups to expand and
unite against common external opponents, but also to retract and fractionalise in
heated localised competition that split communities into factions. Authority was
typically located within particular lineages or families, but it was not without its
challengers. Although accepting the idea of administrative centralisation, there was
often considerable hostility towards the individuals within those posts, and factional
disputes frequently erupted throughout the Gezira in competition for control of
administrative positions. Within the Halawin for example, this internal political
'\1 Harold MacMichacl. The Sudan, p. ~2.
'\2 Ibid., p. H2.
'\.' lbid., p. 82.
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wrangling occurred between the four main factions of the tribe at a tribal and a local
level.54
Most critically, Mamdani's thesis of local despotism relies upon an assumption of
effective colonial power to impose authority structures upon the landscape. which
certainly did not exist within the early Condominium. Always reliant upon working
with existing structures of authority, this government weakness was clearest in cases
in which the existing authority structures did not coincide with the government's
notion of idea authority, but continued nonetheless. Such was the position of Abdel
Bagi Hamed el Nil of Tayiba, who as the accepted religious leader of the Qadiriya
tariqa, did not hold any recognised administrative position himself. However. his
religious influence, together with his considerable wealth and land, meant that he
was one of the most powerful figures in the Gezira.P He consolidated his powers by
controlling those holding administrative positions such as Mohammed Ahmed El
Tom Abu Agla, who was the sheikh of Arakiin Khut and both relative and follower
of Hamed el Nil. He also appointed subsidiary village sheikhs over villages whose
land he owned, including Tayiba village itself, whose nominal sheikh was Ulum, a
slave of el Nil. When an argument between Ulum and el Nil brought the
government's attention to Ulum's dependent slave status, the latter gave Ulum his
freedom in an attempt to enforce the independence of administrative positions.
However, in response, el Nil retaliated in ways that allowed him to regain his control
over the village, undermining the authority of Ulum to the extent that just one year
later his position as sheikh was untenable. 56
Despite the government's focus upon change, the structures of local governance
during the first twenty years of the Condominium were ultimately closely related to
those of previous regimes. Where the state saw discontinuities, there were actually
continuities. The Gezira was a society familiar with administrative hierarchies and
with mediating with central states and was able to adapt and to co-opt the structures
5-1 NRO BNP 1/31/~.f l. R.Y. Bardsley. DC Rufa'a to lies. Governor BNP. 22 January 1919.
55 On his death in 195~. the government reported that he was one of the most influential individuals In
the Gczira. and that he owned 8.000 fcddans of land. NRO ~Ci\scc 30/113. Bf\:P Monthly Diaries.
1952. January... . ,,:)"'\ .;. . 1\"'\7
56 NRO BNP 1/111, GL'otfrcy Barter. DC Mcdani to Huddleston. Governor B:'\f. _7 February h_,.
NRO BNP 1/331:253, Barter. DC Mcdani to Governor BNP. 2 April 1927.
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imposed by the Condominium government with comparative ease. Where obvious
figures of administrative authority existed, they were incorporated into the new
administration as sheikhs of khut and omdas, for as Sharkey states:
British officials respected or absorbed extant status hierarchies
and reinforced them... [they] did not create status differentials but
fortified existing ones.57
Numerous individuals and families were In this way recognised as the official
mediators between their communities and the government by successive regimes,
such as Mohammed el Masri el Kheiri, who was appointed village sheikh in 1902
and omda in 1911, and whose father was both a sub-governor during the Turkia and
an emir during the Mahdia. 58 The centralising trends of the Condominium
government were therefore nothing new, but reflected the earlier policies of central
governments throughout at least the nineteenth century. Where community
leadership was less easily defined, sheikhs were appointed and dismissed from a
variety of competing lineages according to both the government's notion of
efficiency and the community's level of support in a long process of negotiation to
find suitable community leaders. This was a process in which communities more
than the government influenced the outcome. Unfamiliar with local politics and
without the resources to impose unwanted structures of authority upon communities,
the government was reliant upon working with those figures that had the greatest
support.
Although frequently expressed in terms of dislocation and destruction of authority,
the problem faced by Condominium officials was in fact more closely related to the
effective continuation of authority, which in the complex society of the Gezira
resulted in a plethora of authority positions. The problem was one of too much
authority remaining rather than too little. Holding a suspicious attitude to elements
of multi-focal authority structures (in particular to religious power) and needing an
efficient apparatus through which to channel government policy, British authorities
streamlined the official face of community-level authority. In officially recognising
only certain individuals as the mediators between community and government. an
57 Sharkey. Living with Colonialism. pp. IH-19.
5H ICivsec 16/5/20, Bardsley, Governor BNP to MacMichacl. Civil Secretary. 29 June 19~O,
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attempt was made to centralise and standardise authority. Gradually a situation WJS
arrived at by which there was one village sheikh per village, one omda presiding over
several villages, and one sheikh of khut in charge of a defined territorial area.
However, below this level of official administrative centralisation remained a
plethora of social, economic and religious influences. Although constrained by the
centralising limitations imposed by the government, government policies did not
eradicate the multiple foci of authority, which remained entrenched within the social
structure of the Gezira. Structures of authority remained diffuse, refusing to form a
single pattern of relationships. In some cases these multiple structures were
controlled by one dominant lineage. In others, various wealthy families held
positions of informal authority and invested in non-administrative means of gaining
power; controlling religious tariqas, expanding landholdings and trading ventures
and in charitable giving within communities. In all cases, authority was flexible and
the Condominium government demonstrated little ability to alter the structures of
local governance that had existed upon its arrival.
3ADMINISTERING CUSTOM
The mediation of disputes was of central concern to an administration in which
administrative and judicial powers were virtually indistinguishable. The merka: as
the physical location of district government stood as an emblem of the combined
powers of the central authorities, containing not only the colonial administrative
offices but also the police headquarters, the prison and courtroom. With government
personnel severely stretched, it appeared inevitable that the same mix of judicial and
administrative powers would be delegated to those identified as community leaders,
resulting in a centralised Sudanese administrative elite. However, this was a gradual
process in the Gezira region, and during the first twenty years of the Condominium,
failed to have any significant impact as 'custom' with all its ambiguity remained the
central hallmark of both formal and informal judicial processes. Warburg argues that
the effect of British administrators using and interpreting custom was to "undermine
tribal leadership ... obstructing the natural course of development of tribal laws and
customs".' However, this understanding of custom as a traditional construct distinct
from the 'modern' ideas of the government fails to understand the complexity of
custom as a series of tools allowing communities to adapt to and engage with
external developments. The values lying behind what has been called custom may
not have greatly changed, but the ways in which those values could be translated into
actions were almost endless.
I Warburg. The Sill/ali Under Wingate. p. 136.
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A distinction between formal and informal judicial structures was made in early
condominium policy. Government-identified Sheikhs did have a small formal role in
Condominium judicial administration, but it was upon the informal mechanisms of
community settlements that the government relied. The result was a truly devolved
and largely hidden community justice system that did not centralise power or codifv
law. In the first twenty years of the Condominium, the desire of communities to
settle disputes through informal and internal mechanisms was consistently
demonstrated. Use of parallel government judicial structures only occurred when
these internal mechanisms broke down, or as a means to access government
controlled resources. Ideas of custom were central to each judicial form, and the
continuing ambiguity of custom created a broad and flexible range of interpretations
offering an aspect of choice to the population.
Before the nineteenth century, official judicial procedures within the Gezira were
located within parallel hierarchical systems of courts headed by the Fung sultan and
Islamic judges. In addition, local sheikhs and fekis settled disputes within and
between communities.i Under Ottoman rule, Turkish codes of centralised civil and
military law were imported to Sudan and administered by paid government officials.
Shari' a law was administered by a strengthened ulema, and local custom was
recognised in civil matters and "dispensed by local notables."} During the Mahdia,
the secular apparatus of justice was disbanded in favour the Mahdi's (and
subsequently the Khalifa's) personalised interpretation of Islamic law, but again,
local men of influence were required to maintain basic order within communities.4
Thus preceding the Condominium, a multiple range of authorities existed for the
settling of disputes within and between communities and central powers. Over the
course of the condominium a similar system existed, with the government reliant
upon a range of formal and informal judicial procedures.
It has been argued that Europeans, informed by ideas of equality before the law and
the belief in universal and predictable notions of rights and wrongs, struggled with
1 J. Spaulding, "The Evolution of the Islamic Judiciary in Sinnar", International Journal ofAtrican
Historical Studies, 10, (1977), 40~-426.
3 Zaki Mustafa, The Common Law in the Sudan: an Account of the 'Justice, Equity, and Good
Conscience' Provision (Oxford. 197I), p. ~7.
~ Holt, The Mahdist state, pp. I 12-I 16.
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the ambiguity of customary settlements. 5 Just as the need to know, and thus
dominate, 'the other' had led colonial administrations to categorise people into tribes,
so it compelled them to frame codes of procedure that were regularised and
universally applicable. Recent works have emphasised the controlling nature of
colonial governments in fixing and formalising customary judicial procedure." By
seeing customary law as something extant, whole and definable, able to be written
down and codified, it has been suggested that it was transformed from the fluid and
shifting forms of dispute settlement existing in pre-colonial periods to a rigid, fixed
and frequently 'uncustomary' system. 7 Chanock has further suggested that the
colonial need to know and to understand social procedures, provided space for an
elite social interest group to offer a definitive and homogenous version of customary
law." However, across northern Sudan the emphasis of the judicial system in the first
twenty years of the Condominium was upon informality and continuing fluidity. It
was in this context of continuing fluidity that the ability to interpret custom became a
powerful tool. However the lack of bureaucratisation meant that this ability was
diffuse and non-centralised in the first two decades of the Condominium.
Custodians of Custom - The Ambiguity of Government
The immediate administrative emphasis of the Condominium government was upon
creating a legal framework that gave officials the power to punish offences. In 1899,
the government passed the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. These
codes imposed rigid and 'Westernised' legal boundaries onto a non-Western
population in a classic case of colonial dominance. Through the categorisation of
crimes and the detailing of procedure, an attempt was made to make law definite and
set. The codes created a formal and hierarchical structure of law with clearly
delineated rights and wrongs, fixed notions of criminality and particulariscd
punishments. In its written form there was no compromise made to local
5 Kristin Mann, and Richard Roberts (eds..) Law in Colonial Africa (London. \ \)\) \ ), p. 4.
6 See Spear "Neo-traditionalism and the limits of invention", for a review of current literature.
7 Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order.
K Ihid., p. 77.
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understandings of criminality; an arena of distinct and rigidly defined law had been
created."
Headed by the Legal Secretary, and governed by the ultimate authority of the
Governor General, there were in fact only three High Court judges employed by the
government.l'' Lacking an effective judicial staff, the administration of these codes
was delegated to provincial and district government officials. Under the Penal Code,
five subordinate classes of courts were created; a Mudir's, or provincial governor's
court consisting of three magistrates including the Mudir; a minor district court also
consisting of three magistrates with one at least being of second class; and three
magistrates' courts of the first, second and third classes. These courts allowed
government officials of qualified rank, to try cases within specific boundaries
relating to offence and sentencing as laid out in the Penal Code. The hierarchical
nature of the system meant that powers diminished on a scale based both on rank of
officials and the nature of the court. And while magistrates of first and second
classes - the provincial governor and British district inspectors respectively - could
try cases both in court settings and summarily at lower sentencing powers,
magistrates of the third class, namely Marnurs, could only try cases summarily. I I
However, the Penal Code was only half of the formal legislation introduced at the
start of the Condominium, and one year later the Civil Justice Ordinance was passed.
In the guise of formal bureaucracy, this ordinance was in fact founded on ambiguity.
It was this considered ambiguity of the civil ordinance that established flexibility as
the dominant influence upon the legal administration during the Condominium. In
contrast with the concern to rid leadership titles of ambiguity, government policy
actively retained an ambiguity in legal procedures. Knowing only that they wished
to work to the tone of existing custom, but unsure of what this existing custom was,
civil law remained an essentially unfixed body of legislation. As Cromer stated:
[I]t was not thought advisable to create a body of substantial civil
law at a time when all that was known of the customs of the
9 Sudan Government. The Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure. /899 (Cairo: 1899).
In Zaki Mustafa, The common law in the Sudan, p. 59.
II Sudan Government, The Sudan Code of Criminal Procedure. 1899.
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people was that they probably differed from those of anv countrv
- -
whose legislation could have been taken as a precedent. 12
While the ordinance instituted a formalised hierarchy of courts and court procedures
in the model of the Penal Code, it did little to legislate for particular rules or laws.
The only fixed civil laws related to land and some forms of taxation, and the
dominant feature of the Ordinance was in its provision of guidelines for the
administration of civil justice by prevailing 'custom', with the only proviso that
judgements should conform to "justice, equity, and good conscience". 13
British officials thus found themselves acting as judges within a narrow style of
criminal law, and as the custodians of a civil law which was based on largely
unknown custom and on vague notions of equity and common sense. Aiming for
stability and a return to the situation prior to 'Dervish contamination', the elevation
of custom was a way of gaining the confidence of the population. G.E. Matthews,
Governor of Upper Nile Province expressed common opinion when he wrote in 1908~
"so long as we decide cases according to equity and common sense, and avoid legal
technicalities, we shall hold the confidence of these tribes." 14 However, without
detailed written legislation, the administration of civil law by government officials
was conducted only "according to their understanding of customary law." 15 In
practice this understanding was influenced by what colonial officials knew best, the
common law system of English law." The flexibility of the legal structure allowed
the government to influence custom by melding local traditions with what they saw
as the best of European custom, "retaining the best of the native customs while
modifying them by such western practices as were suited to an evolving
civilisarion.v' Ambiguity remained at the centre of the government civil judicial
system, with vague and unverifiable notions of custom, mixed with equally vague
notions of universal justice existing as the basis of the law. By these means,
12 Lord Cromer in, SGR 1903, p. 17.
13 Sudan Government, The Sudan Civil Justice Ordinance 1900, (Cairo, National Printing Office.
1900).
lot SGR 1908, p. 663. .
15 Douglas Johnson, "Judicial Regulation and Administrative control: Customary Law and the Nucr,
1898-195'+". Journal ofAfrican History. 27, (1986) 59-78, at p. 62.
16 Egon Guttman, "The Reception of the Common Law in the Sudan", The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly. 6, (1957), ppA01-'+ 17.
11 Jackson, Behind the modem Stu/an, p. 67.
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government authority was firmly established as a hierarchical and formal apparatus
but applying a mix of fixed and fluid regulations.
Controlling Custom
This lack of codification of custom left space for contestation and raises many
questions about who controlled the interpretation of custom. Custom was corruptible,
open to administrators influence and political manipulation. The fluidity of a law
based upon custom was distinctly advantageous to an administration that had only a
limited knowledge of the society it ruled, and was uncertain about the direction it
wanted society to take. As Brett Shadle has posited;
British officials believed that reducing African custom to written
law and placing it in a code would 'crystallise' it, altering its
fundamentally fluid or evolutionary nature. Colonizers naturally
harboured intentions of using the law to shape society but a fluid,
unwritten law provided much greater latitude to pursue these
goals."
The continuing ambiguity of civil and large parts of criminal law allowed change,
and gave the administration the space to decide what direction this change was to
take. A further benefit of using custom as a basis of law was in its efficiency.
Settlements by custom generally gained wider approval than those made according to
alien legal codes, and did little to disrupt existing community structures or culture.
Even the application of the Penal Code was subordinate to the understanding of
custom, and the importance of accepted settlements. Pragmatism was the order of
the day, even when it flew in the face of European convention. Understanding that
"the same crime committed by a Sudanese black, a Jaalin Arab, or a Kababish nomad
would probably not be fairly met by the same punishment", British inspectors were
18 Brett Shadle, "Changing Traditions to meet Current Altering Conditions: Customary Law. African
Courts and the Rejection of Codification in Kenya, 1930-60", Journal ofAfrican History. -lO. ( 19(9).
-l11-431. at pp. -l11-2.
Administering Custom
encouraged to seek settlements that accorded with local understandings of fairness. 19
In particular, the statutory punishment of life imprisonment or death in the case of
murder was on occasions remitted in favour of a payment of blood money and a
token sentence of imprisonment." Community acceptance of government decisions
was a primary motivation for the administration.
However, despite the emphasis upon local custom, the law as applied by British
officials failed to be as fluid as communities wished. A case that occurred in Wad
Medani - in which charms bought from a tiki were associated with a man's death _
was accepted locally as a case of black magic. 21 Kenneth Henderson, province
Governor also wished it to be interpreted as a case of magic, on the basis that that
was the man's intention in using the charms. However, Henderson was acutely
aware that such a premise would not be accepted in a criminal court, and thus
predicted that the man would be acquitted. Although the final case outcomes are
undocumented, this reveals much about the government's confused attitude towards
local custom, and the ongoing debates over the application and direction of law, that
occurred within the administration.
Just as custom was open to manipulation and direction by government officials, so
the free interpretation of custom potentially empowered the identified elite of 'tribal'
and community leaders by giving them the ear of government. Chanock focuses
upon this potential to suggest that control over customary law became a central arena
of contestation within communities.n Certainly, administrators' understanding of
custom was gained primarily through discussion with community leaders, and
administrators unfamiliar with local custom frequently approached community
mediators; administrative sheikhs, religious figures and 'councils of elders' to apply
their knowledge and authority to the case. Not only did community leaders know the
background to cases, but it was felt that indigenous forms of dispute settlement.
"emphasizing intermediaries and intermediation, delegations, dyadic diplomacy,
compensation, truce and final reconciliation and peace-making" were frequently
19 SGR 1904, p. 57.
20 Warburg, The Sudan Under Wingate, p. 126.
21 SAD 5,'nil 0, Henderson to his mother, 29 April 1927.
22 Chanock. Law, Custom and Social Order, chapter 4.
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superior to anything offered by the DC. 23 Thus, when struggling with knowing what
legal or customary principles to apply to a case brought against afiki. whose claim to
cure a sick donkey was undermined when the donkey was eaten by a hyena, H.C.
Jackson, DC Sennar, simply passed the whole case on to a local council of elders.i"
Community mediators, and particularly the administrative elite remained the
acknowledged experts of customary law, and the government provided them with
considerable judicial space in which to operate. That this could work to the
advantage of sheikhs is demonstrated in the ability for them to portray formerly
communal lands as their own property during the process of land registration in the
first decade of Condominium rule. 25
However, it was over the issue of slavery - in which custom came up against
enshrined Western notions of individual liberty - that the elite gained their most
emphatic win. Despite the fervent anti-slavery stance prevalent within Britain itself.
the policy taken towards slavery in the first years of the Condominium was intensely
pragmatic and favoured the slave-owning elite. Although finding the institution of
slavery distasteful, the British were convinced of its customary role in Sudanese
economic life. 26 In an effort to maintain a level of continuity and social and
economic security, the administration followed a policy of giving freedom papers
only to those who requested them, and not interfering in any cases that were not
brought to the government's attention." Even on the occasions of a slave's request
for freedom, DC's were to make all efforts to mediate between slave and master and
28
encourage the slave to stay.
This policy was sanctioned on the understanding that domestic slavery was not only
an integral part of northern Sudanese society, but was a benign institution. The
distinction was made between domestic slavery and the trading in slaves; "the object
of the whole thing [slave policy] being to stop trading in humanity rather than to
21 Richard Antoun, "Civil Society, Tribal Process, and Change in Jordan: An Anthropological View".
Journal ofMiddle Eastern Studies. 32. (2000), pp. 441-463. at p. 446.
21 H.C. Jackson, Sudan Days and Ways, (London. 1954). pp. 48-9.
25 Nihlock Class and power in Sudan, p. 15
26 Warhurg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 51.
n Sikainga, Slaves into Workers. pp. 44-50.
28 NRO BNP 1/28/21 I. 'Regulations as to Sudanese Servants. 1907'.
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disturb slavery as an institution where it was not particularly harmful.t'" Summing
up the government's benign understanding of slavery within the Gezira, the Assistant
DC of Hassaheissa wrote; "all the larger sheikhs have so-called slaves, and the richer
ones a fair number of them; they look after them very well, treat them well, and
allow them practically unlimited liberty." 30 This interpretation of slavery
deliberately supported the existing status quo, and the government failed to abolish
slavery in the fear that it would "alienate the section of Sudanese society that has
been till now loyal to government.?" The support for the 'big-men' of Sudan was
deemed as a more important consideration than any moral queasiness felt towards
slavery.
That the elite took specific measures to defend the 'customary' right to own slaves
was demonstrated in the deputation of sheikhs that arrived at the office of the DC in
Medani expressing their concern at the government's action of giving freedom
papers to each slave that asked for one. 32 It was only when the elite began to see
greater advantages in the abolition of slavery that the defence of this custom was
stopped. The disadvantages of having to feed and house a slave all year round and
support him in old age, soon became apparent when compared with the cost of short-
term hired labour. With labour migration patterns emerging in response to the needs
and opportunities provided by the Gezira Scheme, hired labour became a more
efficient manner of farming, and the elite actually looked to the government to
abolish slavery as a means for them to escape their obligations in the upkeep of
slaves.33
29 NRO BNP 1/18/112, 'Minutes of the Gezira District Commissioners' meeting', 2.+ December 192X.
30 NRO BNP 1/28/211, ADC Hassaheissa to Governor BNP, 29 February 192'+.
11 NRO BNP 1/28/211, Huddleston, Governor BNP to Lyall. Civil Secretary. 22 December 192'+ .
.12 NRO BNP 1/28/211. OJ. Coates, ADC Medani to Huddleston. Governor BNP. 2.+ January J92tJ
.1.1 NRO BNP 1/28/211. E.J.N. Wallis, Commissioner Gezira Area to Huddleston. Governor B:\P rc:
comments by Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Isa, 9 Fehruary 1927: See also Sikainga. Slaves into Workers, p.
104 and Jackson, Sudan Days and Ways, p. 4'+.
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Petitioning the Merka:
However, although the administrative and economic elite may have defined custom,
its application in law did not always defend their interests. With no code
,
conceptions of fairness and interpretations of custom as held by sheikhs and by the
DC, frequently clashed, and in the cases that came to the attention of the government
official, it was invariably the interpretation of the latter that won. The government
saw itself as a force to eradicate what was seen as endemic corruption among sheikhs.
This perception of overriding corruption was summed up by the publication of a case,
apocryphal one assumes, in which a village sheikh settled a claim of a theft of three
sheep by giving one sheep to the injured owner in case there had been a theft, one
sheep to the accused in case there had not, and one sheep kept by the sheikh as
payment for his work. 34 It was against such cases of elite enrichment that the
government aimed to defend the 'common man'. The government prided itself on its
openness, and the ability of even the 'poorest inhabitants' to petition the government
directly. The 1907 annual report described this process as 'unwritten law' with "no
effort ... made by the local officials to curtail this popular privilege.t" Despite its
reliance upon internal mechanisms, the government was able to maintain its power
through the establishment of a hierarchy of judicial procedures, in which customary
settlements became subject to the higher authority of government officials. With a
general suspicion of the very elite they co-opted, and an ethos of detached fairness,
opportunities did exist for successful challenges against the elite.
That the merkaz was not a rubber stamp for the elite's interpretation of custom is
demonstrated in the frustration aired by a village sheikh against the judgement of a
DC. When J.W. Robertson as ADC Rufa'a sentenced a man to ten years for the
culpable homicide of two men killed in a fight, the sheikh complained "as he
considers two years quite enough - one for each man".36 However, the extent to
which the judgements of the merkaz actually benefited the less well off was limited.
Freedom papers for slaves were rare, with only 113 papers granted in the ten year"
.q SGR 1905, p. 38.
1~ 1
.. SGR 1907, p. 15-t ,
.11> SAD 531/~/l-III. Robertson to his mother. 18 January 19~3.
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from 1915 to 1925 in Medani district, as against an estimated 5,700 'servant-.'
existing within the district.V Furthermore, the high number of successful claims for
the recovery of loans worked to consolidate the economic position of the elite.
despite official sympathy towards the debtor crippled by what were seen to be
. I h' h 38 Thexcessive y ig usury rates. rough the manipulation of custom and the legal
codes, elites were frequently able to retain and consolidate their privileges. The
government's desire for stability only reinforced this trend.
Access to the government was further countered by the difficulties of taking cases to
the merkaz, either because of distance, because of an intimidation of the formal
procedural process, or because of the potentially alienating effect this would have in
a person's community. However, despite these deterrents, the Governor-General
received approximately one thousand petitions annually during the first years of the
Condominium, relating to a wide range of issues.r" At the district level, it was
predominantly the poor and alienated who came for assistance as it was this group
that had the most to gain from such appeal to government strength, although as seen
in the case of slavery, the elite also turned to the merkaz to defend and back their
interests. The amount of time spent by district commissioners in dealing directly
with members of the public demonstrates clearly the willingness of individuals to use
the machinery of central government40 Familiar with the idea of centralised and
alien authority under former central regimes, the population readily saw the
government as a point of arbitration and appeal.
Petitions generally related to issues directly controlled by the government, such as
taxes, licence fees or unpopular sheikhly appointments. 41 On other occasions
petitions were heard appealing decisions made by a sheikh and considered
17 NRO BNP 1/28/211, Barter, DC Medani, to Huddleston, Governor BNP, 23 March 1926. A
similarly high figure of 3,500 'servants' was made for Hassaheissa district; Corfield, ADC
Hassaheissa, to Huddleston, 20 March 1926.
38 SGR 1906, p. 75. .
39 SGR 1907, p. 154. Subjects of early appeal to the Khartoum authorities included requests lor.
employment and questions regarding building and other regulations. suggesting an awareness oj the
srecific powers of central authority.
.j Henderson as ADC Medani spent four hours a day trying cases brought to him. SAD 5.~71l()113
Henderson diary entry. 22 June 1927.
II Ibid".5 January 1927.
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. f 42
unsatis actory. However, as well as appealing against existing judgements. the
merka: court was also actively used by communities on occasions when formal
judgements (backed by government authority) were required. The high number of
cases brought to district civil courts by merchants aiming to recover loans given on
credit suggests the unsuitability of local settlement mechanisms for this means. This
was especially true in cases in which the merchant was from outside the area. In
these cases the merchant had no relationship with a local sheikh, and thus was
unwilling, or unable to use such personages as figures of arbitration, and
subsequently sought justice at the merkar."
Incorporating Sheikhs
Historians have frequently portrayed the early years of the Condominium as a direct
administration." However, there were severe limitations on the effectiveness of
government officials in the administration of justice. District officials who were
responsible for the administration of justice were remote from the lives of most
people. Treks, although a crucial element of the British administration, were
infrequent and their very public nature made private recourse to the touring DC
difficult. Thus those identified as the leaders of communities were incorporated into
the system of centralised justice. Through the requirements of government-
recognised sheikhs to make summons and report certain crimes, sheikhs were a
visible part of the formal judicial and administrative procedures of the Condominium.
However, this formal use of sheikhs was only a minor aspect of their 'judicial' role.
The Condominium administration was also heavily reliant upon informal arbitration
to resolve local disputes. The inability of government officials to fully administer
the judicial codes interacted neatly with the government's idealisation of 'tribal'
42 Jackson, Sudan Days and Ways. p. '+3.
·13 SGR 1906, p. 349. .
j~ Sarah Voll for instance states that "the theory of native administration was adopted onl~ after a long
period of direct rule". S. Voll. "The Introduction of Native Administration in the Anglo-Egypua»
Sudan" Al-Abhath, 24, (1971) pp. 111-123. at p. III.
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structures and the desire to empower community leaders. The 'customary' judicial
authority within communities was supported, and sheikhs were "encouraged to
maintain order among their own adherents, and to deal with minor misdemeanours
themselves, as they had done for generations past.,,45 This policy was explicitly
intended to shore up tribal authority, and Matthew emphasised that "provided neither
cruelty nor extortion is practised we should be careful to avoid the danger of robbing
chiefs of their power.?"
The essence of these community settlements was flexibility. As Anthony Disney
reported;
There was no formal code, or system, but a vast corpus of
unwritten law, carried in the minds of the tribal and village elders,
varying from place to place in accordance with local requirements,
changing to meet new needs and acceptable to the people."
The government made no attempt to categorise custom as it was practised within the
community, seeing rival authorities within the community and the right to appeal to
the merkaz as safeguards to abuse. Suitable mediators were found throughout the
community in the form of government sheikhs, religious men, and community
notables, all of whom might work independently, or as a group. The key was to find
an acceptable authority to all parties involved in the dispute. As with the flexibility of
custom, the figures of authority were also flexible, and were not confined to
government-identified leaders. For instance Sheikh Abdel Gader Ahmed el Bedawi,
also known as Fiki Wad Hashi had no officially sanctioned position, but was famed
for his "mediatory skills and "exercise]d] the common right to arbitrate in disputes
voluntarily brought to him for settlement." 48 Dealing with all types of cases;
criminal, civil and Shari'a, Wad Hashi offered advisory compensation solutions to
disputes in a process that proved popular with litigants and enjoyed "a very good
repute".49
45 Jackson, Behind the modem Sudan. p. 110.
46 SGR 1908, p. 663.
47 Anthony Disney, "English Law in the Sudan, 1899-1958", Sudan Notes and Records. 40, (Il),'il)) pp.
121-123, at p. 121.
48 NRO BNP l/l/l, anon., "Note on Fiki Wad Hashi", n.d.
49 Ibid.,
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The importance of independent religious leaders in dispute settlement and as general
community power brokers was, by the 1920s openly recognised by the government
despite the continuing lack of official sanction. Recognising that religious leaders
"do exercise a good deal of influence which exists not by virtue of encouragement on
the part of Government but by virtue of 'old traditions''', unofficial use was made of
these channels of authority.i'' With practical results a higher priority than ideology.
the forms of judicial authority within communities remained virtually unchanged in
the first two decades of the Condominium, continuing to be based upon a multiple
range and forms of authority. Notably these informal judicial structures remained
largely independent and unsupervised by government officials. There was no formal
apparatus of personnel, procedure or paperwork, settlements went undocumented and
remained for the most part invisible to colonial administrators during the first half of
the Condominium. It is therefore very difficult to get an impression of the ways in
which Gezira communities settled their disputes. However the flexibility and
dispersed authority of 'judicial' authority within the Gezira is suggested by the forms
of dispute settlement during the process of land registration within Messellemia
district, in which sheikhs, omdas, notables and holy men were all called upon to act
as mediators between antagonistic parties. 51
Administrative sheikhs may have been appointed and recognised by the government,
but they did not necessarily have more community-sanctioned power because of their
position. As R.V. Bardsley, new Governor of Blue Nile Province stated; "the
religious head of any given family exercises, without Government sanction, more
power than the Government administrative representative - and in the majority of
cases he is the better man in every way.,,52 In this structure, the government sheikh
held an uncertain position. He generally had considerable authority in his locality.
but was not necessarily dominant. His was a specific role in which he acted as a
mediator between the community and the government. He was at the same time "a
direct, if sometimes passive, agent of external authority", and "the principal
50 Huddleston, Governor BNP to all DCs BNP, 3 February 1927. (emphasis in original). for instance
Huddleston requested the services of an omda and a religious leader in settling a blood dispute 111 a
village near Wad Medani. SAD 537/10. Henderson to his mother. :" August 1427,
5\ Peacock, A Report 011 the Land Settlement, p. 46. . " . , ,5~ NRO ICivscc 1/16/50, Bardsley. Governor BNP to Maclvlichacl, Civil xccrciarv. 4 June IlLS
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spokesman for the community and a patron of its interests. ,,53 The recognition of
government provided the opportunity for the extension of power: however this
mediating role was also potentially limiting forcing the sheikh to balance the
demands of government and the wishes of the people. 5~
In whatever form, there was a consistent preference for communities to settle their
own disputes when possible. Jackson summed up this preference of villages to retain
control over the processes of justice in a typical dismissive manner,
Litigation being to them what football or cricket is to the average
Englishman, it was much more satisfying and encouraging to play
on the home ground under the village tree than it was to play an
'away match' at District Headquarters.f
This light-hearted understanding of community justice vastly undervalued the
importance of a community settling its own internal disputes, and in the process
maintaining the working structure of a community. Observing a judgement passed
by Sheikh Mohammed Musaad of the Halawin, Richardson asked "the victim", (the
accused on trial) whether he wanted the case to be re-tried at the Merka~.56 To the
Richardson's surprise, the offer was declined. The merka: might have offered a
more lenient punishment, but in its external judgement, and its concern to punish
rather than negotiate an outcome acceptable to all parties, merka: judicial settlements
were unable to provide for the re-establishment of normal relations so necessary
within small communities. Even if not applying a fixed code, British dualistic
conceptions of justice, with a victim and victor, and punishment relating solely to
crime, rather than context, worked to fix notions of justice. Communities aimed to
avoid this process through settling as many of their own judgements as possible."
53 Marvin G. Weinbaum "Structure and Performance of Mediating Elites", In 1. William Zartman.
(ed.,) Elites in the Middle East (New York, 1980), p. 156.
5-1 Marshall Clough, Fighting Two Sides.
55 Jackson, Behind the Modem Sudan, pp. 112-113.
56 NRO BNP 1/1/1, Richardson, ADC Hassaheissa to Huddleston, Governor BNP. II Februarv \Y27
57 Sec Johnson, "Judicial Regulation and Administrative control", for an analysis of the different
conceptions of justice within Condominium Sudan.
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The Availability of Choice
In addition to settlements given at the merkaz and within the community, the formal
structure of Shari' a courts tried civil cases between consenting Muslims under the
jurisdiction of educated qadis. Seen as part of customary authority in northern Sudan.
the government made a concerted attempt to strengthen the structure of Islamic law.
Like tribal structures, the institutions of Shari'a law were perceived as having
suffered severe dislocation under the rule of the Mahdi. The 'traditional' role of
orthodox Islam was thus evoked by Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who wrote in 190 I
"Under the old Government every place of any pretensions had its Cadi".s8 The
value of this tradition was particularly high in the context of the suspicion held
towards unorthodox Islam, and its evocation of the spectre of the Mahdia. The
strengthening of orthodox Islam became a central aspect of early Condominium
policy, allowing as it did, the government to attack Sufism, while still presenting
themselves as the supporters of Islam. Thus by actively supporting the ulema, "the
government received an orthodox Muslim sanction for its actions.t'"
In 1902, the 'Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts Ordinance' provided for a reformed
Islamic judicial system, and as with the other legal codes it formed a hierarchy of
courts in districts and provinces, and a high court in Khartoum. Through this
ordinance a formal apparatus of Islamic law was established and ultimately
controlled by the government. Not only was the Grand Qadi appointed by the
Governor-General of Sudan, but all Egyptian Qadis entering Sudan were first vetted
by Slatin and Bonham-Carter before being 'appointed' by the Grand Qadi of Egypt.?"
Through such stringent controls and the reduction of court powers, the Sudan
government was able to develop an institution which supported it.
As long as the Shari'a courts did not present a challenge, then they were left to
conduct their business with a high degree of independence. Islamic courts maintained
an independent appeals system and internal systems of inspection in part because of
58 Edgar Bonham-Carter quoted in Donald Hawley. Sandtracks ill the Sudan. (Norwich. 199)). p. 72.
5<) Daly. Empire 011 the Nile. p. 123.
60 Warhurg. Sudan Under Wingate. p. 17.
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the obvious lack of Islamic legal qualifications of government officials. However.
the absence of government discussion about Islamic law also suggests a lack of
interest in Islamic law other than in its ability to maintain stability. This was
demonstrated in the ambivalent attitudes to legal practice. Not only were non-
orthodox practices permitted, they were actively encouraged if this was to maintain
order among populations that considered their customary interpretation of Islamic
law to be orthodox. As Cromer stated
The men appointed Deputy Kadis [sic] are usually men who have
a reputation in their own villages of being men of religion and
who are consequently respected. Their decisions, though wrong
in form and possibly in law are based on a knowledge of the
people and are usually regarded by them as just."
As with other forms of judicial administration, the emphasis was upon consensus and
acceptance rather than strict codification, and ambiguity was tolerated in the cause of
stability.
While Shari'a courts had powers to decide cases of personal status, they also had
jurisdiction in wider civil issues if all parties agreed." This ability gave considerable
scope for public assessment of the differences between court procedures and the
potential benefits of the different facilities. Henderson wrote that women in
particular frequently found the Hanafi code of orthodox courts more favourable (and
more accessible) than the Maliki interpretation of Islamic law, which was the
63 0 ..stronger influence upon custom throughout most of northern Sudan. - nee again. It
was the poor that had the greatest potential gain through using these courts and were
the most frequent litigants. Popular use and approval of these courts was
demonstrated in the increase in fees taken and in the long term demand for a court in
Managil which was finally granted in 1910.64
The British administration thus recognised three systems of justice: that of the legal
codes administered by government officials; customary law administered hy local
61 SGR 1903. p. xxxiii. . _ ..
62 M.l EI Nur, "The Role of the Native Courts in the Administration of Justice In the Sudan . Sudan
Notes and Records. .+1 (1960). pp. 78-87. at p. 79.
6.1 Henderson. SeT Under Authoritv, p. 51
h~ SGR 1906. p. 356 and 1910. p. 608.
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leaders; and Islamic law administered by an appointed educated judiciary. They thus
returned to a multilayered system not dissimilar to that established by the Turko-
Egyptians in the nineteenth century. With the exception of Shari'a courts beinz
C'
unable to try criminal cases, and capital crimes always being judged by government
officials, the jurisdiction of these systems overlapped greatly. In effect this gave the
population of Sudan a choice of formal institutions to which they could take their
disputes. While taking into account the limitations in gaining access to sometimes
remote district offices or Shari'a courts, this "availability of externally constituted
hearing agencies changed the options" and potentially empowered people. 65 A
person might tum to the merkaz; the sheikh, the qadi, or other religious figure. or he
might tum to several of these authorities in appeal until he got the judgement that he
was looking for. These decisions (and limitations upon them) were formed on the
basis of the type of the case and the circumstances of the individual.
Ambiguity remained the main feature of Condominium judicial processes throughout
the first two decades of the Condominium. Vague notions of 'custom' formed the
basis of procedures in the civil suits at the Merkaz as well as community-based
dispute settlements. British officials presented themselves as the disseminators of
custom within a formal and hierarchical setting, in which it was never clear whether
fixed rules or flexible solutions were the dominant policy. Away from the merkaz:
the government relied upon community leaders to settle disputes that the government
could not. In contrast with the merkaz: these community settlements were informal
and undocumented. As with Islamic courts, they retained practical independence.
with only rare government interference. The common theme was the decision not to
codify 'custom', or to impose rigid interpretations of the law. Based largely on
custom, judicial processes remained for the most part flexible, for 'custom' could
and did mean many things.
The control of these judicial processes, and the interpretation of custom brought
considerable power to individuals. In particular, the wealthy elite with the ear of
government officials were able to gain significant advantages by presenting
themselves as the guardians of tradition. As the gatekeeper between the worlds of
65 Falk Moore. Social Facts and Fabrications. p. 170.
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the government and the community, the sheikh was in a central position in the
community. However, during the first twenty years of the Condominium, the sheikh.
while recognised by the government, had few formal powers and was unable to
assume total command of community judicial administration. The very role of
sheikhs as gatekeepers meant that they balanced a delicate line between communities
and the government. The existence of other individuals with mediating powers
meant that these powers were shared and dispersed throughout the community.
From 1920, this flexible situation was to end. Until that date third class magistrates
who sat on Mudir and Minor District courts as provided by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, were all appointed from Mamurs, thus retaining an effective separation
between community and government machinery. In 1920, the same legislation was
used to appoint Sheikhs and Omdas, and in that year, all Sheikhs of Khut within the
Gezira were appointed third class magistrates." Although this was a continuation of
their administrative, government appointed role, the incorporation of 'native leaders'
into the formal judicial bureaucracy of government marked a considerable departure
from previous policy. As government servants, sheikhs were required to both
administer custom within the community and apply formal codes from the merkaz:
In recognising only Sheikhs of Khut and a limited number of Omdas, the government
began the process of centralisation of official powers within the personnel of
government-identified sheikhs that was to become the theme of subsequent policy.
t.t. Sudan Government Gazette. no. 360. I June 1920. p. 12fl8.
4CREATING COURTS
After twenty years of applying 'customary law' from the merka; and relying on virtually
hidden forms of judicial settlement at the local level, the active application of Indirect
Rule marked a transformation in the ways in which judicial settlements were reached.
As Sally Falk Moore has stated; "When 'customary law' is treated as a set of mandatory
substantive rules enforced by a court rather than as a set of guideline norms used by a
primary group to manage the affairs of its members a major reinterpretation is
involved."! Government policies formalised and bureaucratised judicial procedures with
an aim of creating accountable bodies considered necessary for equitable administration.
The period after 1920 saw the formal bureaucratic judicial procedures previously
confined to the government extend into the community. A series of legislative reforms
gave defined judicial powers to government sheikhs and began to officially centralise
power at the community level. This government-driven process was embraced by
Gezira communities who used courts as a way of controlling their own experience of
formal justice and governance. At the same time existing informal methods of dispute
settlement were also retained away from the centralised control of the government
resulting in the continuation of a flexible system of judicial settlement.
The process also demonstrates a concerted attempt by the government to shape the
direction of Sudan's future by strengthening the supposedly traditional and tribal
I Moore, Social facts and fabrications. p. 170.
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elements of society, with rural sheikhs seen as the 'natural' custodians of customary law,
By the mid-1920s, the theory of Indirect Rule had become a central element of
government self-identification.i Inherently conservative and suspicious of the desire of
the educated urban effendi class for political change, the involvement of the latter in the
political unrest of the early 1920s hastened the desire of the government to give
increasing powers to 'traditional' leaders whose interests were believed to ally more
closely with the government. In October 1924, Guy Pawson, the Deputy Governor of
Blue Nile Province, outlined the supposed dangers posed by effendia when he described
mamurs as men who
[I]nherit the Egyptian love of personal power and the Egyptian
dislike of the powerful Nazir or Omda... They have no conception of
themselves as men of less importance than the Nazirs and Omdas of
the district, while by an alteration in their dress and mode of life, they
raise a barrier between themselves and their own people ... With the
whole structure of rule by native chiefs still to be built up, the danger
from a powerful native official class [is] very real.'
The introduction of a policy that relied on stringent notions of tribal 'tradition' at the
same time as the Gezira Scheme - with its decidedly 'untraditional' structures - was
about to be opened, was a contradiction that proved a running problematic for the
government."
The legislation of the 1920s attempted to counter the 'threat' that the growth of a
modern educated and non-tribal population posed, by giving greater powers to
'traditional' authorities. In actual fact the continuing drive for efficiency meant that the
legislation created a bureaucratic structure of courts, which worked as extensions of the
merka: and were far from traditional and far from being effectively devolved. With
salaried personnel, native courts administered criminal and civil codes in a similar way
2 Voll, "The Introduction of Native Administration", p. 111.
~ NRO 1Civsec 50/2110, A.G. Pawson, Deputy Governor BNP, "Note on the native Mamur and Suh-
Mamur as effecting the government policy of centralization". 192..+. . .
4 Berry notes that this desire for a controllable 'Westernised' economy. at the same urne as wanting to
retain traditional norms within a society was an inherent contradiction of all colonial regime'>, .\'0
Condition is Permanent, p. 8.
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to the government offices, taking over many of the same duties that had previousIy been
conducted by the effendi class.' They were also closely monitored by the merkat; thus
effectively remaining part of the merka; infrastructure. Sudanese use of these courts
reflected the alien nature of the institutions. They were viewed as bodies through which
Sudanese might communicate with external communities and authorities. Central to the
courts' role within the Gezira was the cotton Scheme, and courts became central to the
functioning of the Scheme, mediating in the labour disputes and imposing the
agricultural ordinances that government administrators simply could not oversee. This
subordination of judicial and administrative purposes to the needs of the Scheme
illustrates that despite the traditional rhetoric, native courts were .modern ' institutions
cloaked in a thin guise of tradition.
Processes of Devolution
The Milner report of 1920 gave official sanction to the process of administrative and
judicial devolution to local leaders, with its conclusion that
Decentralization and the employment, wherever possible, of native
agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its
present stage of development, would make both for economy and
efficiency."
Under General Sir Lee Stack, who held the position of Governor General from 1917 to
1924, this report formed the basis of a dual policy. Mamurs and other educated and
trained Sudanese were still seen to hold a vital position in the administration and public
services of Sudan, but the positions of 'traditional' leaders were increasingly formalised
with the provision of official powers.
~ In the 1928 budget, fE.15,OOO was allocated for the purposes of 'devolution', most of which \\ ~s to he
spent on 'adequate remuneration' of tribal leaders sitting on courts. Voll, "The Introduction 01 Nauvc
Administration", p. \19.
fl Sudan Government, Memorandum - General .....dniinistrative Polin', p. \.
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The devolutionary policies of the 1920s were primarily formulated in judicial rather than
administrative terms, on the grounds that this "follows traditions better". and resulted in
a formal system of 'native courts'." The government's understanding of past traditions
shaped these policies and thus in 1922 the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance
recognised:
[I]t has from time immemorial been customary for native sheikhs
sitting alone or assisted by their tribal or district elders to exercise
powers of punishment upon those subject to their tribal or local
jurisdiction and of deciding disputes among them."
By extending formal judicial powers to tribal sheikhs the government attempted to
bolster the authority of 'traditional' tribal leadership. The Ordinance provided for each
appointed tribal sheikh, sitting individually or as president of a court to try certain
offences in his position as tribal leader rather than as a government magistrate. Judicial
procedure was regularised and formalised through the listing of offences and
punishments within the courts authority by warrant, but custom, which was at the heart
of a court's powers remained uncodified. However, although an important event in the
legal history of Sudan, this ordinance had little effect within the settled region of the
Gezira. It was not until 1926 that officially devolved courts were established in the area
by means of the Village Courts Ordinance.
In February of that year, Huddleston, the Governor of the Blue Nile Province, wrote to
the Civil Secretary requesting the application of the Village Courts Ordinance to the
province and identified the omodia as "the most convenient unit from which to establish
courts.',9 Thus although termed village courts, and seeming to recognise the social
importance of the village unit, the name was an anomaly, bringing together a number of
villages under the jurisdiction of one court, the president of which was the omda. A
permanent panel of members was appointed by the government. There were to be no
more than four members from anyone village, and each village sheikh was appointed
7 NRO 1Civscc 1/16/50. Huddleston. Governor BNP to Maclvlichacl, Civil Secretary. II ;"brch 1927.
K Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance 1922. Sudan Government Gazette. No. 396. 1922
I} NRO l Civscc 1/50/133. Huddleston. to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 23 February 192h
Creating Courts
ex-officio member. Although members had the automatic right to sit on the court in the
case of an inhabitant of their village being involved in the case, in every other case the)
were not allowed to sit as members unless invited.'? Based upon the idea of a group of
village 'elders', the ordinance actually centralised authority onto the ornda, and lacked
the fluidity of previous communal settlements. These courts had the jurisdiction to try
scheduled minor offences and award fines of up to £E.2, and to determine civil suits to
the value of £E.2. l l
These courts quickly became an established feature of the Gezira landscape with 23
established within the area of the Gezira Scheme by 1927, and 42 by 1928.12 Their
value in trying both civil and criminal cases was soon announced with Huddleston
writing as early as March 1927 that "the success of these courts has far exceeded my
expectations't.v' Throughout 1927, 328 cases came before village courts in Hassaheissa
district and it was estimated that "at least one third of these cases would otherwise have
come to the DC.,,14 The inference was that not only did village courts settle cases
formerly mediated informally by local leaders, but they were also able to incorporate
cases previously heard at the merkaz: Thus the mamur of Hassaheissa district heard only
127 cases during 1928, while the omda of Hassaheissa town heard a total of 329 cases.
As the annual report stated, "Far fewer petitions and petty quarrels have been brought to
the offices of the district commissioner and Mamur and people do go straight to the
Omda, which is most encouraging.t'P
Under the Governor-Generalship of Sir John Maffey, these first devolutionary steps
became a rush. With a fervent belief in the ideas of Indirect Rule, Maffey aimed to
further strengthen traditional authorities, "thereby sterilising and local ising the political
germs which must spread from the lower Nile into Khartoum.,,16 In 1927, the Powers of
10 NRO ICivsec 1/50/LB. "Regulations for Village Courts", 1926.
11 EI Nur, "Native Courts", p. 82.
12 NRO BNP 11271201. BNP Annual Report 1928.
13 NRO ICivsec 1/50/133, Huddleston. Governor BNP to MacMichael, Civil Secretary. 18 March 1927.
14 NRO 2BNP 42/2/10. BNP Annual Report 1927.
1" NRO BNP 1/27/201. BNP Annual Report 1928. emphasis in original
If> NRO BNP 1/1/1. 'Minute by His Excellency the Governor-GeneraI'I January 1927.
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Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance was replaced by the Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance. which
increased the official powers of sheikhs. Just one year later it was itself replaced by the
Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance, 1928, which extended the ordinance to settled areas. Like
the earlier ordinances, it provided for nominated Sheikhs sitting individually or in
meglis, to try a wide range of designated offences under the Sudan Penal Code, and on
the basis of custom. It did not allow courts to try offences that were contained in other
government ordinances. I? This series of legislation extended the codified concepts of
criminality to sheikhs' courts, and both opened opportunities to courts and at the same
time restricted them in other ways. However, the focus of these institutions continued to
be the application of custom, which remained open to interpretation.
Huddleston had grave doubts about the value of the 1927 Ordinance, believing that it
was still too tribally constructed for application in the Gezira:
There is clearly a great scope for an increase of judicial devolution in
the Gezira Scheme, but of large parts of the Scheme it can be said
that there is no individual of real authority, and that no tribal
discipline exists. 18
Huddleston instead suggested that the Scheme be included under the Courts of Elders
Ordinance, as then provided only for urban areas." These courts, with their emphasis
upon codified law rather than custom, Huddleston suggested, would overcome the
necessity of 'resurrecting' tribal identities. He argued for the specific needs of the
Gezira Scheme when he wrote of the courts of elders; "I feel that it will probably be
found that these courts suit sophisticated rural areas better than courts to be established
under the Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance.T"
17 EI Nur, "Native Courts", p. 82.
III NRO ICivsec 1/16/50. Huddleston. Governor BNP to MacMichaeI. C~v~1 Secretary. 2 April ,1927.
p
IlJ NRO ICivsec \/16/50. Huddleston. Governor BNP to MacMichacl. CIvIl Secretary. 1\ March \9_1.
~() NRO lCivscc \/16/50. Huddleston. Governor BNP to Maclvlichael, Civil Secretary. 2 April 1927.
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A Sophisticated Rural Area
Thus began a debate over the specialised nature and identity of the Gezira Scheme.
which as 'a sophisticated rural area' failed to come within the accepted rural/urban
dichotomy through which the government operated its devolutionary policy.
Contradiction was at the heart of government policy as regarded the Scheme. In the
climate of Indirect Rule, the government had to justify the creation of a highly
centralised and intrusive agricultural Scheme, which had in its planning stages prior to
the First World War been a straight-forward revenue-generating project. Driven by the
necessity to find internal revenue, and tied to the Scheme by debt, the government on
one hand looked to the Scheme as a positive beacon of modernity. On the other.
prevailing conservative ideology led officials to fear the corrupting influences of change
and development. Uncertainty and a lack of preparation were the hallmarks of
government policy towards the Gezira and C.S. Lyall, Civil Secretary in the years
immediately prior to the Scheme's full opening, stated:
[I]n practice the social organization in the Gezira will probably work
itself out gradually and satisfactorily without Government
interference and I think it would be a mistake for the Sudan
Government to have any cut and dried policy with regard to it now."
In the meantime, the focus was upon preserving as much of the past as possible. There
were no changes made in district boundaries, meaning that at the time of opening, the
Scheme was part of three districts, spanning areas within and outside of the Scheme. In
1928, the position of 'Commissioner of the Gezira Area' was created to coordinate
administrative policy within the Scheme area, but he remained subordinate to each of the
District Commissioners of the North Gezira and South Gezira. 22 Thus although the
distinctiveness of the Scheme was acknowledged, it was not allowed to dominate
administrative policy. An attempt was made to control the administration of the Scheme
21 NRO ICivscc 2/13/57, Lyall. Civil Secretary to CA. Willis, Director of Intelligence. 10 N\l\ ember
1921.
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In exactly the same way as all other administrative areas of Sudan, divorcing it
completely from the agricultural concerns of the Syndicate. By separating
administrative and agricultural functions, the government attempted to maintain the
social authority of village structures and allow modernisation to impinge solelv on
economic life.
Even so, the dangers of modernisation as symbolised by the Scheme were acutely felt.
Upon becoming Governor of the Province in 1928, Bardsely articulated his fears:
There is a distinct danger of the artificial divisions necessitated by
the Gezira Scheme, not gradually, but rapidly undermining tribal
traditions and I look to these courts to preserve it. The sudden and
rather unexpected elevation to a position of comparative affluence.
the influx of strangers - characters good and bad - which money
attracts, the spendthrift nature of the majority of the population
prompted chiefly by the traditional desire for outward and visible
display cut at the very roots of any tribal discipline, and not only
tribal discipline but family or home discipline and tradition, which is,
of course, the foundation of the tribal and social system ... The proper
corrective to the disintegrating influences inseparable from
commercial development, is, in my opinion, judicial powers which
are, in fact, readily appreciated and respected by the people.i"
Although the lack of socio-political tribal units in the Gezira had been one of the
enabling factors for the Scheme, in the climate of the late 1920s, it was seen as distinctly
problematic.
These concerns prompted the government to promote tribal 'traditions', in the form of
judicial powers throughout the Scheme, and despite the unique conditions of the
Scheme, it was treated officially in the same way as any other settled rural area of
Sudan. For this reason MacMichael as Civil Secretary was adamant in his wish to keep
22 Sudan Government. Notes 011 the Getira, p. 23.
2~ NRO lCivsec 1/16/50, Bardsley. Governor BNP to Maclvlichael, Civil Secretary. 9 June 192X.
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courts of elders restricted to towns, and overrode Huddleston's request for the
uniqueness of Scheme conditions to be administratively recognised." With a far from
subtle analysis of the past as a positive utopia, sheikhs' courts were seen as a bulwark
against the influence of the new agricultural administration, providing recognised and
extensive powers to 'traditional leaders'. Thus the processes of centralisation and
bureaucratisation, begun in the creation of village courts continued in these sheikhs'
courts. Despite the rhetoric of tribalism - with the courts given tribal names - the courts
were based on the existing territorial unit of the khut, with the sheikhs of khut acting as
presidents." It was actively recognised that the main concern within the Gezira "was
not so much a matter of regularising customary punitive powers as of forming some kind
of native authority.v'' By giving existing sheikhs of khut new judicial powers and
formal position, the government attempted to increase the prestige of the administrative
elite, and even looked upon these institutions to "resuscitate tribal tradition and authority
which - a few years ago - was moribund.v" Further. by forming courts based upon
existing units rather than the new agricultural block boundaries of the Scheme, the
government enforced the separation between the agricultural and administrative spheres.
However, if the fortunes of sheikhs' courts were rising, the same could not be said for
village courts. Created under separate legislation, the greater powers of sheikhs' courts
soon made village courts irrelevant. The powers of the village courts were so small in
comparison to the sheikhs' courts, and the kinds of offences they were allowed to try so
limited, that the sheikhs' courts had an adverse influence on the utility of the village
court. As Bardsley complained:
More than half of the civil suits tried in sheikhs courts in Medani
district in April were for under £2, and therefore within the scope of
village courts, but village courts lack influence and machinery to
enforce judgments, and so villagers prefer to go to sheikhs courts ...
2-1 NRO lCivsec 1116/50, MacMichael, Civil Secretary to Huddleston, Governor BNP.1 March 1927.
25 Rhodes House Archive. (RHA) MSS PERHAM S-B/3. Blue Nile Province devolution file, undated: .
26 NRO BNP 1/112. Bardsley. Governor BNP to Maclvlichael, Civil Secretary, 0 March 1910. emphasis III
original.
27 Ihid.
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We have Native Benches of Magistrates to administer the Code and
we have sheikhs courts to administer native custom. Village courts
are neither the one thing or the other and ought either to be abolished
or brought into line with the sheikhs courtS.28
The attempt to use village courts as the middle ground between Sudan's rural and urban
extremes had failed. Until the creation of the Native Courts Ordinance of 1932, which
brought all existing 'native court' machinery into line and gave village courts the same
powers on a smaller scale, the Gezira struggled with an unsatisfactory arrangement of a
hierarchy of courts with overlapping jurisdiction.
As a temporary solution, and to raise the status of omdas, whose judicial powers were
becoming subsumed under those of sheikhs of khut, it was allowed that the presidents of
sheikhs' courts could delegate their individual powers to nominated sheikhs and omdas.
In effect this gave the existing presidents of village courts powers in line with those of
the larger sheikhs' courts, allowing them to act more effectively as minor sheikhs'
courts. These nominated sheikhs had fining powers of up to £5 within the Scheme area
and £3 outside of the Scheme, contrasting with the £15 of the presidents of the sheikhs'
courts.i" By August of 1930 this policy was seen to be a success and the monthly diary
reported that though "the courts are still busy with wage claims, [they are] learning to
leave the lesser cases to the Omdas for scttlement.v'"
Although originally intended to act as a bastion of tradition, the structures that emerged
from this process of devolution became intimately connected with the Scheme and the
processes of modernisation. By 1930 a hierarchical, bureaucratic apparatus had been
created, staffed by salaried Sudanese. With no greater ability to apply 'customary law'
than they had had previously, the major impact of the sheikhs' courts was to create
decentralised versions of merka: authority, with close merka: supervision. Courts were
far from 'traditional' in the way that they worked. The fact that courts were now
2K NRO 1Civscc 1/16/51, Bardsley, Governor BNP to MacMichaeI. Ci\il Secretary. 22 ~1ay 1929.
N NRO ICivsec 1/16/52. J. Reid. acting Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil SL'LTclary, I October Il>'O.
~o NRO l Civscc 1/16/52. extract from monthly diary, August 19)0.
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accountable, bureaucratic structures, open to inspection and required to keep records.
was a distinct departure from what had been before. Procedure was formalised in court
room settings, and members of courts were no longer simply local 'worthies', they were
also officials held to account by both the public and the government. The courts
themselves proved to be less than sacred traditional structures as the amalgamation of
courts in the late 1920s and early 30s demonstrated." Together with a gradual process
of adapting the boundaries of judicial authority to fit with agricultural boundaries, it
soon became clear that it was the needs of the Scheme rather than tribes or other
'traditional' forces that were the controlling influence on British devolutionary policy in
the Gezira. As J.A. Reid, while acting Governor of the province stated:
The irrigated area brings with it numerous disputes between tenant
and labour, petty affrays, thefts etc., and an Arab court can settle
these on the spot in a manner acceptable to the people.Y
Institutional Gatekeepers
The relationship between tenants and their labourers - who were predominantly
recruited from outside the Gezira region - frequently resulted in dispute and native
courts became the primary apparatus for the settlement of these disputes. Of the 130
civil cases heard by the three courts in Medani district in June 1929, the large majority
were "claims by labourers in the Scheme for wages from tenants", and it was soon
admitted that
the work of the native courts in settling disputes over payment of
wages and arising out of the work of the Scheme has become so
much part and parcel of the administration of this area that it would
. 11
be difficult to envisage to administer without these native courts.'
~I NRO lCivsec 1/16/50, Bardsley, Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil SL'c,rdary, 9 June, IlJ2~ ,
~~ NRO 1Civsec 1/16/52. Reid, acting Governor BNP to Maclvlichael. Civil Secretary, 27 Septemhn
19~O. . . 9'9 d M 'hllJ10
H NRO ICivscc 1/16/51. extracts from BNP rnonthl; diary. June I - an ian.: .'
93
Creating Courts
The type of work courts were dealing with became so linked with the Scheme and with
labour migrants in particular, that patterns were soon identified by which the workloads
of courts were identified with the agricultural calendar, and in particular with the annual
influx of labourers at picking time.i"
Courts soon became a significant focus of judicial life in the region. In 1935 a total of
2,499 cases were formally tried by the native authorities of North Gezira; 986 in the
sheikhs' courts, 411 by sheikhs of khut independently and another I, 102 by omdas and
village courts. Of these, 71 % were instituted in native courts themselves, with only 29Q,
of cases suitable for trial by native authorities forwarded by the merkaz: Although the
number of cases remained very similar, the percentage of cases brought straight to native
courts increased to 78% by 1937. 35 These figures were encouraging to the government,
showing as they did "that Sheikhs of Khut and Omdas have retained a large measure of
their inherent ·sulta,,,.36 Certainly, they suggest that the devolved courts were popularly
viewed as the most appropriate institutions to use in certain circumstances. Gezira
courts soon became indispensable to both the government and Syndicate. They were
seen as increasing administrative and agricultural efficiency by settling disputes
"quickly and on the spot" allowing people to get on with the work of cultivating cotton
rather than travelling to the more distant merkaz. 37 The conditions might have been far
from traditional, but the ability of sheikhs to settle disputes and influence communities
were seen as both timeless and endlessly flexible. Custom was used in its loosest
possible sense, and it was this flexibility that was relied upon.
Ironically, while these quasi-traditional institutions were widely used for new types of
dispute, they were not generally used to resolve the type of dispute that occurred
traditionally within communities. These internal disputes were less likely to be tried in
formal court settings, and informal community settlements remained important. The
monthly diaries of 1938 reported that "many of the cases are settled more or less out of
.~4 Ibid.
.~5 NRO 1Civsec 1117/5'+. W.HT Lucc, :\DC North Gezira to Mayall. Governor BNP. 5 June 19JX.
36 Ibid. . .
H NRO ICivsec 1116/50. Huddleston. Governor BNP to ~1acI\IIL·hael. Cml Secretary. II vlarch 1927.
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court and do not appear in the Registers, though members of the court do a lot of work
on them.":" It thus appears that native courts were seen primarily as a means of formal
communication and bargaining between permanent communities and 'outsiders'.
Convenient in locality for all parties, native courts were the favoured means of
arbitration for cross-community disputes, and the evidence suggests that migrants
preferred to use local courts instead of the merkaz.39 The ability to incorporate outsiders
was a significant aspect of these courts, and courts showed surprising tenacity to uphold
the rights of labour against those in the community attempting to defraud them.
Although seemingly working against their own community interests, these actions
defended a right to individual accumulation that was enshrined within the Gezira, and
were essential if communities were to continue attracting the ever-needed labour to the
locality.
Just as the judicial and administrative authority of the government was combined within
the figure of the District Commissioner, so too was the sheikh seen as the embodiment
of authority within the community. The government had long taken advantage of
sheikhs' authority in the spheres of administration and justice, so now did the Syndicate
see their potential in the administration of the Scheme. They were seen as channels of
communication between syndicate inspectors and tenants, and also as authority figures
able to supervise the completion of agricultural duties on tenancies. Sheikhs became so
central to the practical administration of both the Scheme and government, that in 1932,
Crawford, as Commissioner of the Gezira Area wrote a plea on behalf of the overworked
sheikh. In addition to sheikhs' administrative responsibilities such as the collection of
tax, the maintenance of law and order, and the licensing of businesses, Crawford
identified twenty-nine further duties related to ensunng his individual and the
communities tenancies were maintained efficiently. Among other things. sheikhs were
required to drive the villagers to run their hoshas properly, keep tenants from resigning.
lX NRO 1Ci\'sec 57/6/26. BNP Monthly Diaries June 1938.
w NRO 2BNP "+2/2/1 O. BNP Annual Report 1927.
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ensure canals were baled, find labourers and maintain good relationships between them
and the tenants.l"
The initial attempt to keep administration and economics separate had collapsed leaving
the government uncertain what role sheikhs should play in wider forms of devolution.
Clarke, saw it as a sign of the dominance of the Syndicate within the Gezira region,
which threatened the authority of the government." Others were more positive. seeing
this use of sheikhs in terms of an extension of the official policy of devolution. The use
of sheikhs within the agricultural administration was believed to increase their prestige
within the native courts, and give communities, through their sheikhs, greater powers
and freedoms. The intensive use and supervision of sheikhs was also believed to
rebound beneficially to the government. Reginald Davies as Director of Intelligence
stated that the influence of the Syndicate within the Gezira Scheme "had done more to
demonstrate which were the efficient Omdas and Sheikhs and which the inefficient than
had the preceding quarter of a century of administration.,,42 The Syndicate itself was
ambivalent, officially stating that block inspectors must deal directly with individual
tenants, yet making wide use of sheikhs in practice.l''
For the government, courts and formal judicial powers were a way of strengthening the
position of existing leaders, who were seen as the "repositories, administrators and
judges of 'customary law",.44 The correlation between existing government-sponsored
sheikhs and membership of native courts was thus strong. Where possible, court
presidents were sheikhs of khut. Omdas, who were themselves presidents of village
courts, made up the membership of sheikhs' courts and as with administrative positions,
wealth was a significant factor in gaining court membership. For instance Mohammed
Musaad, Sheikh of Khut and president of the Shenabla, or Nail Court, was "a man of
.10 NRO BNP 1/41/307, W.F. Crawford, Commissioner Gezira Area to W.P.D. Clarke. Governor BNP. 14
July 19)2 .
.1\ NRO BNP 1/41/307, Clarke. Governor BNP to Poyntz-Wright. Manager of Sudan Plantation-
Syndicate. 10 February 1934. ." .
.12 NRO ICivsec 1/16/50, R. Davies. Director of Intelligence to Maclvlichacl, Civil Secretary. 26 October
1927.
.I' NRO BNP 1/4In07. Clarke. Governor BNP 'Note on discussion with Poyntz-Wright'. 1 vlarch 19)4 .
.1.1 Thomas Spear "Nco-Traditionalism and the Limns of Invention". p. I).
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considerable wealth, influence and force of character.t" The resulting institutions were
little more than official and formalised versions of previous power structures. These
appointments were made on the tenuous basis of tradition; and perceived legitimacy
rather than ability formed the criteria for presidency. Thus Sheikh Abdullahi Shaa el
Din of the Kawahla Court "though very keen, is not very trustworthy and is often unduly
influenced by petty jealousies and quarrels with the more influential families in the
Khut," and Mohammed el Tom of the Arakiin Court was "rather weak in character't"
In contrast, for the two courts in the southern part of the Scheme for which there were no
existing sheikhs of khut, the British authorities made a restricted choice from the local
omdas, in which ability became a more important factor. Of these, Omda Fahal Ibrahim
of court number five was "a man of very enlightened and progressive ideas", while
Omda Hamid EI Fiki Babikr of court number six was "perhaps the best Omda in
Makwar district.,,47
The government's fixed conceptions of tradition continued to influence the forms of
devolved formal authority. In effect, courts and thus the official avenues of authority.
were controlled by the same few families identified by the government as important at
the start of the Condominium. Close family relationships among members of courts
formed interlocking networks of power, and although courts had an increasingly wide
membership, and included village sheikhs, this was not always reflected in any real
distribution of power. For instance, Omar Mohammed El Daw became Sheikh of
Khawalda Khut in 1919 after the death of his father, and on the creation of the Khawalda
Court in 1928, became its president. Two of Omar's brothers were omdas and thus
members of the court, and a third brother, a village sheikh acted as clerk to the court."
Religious leaders remained officially outside these structures, although men like Abdel
Bagi Hamed el Nil and Sheikh Sa'id Ahmed el Ghorashi were members of families that
~'i NRO lCivscc 1/16/50 Bardsley, Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 9 June 28.
~Il Ibid.
~7 Ibid.
~~ RH:\ MSS PERHAt\l 5.f3l~ Blue Nile Province devolution file. NRO ICivscc 1/16/51. Bard-ley.
Governor BNP to MacMichael, Civil Secretary, 26 February 19~0.
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controlled the courts. This policy of excluding direct religious interference upon courts
is aptly demonstrated by the reaction to a petition requesting consideration of
membership on a village court from Sherif Mohammed EI Amin, the son of the religious
leader Sherif Yusef el Hindi. In presenting the petition, Bardsley wrote "personally I
believe that Sherif el Amin who is educated, experienced and who bears excellent
manners, would be a very good candidate.?" The Civil Secretary agreed that these
qualifications would make el Amin a "useful member of a court", but the request was
turned down on the grounds that "we want to keep our 'native administrations' in all
their manifestations well clear of the influence of the leading holy men, which does and
should find outlets in more general ways."so Not only does this example clearly
demonstrate that there was a distinctive anti-religious element to British policies of
devolution, it also shows that the devolved structures were far from being traditional
bodies, with EI Amin's education noted as a strong element of his application. Tradition
within the Gezira was far more about the continuity of power among an identified elite
rather than specific and static characteristics, and the elite were encouraged to gain new
'modem' skills, while retaining the positive aspects of old-fashioned ways.
As bureaucratic structures, record keeping had become a central element of native
courts, and clerks had become vital to their performance. Literate and educated, clerks
were frequently members of president's families, and symbolised the attempts of Gezira
families to adapt to the changing needs of the modem world and thus retain their
positions of authority. In striking contrast to views held about the effendi class, these
home-grown rural clerks were viewed as bringing together the best of tradition and
modern civilisation. The clerk of the Halawin Court was described in positive terms as
"a bottle-nosed fiki and more suitable than the bumptious effendi type", while the clerk
of court ten "was of the ideal type - young enough to be intelligent, retiring enough to
be nothing more than a clerk and dressed as a native.t"
49 NRO ICivscc 1/50/1 :B, extracts of minutes from District Commissioners meeting. 18 April 1929.
~o Ihid.
~I NRO I Civscc 1/16/51. report on courts by Redfern. Deputy Governor of Blue Nile Province..~() vlarch
1929.
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The benefits of adaptation to the new structures of governance enshrined in courts were
great. Believing that "Sheikhs cannot be expected to exercise authority if they are
reduced to the financial level of everybody in their village", incentives in the form of
good land and salaries were offered to court members.52 In 1930, the salaries in the
Khawalda Court were £E.75 for a court president, £E.50 for members and £E.24 for
clerks, giving controlling families such as the El Daw's a substantial income." In the
same year, the average tenant made a loss through their work on the cotton, and in 1931,
average tenancy cotton profits were only £E.12, demonstrating the value of
administrative salaries." Henderson further suggests that the common practice of court
presidents appointing a clerk from their own family allowed for bookkeeping methods
that were financially beneficial to the president and his supporters." The powers and
opportunities offered by these positions were welcomed by the elite in the Gezira, and
applications for membership were numerous.
Although based upon a policy of devolution, the formalisation of court structures with
the allocation of specific positions and powers to named individuals in effect centralised
judicial authority within Gezira communities. Not only did the recognition of courts
narrow the field of judicial authority onto sheikhs of khut and omdas, but within this
delineated sphere, it was the president whose individual importance became accentuated.
Taking advantage of the government's notion of customary power as a centralised
phenomenon, and its desire for visible, understandable bureaucratic structures, sheikhs
were able to consolidate their powers, and gained control of a machinery that gave them
the right to fine, imprison, or use corporal punishment on offenders. The resulting
inequalities in power, as Mann and Roberts have suggested, provided this nominated
elite with the "statutory authority to define and enforce rights, obligations, and
relationships. ,,56
'p
. ~ NRO 2BNP '+2/1/1. BNP Annual Report 1929.
.~~ NRO ICivsec 1/16/51. Bardsley. Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 26 February 19.~().
'\-1 Gaitskcll, Getira. p. 270.
" Henderson. Set Under Authority. p. 52.
.~(, Mann and Roberts, Law in Colonial Africa. p. 22.
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Courts became an arena of contestation for power and wealth within communities, as
illustrated by the continuing internecine struggles within Halowin politics. Dafalla
Mohammed Imam, the son of Mohammed Imam who had led the Halawin in the
nineteenth century, felt himself to the rightful leader of the Halawin, but had been
debarred from that position owing to the rebellion of his brother Abdel Gader against the
government in 1908. His ambitions for power centred on the acquisition of court
presidency, and the court was an important vehicle through which Dafalla asserted his
claims. Hillard, the DC of North Gezira wrote in 1936 of "an atmosphere of strain about
the Halowin [sic] Court ... the will for settlements seems absent" and the leading rival
figures were having "slanging matches in public".s7 Dafalla was able to use the public
space of the court to undermine the existing leadership and present himself as a suitable
alternative. Hillard again reported that "Dafalla is once again taking a leading part in the
conduct of the Halowin Court and has on two recent occasions and in my hearing
severely criticised the manner in which the court handled certain cases at sittings from
which he was absent."s8
In their dual position as executors of legal codes and the custodians of custom, the
administrative elite were in a position to interpret the Government's centralised
understanding of custom to their advantage. As court presidents, sheikhs were able to
claim the right to control community facilities. Animal pounds were just one of the new
structures that were created to deal with the conditions of the Scheme. As the Scheme
turned previously open land into intensive areas of agricultural production, the problem
of animal trespass became increasingly acute. The solution was to grant powers to
courts allowing them to impound such animals and charge daily rates for their upkeep
and in effect, the court president controlled the pound. In 1929, ninety animal pounds
existed throughout the Scheme in the control of sheikhs and omdas, and formed the basis
~7 NRO BNP 1/30/222. Hillard, DC North Gezira. "Halowin Politics", 1.+ August 1936.
~K Ihid.
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of a large number of complaints by animal owners who could find that their animals
were found 'straying' on a frequent basis.59
Extensions of the Merkaz
Despite the devolutionary rhetoric of expanding the powers of native authorities, one
result of the increasing formalisation was in creating official limits to the powers of
native leaders. As Nadia Khalaf has stated:
Throughout the supposed period of Indirect Rule the British District
Commissioner remained the effective administrator and rarely assumed
the role of 'advisor' , acting in the background, as Lugard had envisaged
for the British staff attached to native administrations.i"
Schedules of offences within the jurisdiction of native courts were fixed, and it was
decided that the courts should not have jurisdiction over any case arising out of the sale
of crops cultivated on the Scheme, or concerning the borrowing of monies upon the
security of such crops." Through such negative legislation, the British authorities
actually placed limitations on the authority of local leaders, already constrained by the
centralisation of authority into the figure of the sheikh of khut. The ability to appeal
against judgements made in native courts, further constrained the powers of court
presidents and members. The bureaucratisation of judicial authority extended the power
of the merkaz into the community in ever more pervasive ways. Courts were inspected,
and a DC could "of his own initiative intervene to quash or revise the finding or
sentence of a native Court or may transfer the case to his own Court.,,62 A hierarchy of
59 NRO 2BNP 42/111, BNP Annual Report, 1929.
60 Nadia Khalaf. "British Policy Regarding the Administration of the Northern Sudan. 1899-1951". (Ph.D
thesis, Duke University, 1965), p. 117.
61 NRO l Civscc 1/16/50. Bardsley, Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 9 June 1928.
62 The Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance 1928, Sudan Government Gazette. No. 505. I July 1928.
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courts had been created, controlled by the merkaz; at the bottom of which were the
native courts.
The government's need for specific structures to correlate with specific powers, fixed
and pigeon-holed court procedure. The limitations of this categorisation were apparent
in the transformation of a Gezira town bench to a native court. As a court, the body had
wider powers, but these were powers as detailed by the Native Courts Ordinance rather
than the penal code. On transformation, the court attempted to sentence offenders under
penal ordinances as they had been accustomed to doing. When told that they could no
longer do this, the court protested that such judgements were custom, having had those
powers for the previous twenty years. 63 Not only does this case demonstrate the very
real limitations that formalisation imposed on native authorities, it also demonstrates the
uncertain and highly prejudicial nature of the term customary. The government had
created a conundrum. By leaving the definitions of custom completely open, and relying
upon the ability of courts to change and adapt to modern circumstances when it suited
the government, they were open to challenge about what was customary. Even though
this challenge failed, the logic of the government's policy was shown to be seriously
flawed.
However, it was not just that the use of courts was restricted, the extension of native
court powers were just as important in the development of an inflexible, procedure
driven apparatus. Through their positions as magistrates, and through the ultimate
control of the merkaz over native court settlements, sheikhs, with their formal powers
had become extensions of the merkaz: This is seen most clearly in the argument arising
over the issue of what role native courts should have in trying offences against
ordinances relating to agricultural work. The bailing of water from field irrigation
channels at the end of the irrigation season was a desperately unpopular task involving
hard, uncomfortable work for which there was no immediate recompense. However,
due to the potential of these areas of stagnant water becoming breeding grounds for
mosquitoes, bailing was required under the Public Health Ordinance. Bailing also
(\~ Henderson, Set Under Authority. p. 52.
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allowed the clearing of silt and general maintenance of channels so essential to the
continuing efficiency of cotton cultivation. It was therefore of great interest to both the
government and the Syndicate for bailing to be conducted thoroughly. With only two
government offices within the Gezira, DC's were highly limited in their ability to try the
high number of cases that occurred. Conversely, the block inspectors, numerously
scattered throughout the region had no judicial powers. One solution was to use native
courts to try this agricultural offence. Seen as flexible institutions, native courts were
quickly seen as the most efficient institutions for making judgements on the spot, despite
the fact bailing cases had no background in custom and were not listed in the schedule of
offences to be tried by native courts."
In response to this unofficial use of courts, Clarke in 1933, informed the management of
the Sudan Plantations Syndicate that as native courts were not permitted to try offences
against ordinances, they should no longer be permitted to try bailing offences/" This
order reflected Clarke's concern over the independence of the courts. Clarke worried
that the members of courts, economically tied to the Syndicate, were not "yet
independent enough to give an impartial decision on cases of this nature raised before
them by the Syndicate Inspectors in their area.,,66 His fear was based upon his belief that
the court nearly always rules out any defence and accepts the written
complaint of the Syndicate Inspector as incontrovertible, or if it gets
the Syndicate Inspector to appear before the court, which is in itself
undesirable, it is still more loathe not to take his word... The
difficulty is that at present an offender is tried by his fellow-tenants
who are most unlikely to risk antagonising a Syndicate inspector
64 NRO 1Civsec 1/17/53. Poyntz-Wright, Manager of Sudan Plantations Syndicate to Clarke, Governor
BNP 20 November 1933. "The Native Courts Ordinance 1932". in Cecil Bennet (cd ..) Laws of the Sudan,
\'01. 10 (London, 1956).
(,) NRO 1Civsec 1/17/53, Clarke. Governor BNP to Poyntz-Wright. Manager of Sudan Plantations
Syndicate 19 November 1933.
(,(, NRO 1Civscc 1/17/53. Clarke. Governor BNP to MacMichaeI. Civil Secretary. 21 November Jlnl
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under whose jurisdiction (minus judicial powers) they themselves
may fal1.67
Central government, although sympathetic with this view, feared a potential decrease in
prestige to native courts arising from the diminishing of current and accepted powers,
and ruled against Clarke.68 The benefit of native courts to the smooth running of the
Scheme was a further reason behind the government's support of native court powers.
The distance of merka; courts from many agricultural blocks was estimated to draw out
these frequent cases into sojourns of two to four days and it was concluded that "on the
assumption that tenants as a body find life irksome as tenants, to transfer this class of
cases to merkaz courts might hasten an exodus.,,69 Having decided to use native courts,
the solution for the government was to create the Gezira Irrigation Bailing Regulation
1934, which formally enabled native courts to try bailing offences with powers of
punishment of f.E.IO fine or one-month imprisonment.i" For the sake of agricultural
efficiency, native courts were given powers in line with the merkaz: By the 1930s,
native courts within the Gezira were not solely about custom, rather they were
mechanisms which could allow both government and people to engage with the
processes of modernisation brought by the Scheme. Offences and procedures were
increasingly codified and fixed and new concepts of criminality transferred from the
merka: to native courts.
Defending 'Custom'
Bailing cases became a large part of the work of native courts, and in January 1939, 56
"delinquents" were fined in a single block.i' However, the varied fines and significantly
67 Ibid.
ss NRO 1Civsec 1/17/53, MacMichael, Civil Secretary to Clarke, Governor BNP 5 December 1931.
09 NRO I Civscc 1/17/5.\ minute on bailing cases, December 1933.
70 NRO ICivscc 1/17/53, Clarke. Governor BNP, "Order; Bailing of Dowrans", 31 December 193.~.
71 NRO 1Civsec 57/1 0/39, BNP Monthly Diaries, January 1939.
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varied numbers of cases across the Scheme suggests that some courts took this offence
more seriously than others. While the Arakiin Court fined offenders an average of
40PT, the Khawalda Court gave average fines of 70PT, demonstrating the independence
of each court.72 Some native authorities were willing to punish this crime heavily, either
because they believed that it was a serious offence or because of the personal benefits
that they believed such cooperation with the Syndicate would bring; others sided with
the many tenants who saw the task as irksome and unnecessary and defended their rights
not to bail by not bringing people to account.
Court presidents and members further defended their autonomy by adapting the
structures that they were given to suit prevailing attitudes and needs. The annual report
of 1929 noted this trend in relation to village courts with considerable satisfaction.
Although the Village and Native Courts Ordinances provided for the nomination of
specific individuals as court members, in practice court membership was flexible. Court
presidents appointed individuals to sit on the court depending on the situation and with
little regard to official lists:
These worthies often do, in fact, happen to coincide with the
'members' who are on my register, but not always ... In fact, the
Omda, in trying a case in any given village, merely took good care
that he got the best information he could and by natural devolution he
has, entirely through the application of traditional native custom,
abolished the artificial barriers erected by the Ordinance. A rather
comic position has been reached where the native had accepted with
avidity the principle of a Government policy, but has carried it out, in
method of application, more successfully than he could have done if
the strict letter of the law had been followed.v'
The government made no attempt to codify custom within northern Sudan and thus
courts retained a flexibility belied by their formal and legislative facade. This flexibility
7~ NRO ICivsec 57/6/26. BNP Monthly Diaries. February 1938.
n NRO 2BNP --l2/l/l. BNP Annual Report 1929.
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was seen as a great advantage by the colonial administration. It was in the meeting of
the two systems, the codified law of Europe and the flexibility of African custom that
native courts developed, creating a system that was flexible yet familiar with the
procedures of codified law. In Disney's words: "it was in this way that these more
advanced laws began to be grafted on to the sturdy stock of 'native custom'<." The
flexibility of courts allowed them to relate the 'modern' conditions of the Scheme to the
needs of Gezira communities, and in their gatekeeper role courts effectively balanced the
requirements of the government, the Syndicate and the population. By adapting to new
situations, courts were able to demonstrate their continuing validity, and thus retain a
certain independence from the merkaz:
For the government and the Gezira population alike, the courts were viewed as a huge
success. They combined the acceptability and subtlety of the local judgement based
upon custom, with the efficiency of readily available personnel. The 1937 Monthly
Diaries reported:
A mixed court held at Goz el Reheid between members of the
Managil and Tabat administrations successfully resolved various
charges of theft, insult and hurt into one large Arabian peace under
which some money changed hands. This end of a stupid fight
between members of the two administrations was regarded as
eminently superior to anything that could have come out of the heads
of the district commissioners of the southern and northern Gezira."
Having created these courts, and finding them indispensable for the daily administration
of local justice, the government inevitably had a vested interest in maintaining their
authority. Therefore, the appeals process, which worked as the major check to the
independence of native courts, in practice often backed up decisions made by the courts.
A.V. Elliot heard only one appeal from a native court decision in his three months of
working as the DC at Kamlin - in itself suggesting the independence and public
acceptance of the courts. The case concerned the appeal by a man against a one month
74 Disney. "English Law in the Sudan", p. 122.
75 NRO 1Civscc 57/4/18. BNP Monthly Diaries, September 1937.
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sentence for having stolen a sheep from his father. In response Elliot added another
month to this sentence and thus reinforced the independent decision of the court."
Despite this autonomy, native courts were open to inspection by government officials
and to challenge from the communities they served. The dangers of centralising judicial
powers were to some extent diluted by the existence of rival candidates within the
community "lurking in the background waiting for the chance to report an
irregularity.t' " Furthermore, petitions, long established as a means to challenge
structures of authority, were now directed against the new focus of authority invested
within courts. In October of 1930 a letter was received by the secretary of native affairs
from twenty sheikhs of Kamlin district petitioning that the newly appointed president be
made to stand down.78 Similarly in 1934 an anonymous petitioner wrote to the
government "on behalf of the Halawiyin [sic]" to state that "the Native Courts are
working for the benefit of their own members and not in the interest of the
Governrnent.v" The letter outlined various abuses carried out by one member of the
court, Ahmed el Amin Eheimer, who "has sent away all the native butchers ... and has
given the monopoly to a certain 'Zingi' who is bribing him."so Although the Kamlin
petition was put down to a rival's attempts to increase his own influence, and was
dismissed, these petitions clearly demonstrate the belief by the population that they had
the right to hold the courts to account, and that the government was a suitable authority
through which to enforce that accountability.
70 NRO BNP 1/271204. A.V Elliot, DC Kamlin, "Handing Over Notes", Kamilin District Report. 4 August
193 I.
77 Henderson, Set Under Authority. p. 52.
7X NRO l Civscc 1/16/52. sheikhs of Kamlin West to secretary of native affairs, 15 October 19~0.
79 NRO 1Civscc 1/l7/5~. translation of anonymous letter, May 19'4.
so Ibid.
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The Threat from the Syndicate
The greatest danger facing native courts' autonomy came from the influence of block
inspectors. The government constantly worried that the Syndicate's emphasis on
agricultural efficiency would undermine the government's attempts to strengthen
community led settlements. These fears were expressed by C.G. Davies when he wrote:
One must realise that the management of the Scheme as a cotton
growing enterprise is entirely in their [the Syndicate's] hands and
that by controlling the money bags they virtually control the lives of
the tenants and most of those who gain a living through the
Scheme."
Particular worry was expressed at accounts of tenants taking their disputes directly to
block inspectors to be settled, rather than to sheikhs, thus undermining all attempts to
bolster community centred authority structures.V As part of a profit seeking business,
inspectors had all the pressures to drive for efficiency, with none of the government's
administrative concerns. An inspector could evict a tenant if he "neglects or is careless
in the cultivation of his crops or neglects to carry out the reasonable orders of the
Syndicate's officials.,,83 However, Syndicate inspectors had no judicial authority over
tenants for 'lesser offences'.
Inspectors were thus driven to use their influence in other means, and in 1930, a query
was brought before the DC of Hassaheissa which caused great consternation among
government officials. An omda had recently received a letter from a block inspector
ordering him to fine a list of people the inspector had caught stealing grass from
tenancies, until which time the inspector would keep the donkeys of the 'offenders'.
The omda wondered what an appropriate response would be. Kingdon as DC was duly
horrified at this misuse of an inspector's authority and wrote to the Governor "The block
RI NRO BNP 1/28/208. e.G. Davies. DC Gezira, "Handing Over Notes", October 1936.
R~ NRO BNP lilli, Richardson, ADC Hassaheissa, to Huddleston, Governor BNP. II February 1927.
K.l 'Standard Conditions of Tenancy'. Gaitskell, Gezira. appendix I.
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inspector has no authority to tell the omda to fine anyone, even the DC can only refer a
case to the Omda's court for their decision and judgement.t''" He continued:
I am not suggesting that this type of letter is common but I do think
there is a danger of some of the Syndicate officials coming to regard
the native courts as mere machines for giving judgments which they
think desirable. It is very difficult for a native court to disregard an
Englishman's instructions and had the above instructions been
carried out a definite injustice would have been done. 85
Syndicate inspectors also frequently bypassed all official structures to impose their own
summary justice on tenants perceived to be working inefficiently, yet not breaking any
laws. A range of complaints were made against Syndicate inspectors ranging from
setting fire to a tenant's dura because he was working "in esh [dura] to the detriment of
cotton, the cultivation of which latter was being neglected", to assault for not carrying
out an inspector's orders correctly." Although excuses were readily made for such
behaviour, and nearly all cases were swept under the carpet with financial compensation
quietly given, the government was deeply unhappy with such independent judicial
actions. In one particular case, Mr Morgan, a block inspector "exasperated by the
continual failure of certain pickers to carry out his instructions, took the law into his own
hands and burnt one of their huts in order to impress on them that they must either obey
his orders or leave his area".87 In reference to this case, the DC Gezira summed up
government attitude when he caustically remarked that "the failure to pick cotton or
carry out correctly some agricultural operation is not an offence under the laws of the
Sudan. Burning a hut most certainly is.,,88
K4 NRO BNP 1/1/2. J.D. Kingdon, DC Hassaheissa, to Bardsley, Governor BNP. 1..+ October 1930.
K5 Ibid.
Kf> NRO BNP 1/40/305, Complaint by Nur EI Din EI Zein, tenant of Ghobshan block against Mr Steed. for
setting fire to his durra 22 November 1930 and complaint by Mohammed Ahmed Mohammed Imam
Halawi, of Mehereiba block, against Mr. Peterkin. December 1930.
117 NRO BNP 1/"+1/306. e.G. Davies. DC Gczira to Poyntz-Wright, Manager Sudan Plantations Syndicate.
7 March 1934.
Kll Ibid.
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....
Just how common such instances were it is difficult to calculate, as most native
authorities and courts avoided confrontation with block inspectors. Having sent the
letter to the DC of Hassaheissa, the omda begged that the matter not be taken up, as "he
was very nervous of incurring the wrath of the inspector", whom he called the 'rais el
beled', or 'lord of the land'. 89 The personal advantages of good relations with the
Syndicate, namely increased numbers of tenancies and access to the best land when
annually redistributed, were valuable resources that community leaders were unwilling
to jeopardise. However, courts were on occasions willing to confront the Syndicate over
definitions of criminality, and in the 1940s became the vehicle by which certain offences
were contended. For tenants, cotton stalks represented a cheap, easily collectable fuel;
however, the hoarding of cotton stalks was seen as an offence by the Syndicate because
they feared that it would spread cotton diseases. In 1949 the Syndicate encouraged the
government to search Gezira villages for evidence of hoarding, and forty 'offenders'
were handed to native courts. Unwilling to heavily penalise this action, courts only
fined the accused 20PT each: a response that angered the Syndicate. The government
again acquiesced to the demands of the Syndicate and instructed courts that the offence
was to be treated as a serious one in the future. 9o
By this date though, interest in specifically judicial matters was on the wane. During the
1930s, Native Administrations were developed, in which judicial authority was only one
element of wider administrative powers. Declining government interest in courts for and
of themselves suggests not only the increasing concerns of administrative devolution.
but also the huge success of courts as institutions, which allowed them to continue
functioning almost unremarked upon in the background of more radical changes. For
the government, native courts relieved the merkaz of significant amounts of routine
business, especially in connection with the Scheme, and at the same time built up the
authority of a selected elite. Similarly, the Syndicate found native courts a convenient
institution for ensuring the efficient operation of the Scheme, even if they also found
other ways to enforce their will. Labour migrants found courts the most efficient means
IN NRO BNP 1/112. Kingdon. DC Hassaheissa to Bardsley. Governor BNP. 14 October 1930.
l)() 2Civsec 30/8/19. Monthly Diaries. July 1949.
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of mediating their wage disputes with tenants, and Gezira communities embraced native
courts as a point of mediation with the government.
The success of courts as 'modern' institutions despite the rhetoric of tradition, suggests
that modernity and tradition were far from the polar opposites so frequently suggested
by the government. The ease with which people adapted to court procedures suggests
that they were based on ideas and skills firmly rooted in the social backgrounds of
Gezira communities, and it was this ability to work within an institutional context that
empowered communities. For although the native court was an institution created and
ultimately controlled by the government, (and in many ways was simply an extension of
the merkaz), it was also susceptible to influences and control from within the
community. As much as courts brought the government into the community, it also took
the community into the structures of government. There were great benefits for the
individuals involved in staffing the courts and their work was rewarded by government
and Syndicate through salaries, increased numbers of tenancies and control over
community resources. Thus although native courts may have been subsumed by the
needs of the Scheme, and limited by incorporation into merkaz-controlled formal codes,
the general trend was an extension of powers controlled by individuals at the community
level, that was frequently backed up by the government in the appeal process.
Communities did at times complain about the personnel of courts, but there was no
protest against the structures of courts themselves. For while courts offered a channel of
communication with (and a degree of control over) external communities and
authorities, they also created considerable space free from external controls. Defining
courts as the formal point of mediation effectively limited the intrusion of 'outsiders'.
Thus the centralisation of powers onto the 'sheikh', so evident within the formal court
structure did not necessarily transfer into other aspects of community life. Informal
mechanisms continued to operate below the level of courts, including the mediation of
most disputes occurring purely within the community. Disputing parties continued to
choose mediating authorities from a range of possible alternatives including government
sheikhs, other notables and holy men. Even when relating with external authorities.
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informal mechanisms might be preferred, and the fiki Hag Abdalla Dafalla of Bortobeil
village gained a significant income through the selling of charms that would protect the
wearer "against any action against him from either the Syndicate or the government.':"
The continuing importance of this informal sector meant that although government
sheikhs tended to increase in importance, colonial policy in the Gezira rarely resulted in
the creation of 'decentralised despots'. Instead, native courts within communities were
selectively used by communities in mediating with external parties; both the government
and an increasing migrant labour population.
ql NRO BNP 1/25/188. Taycb Elf. Sunni. clerk of Crawford, to Crawford. Commissioner Gezira Arca..' I
May 1930.
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In his study of colonial administrative policy Robert Pearce has identified a
"remarkable transformation that took place in British policy towards the empire in
tropical Africa between 1938 and 1948." I In highlighting these dates, Pearce
emphasises the political changes that found administrators promoting a set of
universal modern values and institutions instead of traditional culture. The Colonial
Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 illustrated a change of political
direction, bringing the idea of duty and interventionist development to the fore of
colonial administration. 2 By the end of the 1940s, a universal form of local
government had become a tool by which colonial populations might be trained in the
art of self-governance. 3
It is not to be doubted that these changes occurred in the minds of colonial
administrators. What should be questioned is the assumption that this political
change of direction had any significant effect in practice. Within the Gezira, policies
that aimed to transform a tribally organised culture into a modern bureaucratic
society were far from transforming for communities that were already bridging the
urban/rural divide. Instead the period highlighted by Pearce represented the
culmination of a continuous process of increasing government control, which had
been gradually ongoing from the start of the Condominium. Within the Gezira
Scheme, this process of increasing government control was accentuated even further.
I Rohert Pearce The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Polin', 1938-../8 (London. I L)X2). p, I.
2 Ihid. pp, 19-20,
3 Ihid. pp. 132 -159,
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Responding to the unique 'sophistication' of the Scheme, the needs of agricultural
efficiency, and attempting to establish a bulwark against Syndicate controls. the
government presided over an accelerated program of devolution. which onlv
introduced ever closer government controls.
The other caution to add to Pearce's thesis is that this political transformation cannot
be contained within his strict dates. Pearce follows the general historiographical
trend in seeing the interwar years in Africa as an unmitigated period of "stagnation
and frustrations". 4 In northern Sudan too, the early 1930s has been frequently
considered only as the high point of indirect rule." However, it was the emergence of
ideas during this time that paved the way to the ideas of local government and
development that became fully fledged from the late 1930s onwards. The 1930s was
a period of ideological experimentation in which the conservative forms of tradition,
taken for granted in the full expression of indirect rule, were now questioned.
Tradition remained an important concept and ideal for some time, but its form as
highlighted by administrators was increasingly expressed as a model of community
democracy rather than autocratic leadership." This was an important stage on the
road to the imposition of universal 'modern' values. The 1930s was also a period in
which educated Africans, actively sidelined since the early 1920s, were once again
incorporated into the administration, and the reliance upon 'tribal' leaders lessened.
Overall, colonial populations were seen increasingly in terms of active participants,
and were incorporated into the processes of local governance as citizens rather than
merely subjects. The effect of the agricultural dominance of devolution within the
Gezira Scheme was that tenants were incorporated into the structures of governance.
and seen as citizens more easily than were other Gezira inhabitants.
~ Ihid. p. 17.
5 Khalaf. "British Policy"; Vall. 'The Introduction of Native Administration", ,
6 Alvin Magid. "British Rule and Indigenous Organization in Nigeria: A Case-study in :'\\l!matm:-
Institutional Change". Journal ofAfrican History. 9. 2 (1968) pp. 299-_~ 13. at p, 313.
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The Reinvention of Tradition
Throughout the 1920s, and particularly under the Governor-Generalship of John
Maffey, government policy focused upon increasing the power of tribal leaders
through judicial institutions. Native courts were institutions through which the
government promoted 'traditional' leaders, sanctioning and bolstering their
'inherent' and 'customary' judicial powers. 7 The language used in this period
consistently referenced tribes and tribal leaders as the traditional basis of community
authority, and a valuable protection against the 'infection' of modernity." This image
of tradition focused upon the qualities of leadership in the individual, with one
person representing the interests of his community. Within the Gezira, courts were
seen as valuable defence against the "spoon-feeding methods of the Syndicate':"
By the early 1930s, courts were flourishing institutions conveniently placed within
communities that might otherwise be distant from the merkaz: In the context of a
severe process of retrenchment among government officials, it did not take long for a
busy district headquarters to start using these existing bodies for additional non-
judicial forms of administration. Thus in 1930, the presidents of Gezira courts were
organising the relapsing fever quarantine and delousing stations set up to monitor
labour migrants, and the courts in the Hassaheissa and Rufa' a districts had become
the body to which the assessed taxes and licence fees were paid.l" By 1933, the
presidents of the native courts were being given the control over treasury chests and
were collecting revenue from court fines, from herd and land taxes and from market
rates. They were expected to spend this money on salaries for native court members.
for market sheikhs and for ghaffirs.!' This financial devolution theoretically aimed
at increasing independence for native authorities; serving as "a slight drag" on the
trend towards increased Syndicate
7 The Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance 1928. Sudan Government Gazette. No 505, I July !tJ2X.
8 NRO BNP 111/1. John Maffey. Governor General "Minute by His Excellency the Governor-
General", I January 1927.
9 NRO lCivsec 1/17/53. Clarke. Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 21 \1ar..:h 19.'~.
10 NRO III fJ/52. Extract from BNP Monthly Diary August 1930: NRO 1/17/53. Clarke. Governor
BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary. 2.+ May 1933.
II NRO lCivscc 1117/53. J.D. Kingdon. Acting Governor BNP to H.E. Fass. Financial Secretary. 2.'
February 1933.
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power within the Scheme." However, as Khalaf notes; "What a native budget really
meant was for the native authority to collect taxes or receive money and to spend it
in a way determined by the Government." 13 In using native courts as native
administrations, the government effectively extended their centralised administrative
powers beyond the merkar,
Within the Gezira, the benefit of devolving greater powers was openly recognised by
the government. Courts proved to be of great benefit in reducing the workload of
DCs, and on this basis the Governor proposed an increase in the salaries given to
Gezira court members:
Their justification is the mass of papers continually poured upon
these N[ative] A[dministration] units by Civil Courts, Shari'a
Courts, Land Registries, the Rents Office and Syndicate
Inspectors - to say nothing of the Merakiz ... The thought that the
Gezira area now contains no fewer than three groups of merkaz
buildings once filled by pension-earning staff and now deserted
by them, and that this relief to the Central Government chest has
been achieved during a period in which the irrigated area with all
it implies has continued its expansion must surely give him food
for sympathetic reflection. 14
Native courts had themselves been supervised by government authorities; now
transformed into native administrations, they were ever more the agents of
government.
This transformation of native courts into native administrations occurred within a
context of changing notions of tradition. The model of indirect rule so potent in the
1920s which sought to promote individuals on a basis of autocratic leadership was by
the 1930s seen to be flawed. With the problem of holding to account those leaders
the government was so keen to promote, the potential corruption and inefficiency of
institutions controlled by individuals was becoming apparent. As Daly ha-,
succinctly stated, a "system dependent upon tribal autocracy was lost without
12 NRO ICivscc 1/17/53. Clarke. Governor BN? to MacMichaeI. Civil Secretary. 21 March 19.'.l
I.l Khalaf. "British Policy", p. 122.
1-1 NRO 1/17/5-1-. R.C. Mayall. Governor BN?, "Budget proposal for 1938", 2~ September 19.n.
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autocrats, and lost as well when they behaved autocratically.'-l5 Throughout the
1930s the ideas of what tradition meant in African societies was re-evaluated.
Tradition may have still been the buzz-word in government circles, but this was a
very different vision of tradition from that previously expressed.
Margery Perham, so influential within British colonial policy argued throughout the
1930s that Indirect Rule had been misapplied in its support of autocratic leaders and
that "conciliar democracy" was in fact the essence of traditional structures within
African communities. 16 As tradition had formerly been used to support the
government's belief that individual leaders were central to maintaining devolved
authority, so in the 1930s was it used to promote community democracy; "it being
universally recognized that the power of a 'meglis' is an especial feature of an Arab
community." 17 As the 'traditional' power of leaders and tribes had been
institutionalised in the form of courts, so councils became the institutional vehicle of
'traditional' community expression from the late 1930s. Tradition was still an
important element of government policy, but the conciliar image of tradition allowed
the government to break from the past veneration of tribes, and to apply a territorial
bias to devolutionary policy.
Within Sudan, worry was being expressed at the direction of policy as articulated
within the often extreme forms of indirect rule as applied in parts of Sudan. As
Governor of Kordofan, Douglas Newbold commented on the dangers of current
policy; "At present there is a dreadful rift opening between the clerks and the sheikhs,
and no one is making any effort to bridge it.,,18 As a solution he called for a rapid
"alignment of effendia and 'sheikhs' and the extension of Native Administration so
as to include intelligentsia and 'technicians' .,,19 The change of Governorship in 193.+
from John Maffey to Stewart Symes set the scene for the pursuit of this policy.
Supported by forward-thinking administrators, most notably Civil Secretaries Angus
15 Martin Daly, Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium N3-1-/95() (Cambridge, ]l)l} I), p.
~1.
i6' Margery Perham "Problems of indirect rule", East Africa. (1934) p. 622. cited in Magid. "British
Rule and Indigenous Organization in Nigeria". p. 305. _
17 BNP 1/40/301, A.R.C. Bolton, DC South Gezira to Young, Governor BNP ..~O December 19"~).
18 Sir Douglas Newhold to Frank Cotterell. 29 Octoher 1933 in K.D.D. Henderson (cd .. ) Tilt: \f(~~I/1~
or rhe Modem Sudan: the Life and Letters of Sir Douglas Newbold (Westport. Conn.. 1l}74), p. )l
I;) Ihid.
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Gillan and (from 1940) Douglas Newbold, Symes oversaw a distinct change in
administrative policy. The imposition of a 'one size fits all' tribal policy. so
carefully promoted by Maffey, was viewed as outdated and impracticable. Instead
Symes introduced a two-pronged approach to future devolved administration, by
which increasing powers were given simultaneously to both 'tribal leaders' and
educated Sudanese. Challenging the rural-centred policy of previous administrations,
Symes brought urban centres and educated Sudanese to the fore of government
policy. Using the rather overwrought expression "functional dilution in sophisticated
areas", Symes identified differing administrative needs within a roughly
geographical model, in terms of a scale of established 'progress'. For this purpose,
he openly contrasted
[U]rban communities, to whom newspapers and lately the radio
bring the news of the world, with country men whose secular
existence has stayed almost undisturbed by the advent of the
motor transport and the distant passage of an aeroplane, and
whose metropolis is the hamlet where a local district headquarters
is sited."
Fertile Soil
If the 1930s was a period of political reorientation at the level of central government,
then the Gezira has been seen as an anomaly. It has become a historiographical
truism that the conditions of the Gezira were inappropriate for devolution. With its
centralised and intrusive style of management, the Scheme has been cited as the
antithesis of devolved government. Daly has suggested that the levelling effect of
the tenancy system together with the "disturbingly 'direct'" administration of the
Syndicate stifled indigenous authority, while the government's dependence upon the
Scheme "argued powerfully against free-wheeling experiments in Indirect Rule.,,21
However, this attitude relies far more upon assumption than it docs upon reality. The
20 Symes. "Note on Administrative Purposes". p. ~.
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very existence of the Syndicate actually provided the conditions in which devolution
flourished and occurred at a faster rate within the Gezira than in any other rural
region of Sudan. Rather than proving to be incompatible, the Scheme became an
arena of 'devolutionary' experimentation.
The 'modern' conditions of the Scheme offered the government a unique opportunity
for experimenting in forms of governance. It was an area that was believed to have
already undergone dramatic change, both long term detribalisation and the
imposition of the Scheme, whose canals
drove artificial boundaries, rendered necessary by irrigation
requirements, through territorial units of khuts, omodias and even
villages. Then followed the syndicate organization of blocks,
which also, could take no thought for either tribal or territorial
considerations.f
Believing that community structures beyond the village unit needed rebuilding in a
radically different landscape, and with little 'tribal' political identity remaining, there
were no fears of experiments disrupting a delicate balance of indigenous tradition.
The conditions were right, and there were other pressing factors. The Scheme was
seen to undermine all previous attempts to bolster Sudanese authority not only
through its territorial modifications, but through its direct style of management, in
which the only official channel of agricultural mediation was between each
individual tenant and his block inspector. With over one hundred block inspectors
living within the Scheme at anyone time the Syndicate was a highly visible and
intrusive presence. Following direct orders and constantly supervised. the
government feared that tenants were becoming mere cogs in a revenue-generating
machine. The opposition to this direct form of management inspired the government
to experiment in devolving authority. Highly outnumbered by Syndicate staff. and
seeing its own position and administrative aims as being threatened. the government
saw devolution as a necessary way of bolstering community independence.
~I Daly. Imperial Sudan. p. :B. S~C also Victoria Bernal "Coloni.al M,oral l.conomv"
~2 NRO BNP 1/1/2. Bardsley. Governor BNP. to Mac vl ichacl, Civil Secretary 6 June \lJ.'O.
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The existence of the Syndicate thus did not preclude, but rather encouraged a high
rate of institutional devolution. As Huddleston had realised in 1927. "administrative
devolution on a small scale fits in, to my mind, extremely well with the conditions
brought about by Syndicate development't." In the changing political climate of the
1930s and no longer hidebound by the need to find 'tribal' forms of tradition, the
decentralisation of power within the Gezira increased rapidly. However. devolution
within the Gezira not only occurred at an accelerated rate, but also developed in a
distinctive manner that responded primarily to the agricultural and administrative
needs of the Scheme.
As early as 1931, government officials had started to discuss the potential of
devolving agricultural managerial responsibilities from block inspectors to Sudanese
personnel. It was hoped that by extending the principles of devolution to economic
production, Syndicate controls could be moderated and a class of self-sufficient
farmers (rather than cotton labourers) could be created.i" In the early 1930s, various
Schemes were put forward in which the management of an area of tenancies would
be overseen by chosen local tenants. For instance l.A. Reid suggested cooperative
economic management within existing agricultural 'numbers' - the irrigation unit of
nine hoshas or tenancies - organised on the basis of one tenant chosen by the others
to act as manager or mulahiz.t" However, these ideas not only challenged the
government's focus upon large tribal units, but also coincided with the world
depression, which together with a series of diseased crops brought the Scheme to its
knees. Under these conditions, survival and efficiency were all, and agricultural
devolution was indefinitely postponed.
However, if the depression of the early 1930s delayed the implementation of
devolution within the Gezira Scheme, it also made it an ever more important priority
after the depression. The financial crisis brought about a new sympathetic attitude
towards tenants as the victims of circumstance. Not only was the Scheme itself
viewed as intrusive and highly controlling, but it was proved that it wa-, not
2_1 NRO ICivsec 1/16/50. Huddleston to MacMicbael. Civil Secretary. II vlarch 11.)27. .
2~ NRO BNP 1/40/30 I, Clarke. Governor BNP to Walle). Assistant Director .vgriculturc and Forest:v,
1.+ March 19.~3. .
2'i NRO BNP 1/40/30 I, Reid. "Proposed method of cultivating cotton in the Gczira SL'hClllC on a ell
operative basis". 20 Fehruary 193I.
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inevitably a profitable venture that provided material compensation for its cultural
and economic impact. Although with no other significant source of national revenue,
the government was forced to back the Scheme, it did so with growing reluctance
and sympathy for the tenants working under factory like conditions for the financial
benefit of the nation rather than themselves. Government officials within the Gezira
became increasingly uneasy about supporting the Scheme, as province governor
Clarke stated:
It seems to me wrong that the Sudan Government or the British
Government or any British official should be compelled to
enforce on say 80,000 people (tenants and their families) a system
of which the best that can be said is that we hope they will submit
to it without causing serious trouble. 26
The depression drew attention to the economic fallibility of the Scheme while at the
same time highlighting the controlling conditions under which tenants worked. Seen
as fundamentally flawed by the government, the depression forced a re-evaluation of
how the Scheme should be run, and what its objectives were. The immediate
problem of retaining tenants demonstrated that the conditions of the Scheme were
only accepted when rewarded with financial profit. Without profits, tenants began to
abandon their tenancies on a large scale, and by 1934, the government was only able
to maintain tenant numbers through the "providential failure of the rains outside the
Scheme"." The government had already been uneasy about the imposition of social
change within the Scheme and this unease deepened further once guaranteed material
compensation was undermined. Even once the economic situation began to ease, the
evaluation of the Scheme by local government officers was largely negative. C.G.
Davies, the Commissioner of the Gezira Area summed up his fears stating:
I cannot honestly believe that any of the old time cultivators
really enjoy the Scheme... I do not think that the ordinary
working advances strike them as either generous or an adequate
return for the amount of work and time they must spend on their
howashas [tenancies]. There is more cash now, but the present
~6 NRO 2BNP 50n/28. Clarkc. Governor BNP to Angus Gillan. Ci\d SCLTl'lar~.~I December Iy~~
27 NRO BNP 1/..H)/301. Hillard. DC North Gczira \0 Young. Governor B\P. I" December 14~5.
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generation of cultivator cannot forget in ten years his old freedom.
He used to work for his two or three months in the year; he had
enough food for his needs and enough money for ordinary small
luxuries and he was his own master. The standard of livins
b
nowadays is higher but he has to work more than twice as hard
and twice as long to achieve it, and he is always working to a
programme arranged by someone else. 28
These feelings were only intensified by the fact that the government had no effective
control over the management of the Scheme. The tensions arising between the
Syndicate's focus upon agricultural efficiency, and the government's prioritisation of
effective administration were significant. The government was financially
committed to the continuing success of the Gezira Scheme, and they were also
committed to working with the Syndicate as Scheme managers until at least 1939.29
Unable to make structural changes to the Scheme, the government attempted to find
other forms of compensation for those living under the controlling conditions of the
Scheme. This unofficial compensation gradually became associated with an
accelerated rate of modern development, by which existing economic developments
would be balanced by corresponding rates of social and political development. At
the heart of these proposals was a desire to create an informed tenant body with
increased control over their economic involvement within the Scheme. By engaging
with tenants as economic actors, the government attempted to treat tenants more as
the partners in the Scheme that they officially were, rather than as a labouring
workforce. As A.R. Bolton stated:
If a tenant were told more about marketing, etc., and about the
purport of complicated processes which are vexatious to him
because their aim is obscure there might be more goodwill and
. 10
co-operation.-
28 NRO BNP, 1/40/30 l. c.o. Davies, DC Gezira Area to Young. Governor B:\P: 22 [)cccm~cr ]lnS,
2') In 1939 the government had the right to review the concession agreement Gaitskcll. Getira. p
2()-l, . . f d .. h '\ t
30 NRO BNP, 1140130 I, Minutes of a meeting held "to discuss the possibilities o a muung t e. a In:
Inhabitants of the Gezira to a greater and more direct share in the Gczira Scheme as at prevent
const itutcd." 16 November ]9.~5,
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Experimentation in Management
The government set about experimenting with ways in which tenants might be given
greater control over the management of their own tenancies, but faced continued
opposition from the Syndicate who jealously guarded their right to manage the
Scheme. It was not until a meeting in 1935, that W.P. Archdale. the Assistant
Manager of the Syndicate, "suddenly 'blew up' and said that of course the SPS
[Sudan Plantations Syndicate] used sheikhs and anyone else who was of any
value".31 From this surprise admission followed the grudging concession that an
unofficial experiment might be made with seven wakil, or agricultural sheikhs, who
were to undertake the supervision of an area of tenancies around a village." The
wakil sheikh experiment attempted to place a nominated tenant as intermediary
between the block inspector and the other tenants within a village. As village
sheikhs acted to mediate between their village and the government, so wakil sheikhs
were intended to mediate between village tenants and the Syndicate management.
With 450 villages existing within the Scheme, seven agricultural sheikhs did not
bring about a dramatic change in policy, but it was an important concession. The
question remained who these wakil sheikhs might be, fuelling a debate that forced
the government to evaluate the direction of development.
In this first experiment, the Syndicate was given the right to nominate the wakil
sheikh. The government recognised these appointments, but privately raised doubts
that in the context of the Syndicate's priority of efficiency, its control over the
direction of agricultural devolution would further undermine the position of the
"natural leaders" cultivated by the government and thus by implication. the
government itself. Robert Mayall, the new province governor feared that it wa- a
policy, which instead of stemming Syndicate control, could help to increase it. He
wrote of the new agricultural sheikhs:
[I]f they are merely good tenants ... relying entirely for their
.11 NRO BNP 1/40/301. e.G. Davies. DC Gezira Area, "Note on ~\'akil Sheikhs", .,1 December I~.'tl .
.1~ Ihid .. The role of a wakil sheikh was "to go round his murur dally. [an~lto k,eep the..cu,ltIv311 1r\ up
h k.. NR() BNP 1/40/,01 Peter i\dand DC Gczira "Note on \\ akil Sheikh.... - h.'hru,lr~to t c mar' • . _. . .
1~37.
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authority on the block inspector, I don't think we have done much
good. In fact we have merely given the Syndicate an extra ghaffir
paid by the government. 33
As a solution he proposed that wherever possible, the position of agricultural sheikh
should be held by the existing administrative sheikh in order to reinforce the existing
order.
This desire to amalgamate positions of administrative and agricultural authority
stemmed from a belief that consolidating the power of 'traditional' leaders was the
most positive way in which Gezira communities might be strengthened, against the
'threat' of Syndicate authority. However, growing support for the separation of roles
emerged among provincial government staff. This was in part a practical
consideration, as the roles of agricultural manager, administrator and cultivator were
considered too great for all but the most 'able' of sheikhs. But it was also reflective
of a more fundamental shift of opinion, which was most succinctly stated by Peter
Acland:
I do not think we should look only to the sheikhly families to
provide wakils. A new aristocracy of bigger and better cultivators
is slowly arising and I feel that they should have their chance as
wel1.34
Understanding that the "tempo of life in the Gezira is increasing and will go on
increasing", the value of tradition, so painfully cultivated was now openly
questioned." In a region that was experiencing rapid economic development, it was
an individual's skills rather than a traditional background that began at least
theoretically to be recognised.
In the short term, a pragmatic solution was found by encouraging the Syndicate to
nominate men who were suitably skilled in agricultural affairs, but came from the
family of the administrative sheikh. The Syndicate was generally happy to oblige. It
33 NRO BNP, 1/40/30 I. Mayall. Governor BNP to Acland. DC Gezira 31 December 1936. A ghaffir
within the Syndicate was generally a local man employ cd to regulate the flow of water In the
irrigation channels.
14 NRO BNP. 1/401301. Acland, DC Gezira "Note on Wakil Sheikhs". ~ February 1937.
35 NRO BNP. \/40/301. Hillard. DC North Gezira to Acland, DC Gevira \4 February 1937.
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too found the established respect for sheikhly families a useful basis for a wakil
sheikh's authority. As Acland noted:
In five out of the 7 cases the wakil is of the leading family in his
village; one is the sheikh, 2 are brothers of the sheikh, 1 is son of
the late Omda of the area, 1 is first cousin of the sheikh."
Thus agricultural devolution generally consolidated existing patterns of authority.
However, if five of the seven wakils were from 'leading families', then presumably
two were not. In a climate in which specific skills were starting to be valued over
and above established position, there were limited opportunities available to those
from outside the existing status quo.
However, a wahl sheikh not from a sheikhly background was disadvantaged. The
mediatory position of an established village sheikh was generally accepted and could
be extended to agricultural mediation and management. When a non-sheikhly tenant
was appointed as wakil sheikh, he frequently lacked legitimacy within the village and
thus the influence to work effectively. For instance it was reported of Ahmed
Abdullahi Fadlalla of Wad Reiya village in Nueila block that "unfortunately the
tenants did not respond kindly to his jurisdiction, and in a very short period matters
became chaotic". 37 Paid a (nominal) salary for his work as an agricultural
mediator/supervisor, it was an easy, and frequently correct, assumption to see the
wahl sheikh as merely an adjunct to the block inspector. Supervisory powers may
have been devolved, but they were not decentralised, and the block inspector
generally delegated a specific range of tasks. As with the delegation of
administrative functions to courts, this extension of agricultural supervision acted to
bring the power of the block inspector ever more firmly into the community.
Whereas courts were highly valued for their ability to act as mediatory institutions
between community and government, the individual wahl sheikh did not bring the
same benefits to tenants or to the community. The fact that the block inspector
generally used the wakil sheikh as an agricultural foreman meant that there was little
possibility of a community expressing their views to agricultural management
.'6 NRO BNP. 1/40/301. Acland. DC Gezira "Note on Wakil Sheikhs". 2 February 1937.
n NRO BNP, 1/40/301. c.o. Davies, "Wakil Sheikh report on Ahmed Abdullahi Fadlalla". 9 June
1938.
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through the wakil sheikh. In addition, the relationships that a village had with the
government and had with the Syndicate were quite different. The government was a
generally distant authority, rarely if ever experienced by an individual, and thus
official channels of community mediation were a highly important means of
communication. In contrast, agricultural management was intensive, and the block
inspector a close and constant presence. With each tenant already having a personal
relationship with his block inspector, the existence of a wakil sheikh acted to distance
a tenant from the Syndicate rather than forge closer links. The power of the
Syndicate was at the same time more deeply entrenched, and less accessible.
Agricultural work being the personal livelihood of a tenant, it was viewed as an
individual rather than communal responsibility. The feelings towards the position of
wakil sheikh were thus largely negative. From the perspective of tenants the
imposition of a non-elected individual between the tenant and his inspector was
frequently resented, and the Group Inspector, Centre Group reported that "a notable
Radma tenant told Mr MacLean [the block inspector] he wanted orders direct from
him and not from Yusif [the wakil and village sheikh].,,38 In contrast with highly
sought after administrative and judicial positions, the position of wakil sheikh was
not greatly popular. Existing administrative sheikhs accustomed to using their
influence in the practice of mediation, found the transition to direct supervision and
management frequently unpalatable. The drive necessary to get agricultural
standards to meet Syndicate expectations too easily conflicted with the maintenance
of community harmony and brought resentment rather than prestige. As MacLean,
the block inspector of Radma block reported of the same wakil sheikh;
I am quite sure Yusif does not want this job nor would a salary if
attached to it attract him. He is only doing what he does do
because he is willing to oblige ... but this job is not at all to his
liking and he would be more than grateful if we let him off the
job altogether. 39
38 NRO BN? 1/40/301. Group Inspector Centre Group, "Wakil Sheikh report on Yusif Hag cl Zein",
18 November 1936.
39 NRO BNP. 1/..f()/301, Maclean. Block Inspector Radma block, "Wakil Sheikh report on Yusif Hag
cl Ie in". 15 JuIy I937.
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Reliant upon reports written by Syndicate inspectors, the image left in the record is
one of frustration with wakil sheikhs. They were accused of failing to show initiative.
lacking drive, failing to insist upon suitable standards of work, and not demonstrating
responsibility/" However, turning these reports around and it can be seen that what
were reported as instances of failure by the Syndicate might in fact indicate
considerable success within tenant communities. Accepting that most tenants
preferred to spend time on their food crops rather than the cotton crop, the lack of
drive by wakil sheikhs fitted with the aims of most tenants. Indeed wakil sheikhs
although an agent of the block inspector rather than the village, frequently acted to
defend tenant interests. Thus it was reported of Ismail Mohammed Ahmed that he
"never reports that someone' s watering or picking is bad", while a consistent
complaint was that tenants' labouring costs were overestimated by wakil sheikhs in
order to ensure a continuation of advance payments from the Syndicate."
Wakil sheikhs were gradually accepted by block inspectors, however, the
government remained sceptical about the value of agricultural devolution controlled
by the Syndicate. 42 In separate experiments beginning in 1937, the government
attempted to create entire model villages within the blocks of Fawar and Gondal. As
with wakil sheikhs, the government saw these experiments as an attempt to wrest
control from the Syndicate. But in creating entirely new villages, these experiments
went considerably further. By offering services, and building viable village
communities, ideas of social development were central to these village-based
experiments. Each new village was given specific services including a shop, a well,
latrines, a fuel plot, and animal zaribas [enclosures], and each tenant was given land
within the immediate vicinity of the village.v' If the wakil sheikh experiments had
been explicitly about devolving agricultural responsibilities, then Fawar and Gondal
used this as a starting point for a much more adventurous scheme in which economic
and social development were linked. A notable result of this attempt was that
development and tenant status were implicitly connected. Tenants were the only
inhabitants within these model villages, and it was that group that were explicitly
-10 NRO BNP. 1/40/301. Wakil Sheikh Reports.
-II NRO BNP. 1/40/301. H.N. Crossley. Block Inspector A'Galil block, 20 April 1937, and Group
Inspector Southern Group. "Wakil Sheikh report on Hamed Ahmed Abu Naib", 16 November 1936.
-12 NRO BNP. 1/401301, Sanders, DC South Gezira. to Hillard, DC Gezira, 3 January 1938.
-I.~ RHA. MSS PERHAM 12~, "Notes on the Gezira", n.d.
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targeted. The overall aim of the experiments was "to produce a class of peasant
proprietors in village units under the supervision and control of their own headmen
for all agricultural and administrative purposes'v " However, for the first time,
private accumulation was not only acknowledged as a primary aim of tenants, but
was actively encouraged as a motivating principle; "the enterprising tenant must have
room to increase his cultivation, should be allowed to buy land from less successful
tenant"."
Individual headmen were again the focus of government notice, however although
referencing the autocratic view of tradition, the actual experimentation in devolution
was far from traditional, with entirely new sheikhs appointed and new skills instilled.
As Perham noted; "Sheikhs must be trained to be real leaders, this requires careful
selection, and real co-operation on the part of the block inspector'Y'" However, these
experiments in nominating leaders were not always successful, as demonstrated by
the difficulties the government had in finding a suitable sheikh for the village of
Mansi in Fawar block. On the 5 May 1937, the government appointed the sheikhs
for the eight experimental villages. In Mansi, they chose "a well-born and well
connected Halawi" for whom there were high hopes, but less than three months later
it was reported that he "forestalled dismissal by resigning.v'" In mid-July Sheikh
Awad Bashir was appointed in his place, but lasted even less time. On the 31 July,
the block inspector reported that 25 of the villagers were "indulging" in a sit-down
strike until Bashir was removed." Their complaints included the allegations that the
sheikh had been rude to them, had 'stolen' their labourers, and "was generally a
menace and a nuisance. ,,49 Once again, the sheikh was persuaded to resign, and Fadil
Osman took his place. Formerly unknown to the government, this was a candidate
"whom his fellow-tenants wish to tryout". 50 Having found the previous
government-appointed sheikhs unsuitable, the tenants settled in the Fawar villages
proved themselves willing to grasp the reins of power and acted in concert to gain a
united end. Although it is difficult to say that the Mansi tenants were acting to
~~ NRO lCivsec 57/24/93. BNP Annual Report 1937.
~5 RHA. MSS PERHAM 128. "Notes on the Gezira", n.d.
~6 Ibid. [emphasis added].
47 NRO 1Civsec 57/4/18. BNP Monthly Diaries 1937. August.
~8 NRO ICivscc 57/61'26. BNP Monthly Diaries 1938. July.
~q NRO 1Civscc 57/6/26, BNP Monthly Diaries 1938. August.
50 Ibid.
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protect their economic interests, the complaint about labour being 'stolen' suggests
that the defence of common economic interests were at least one aim of this action.
Introducing Local Government
Agricultural-led and thus tenant-oriented devolution had outpaced developments in
administrative devolution throughout the 1930s. it was not until 1937 that the
passing of local government legislation redressed this balance. The model of
governance put forward by Symes and his Civil Secretaries at the end of the 1930s
was ambitious and 'modern' in scope, reflecting the drive to pass greater powers to
"larger and more independent organs of provincial self-government [which] enabled
them to exercise much greater authority and financial powers." 51 This was a
significant change of direction, in part responding to the increasing demands for
participation within the political processes by educated Sudanese excluded by the
language of tradition. As such it looked forward rather than back, to a 'rational'
form of administration. As Newbold retrospectively stated, it followed
the lines of modern local government, i.e. so as to rest more on
popular consent, and be acceptable to educated Arabs, and to be
trained and equipped to deal with the new social and economic
problems, e.g. sanitation, soil erosion, [and] town planning.52
The local government ordinances of 1937 demonstrated a change in this direction.
These were 'local government' as opposed to 'tribal government' ordinances,
demonstrating that territorial units had become the focus of government policy rather
than tribal units. The institutions to which powers were devolved were no longer
'native authorities' but had become 'local authorities', similarly 'native courts' had
become 'local courts,53 As Newbold reported:
)) Symes. "Note on Administrative Purposes", p. 2.
)2 Newbold, lecture entitled "Recent Political Development in the Sudan," given October 1944. in
Henderson [ed.] The Making of the Modem Sudan. p. 532.
).' The Local Government (Rural Areas) Ordinance 1937, in Sudan Gazette. no. fl25. IS Octoher 19:n,
pp.59-66.
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'Local Government' is a more intelligible term, and arouses no
passions .. .it will absorb some nationalist ambitions and under the
ample folds of its respectable cloak the sons of sheikhs and sons
of effendia can lie down happily together.54
This was a vision of unity and universality; of two worlds meeting in a new setting.
It also a marked the move away from a world that was seen as staid and potentially
corrupt, and towards a very different one in which 'modernity' and 'development'
were the goals.
In terms of stated policy, the legislation marked an official move away from
autocratic tribal leadership and towards councils as the source of legitimate authority
within communities. However, the results were far less transforming than the
government's rhetoric suggested. Within the Gezira, where territory had been
unofficially recognised as the basic principle of social organisation throughout the
Condominium, the new emphasis upon the 'local' was less than radical. In many
ways the legislation gave only a statuary basis to the executive powers which had
been in fact exercised by the native authorities during the preceding period. 55
However, what it did do was to place native authorities ever more firmly under the
direction of the merkaz:
The legislation itself was divided into three parts, providing different powers for
local authorities within municipalities, townships and rural areas. These regional
distinctions had been broadly made under the judicial legislation, but now became
explicit. The map of Sudan was carved into distinct regions, using colour to define
different forms of governance. Rural areas were painted blue, townships pink and
municipalities red. This was an attempt to incorporate the differing needs of
communities within Sudan ranging from the nomadic to the urban, into a limited and
uni-directional spectrum. An example of colonial categorisation through which the
government might 'know' its subject, the matching of set governance needs to
geographical absolutes created its own limitations. In particular, the 'sophisticated'
Gezira, with its population that was in close touch with the urban centres of Wad
5.t Newbold "Note on Relations between Educated and Tribal Elements in the Sudan", February 1939.
in Henderson, The Making of the Modem Sudan, p. 509.
55 Khalaf. "British Policy" p. ) 17.
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Medani and Khartoum, and intimately connected with the world economy and
political opinion, was problematically placed in the same 'rural' category as nomadic
communities.i"
As with agricultural devolution, the government was unsure of what form
administrative devolution should take, and so a similar period of experimentation
occurred. In February 1937, Mayall created an informal advisory body on which sat
all thirteen sheikhs of khut in the Gezira. The sheikhs were used as a channel of
communication between the government and the Gezira population, predominantly
disseminating information from the government. The 'traditional' figures of sheikhs
of khut were seen as ably representing the population. They were the obvious
leaders having been promoted since the start of the Condominium, and not only had
close relationships with government officials, but were the existing figures of
authority as the heads of courts and native administrations. What distinguished this
attempt at mediation from previous purely administrative uses of sheikhs, was the
idea that this was potentially a two-way channel of communication, and that the
population had a role in directing policy. Furthermore, this was the first time that the
sheikhs were brought together to discuss Gezira-wide concerns in a communal,
council-like atmosphere.Y The Gezira Scheme was seen as a region with its own
particular needs, and became an administrative unit separate from other parts of the
province in which it lay.
Matters including the future policy of wakil sheikhs, the pay of sheikhs and omdas,
and the most suitable days in the week for the sitting of courts were discussed. In
participating in this new administrative body, sheikhs of khut gained a new province-
wide importance. They also gained individual benefits from a good salary, and in
1938, the province reports stated that six out the seven sheikhs of khut possessed
cars. 58 The existing control of sheikhs of khut over native administration was
confirmed. Despite the language of universal local government, what was created
was a centralised body that duplicated existing hierarchies of authority. However, as
much as individual sheikhs of khut benefited, this was primarily about the growth of
56 The Local government (Rural Areas) Ordinance 1937.
57 NRO ICivsec 57/4/18. BNP Monthly Diaries 1937. March.
58 NRO ICivsec 57/6/26. BNP Monthly Diaries IlHS. April.
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state power. Sheikhs of khut were essentially reduced to spokesmen of the
government and although this was described as a major piece of devolution
associating Gezira inhabitants with Government policy, it was more closely
controlled by the government than any previous body had been. Mayall as province
Governor acted as the chairman of the advisory body and the Gezira DC's also
attended, thus maintaining close government control over discussion.i"
This experimental advisory body became the Gezira Local Authority in 1939. No
longer purely advisory, the Local Authority had by virtue of the Local Government
(Rural Areas) Ordinance, the powers to "make local orders enforceable by law".6o
The provincial report stated that the creation of the Local Authority "marked the
biggest step forward in the delegation of powers so far taken in this area". Indeed the
'independence' of the Gezira Local Authority was officially cultivated by the
provision of a budget, the powers to make orders over a (designated) range of issues
and the means to appoint and dismiss an executive body of omdas, sheikhs "and
other similar subordinate authorities", to whom powers would be delegated. 61
However, this was in fact more about the delegating of the functions of governance
rather than full powers.62 The Local Authority essentially remained a tool of the
merkaz; existing "to carry out any lawful order of the Governor or any magistrate",
and all members were appointed by the province Governor, who retained the power
1 h . ~to cance any sue appointment.
No longer was there was an automatic right of membership, and only four of the
thirteen Gezira sheikhs of khut were appointed alongside the Deputy Governor and
the DC's of North and South Gezira. This move caused a significant amount of
resistance and jealousy among the sheikhs of khut who feared that their powerbase
was being undermined. These fears were to some extent allayed when told that each
member of the Local Authority "should only serve for one year and then be replaced
in rotation by the other sheikhs of khut.,,64 In making this decision, the government
59 NRO lCivsec 57/4/18, BNP Monthly Diaries 1937, March.
60 NRO 2BNP 42/112. BNP Annual Report 1939.
61 The Local Government (Rural Areas) Ordinance 1937 (section seven).
62 NRO 2BNP 42/1/2. BNP Annual Report 1939.
6.1 The Local Government (Rural Areas) Ordinance 1937 (section six).
M NRO BNP 1/38/293. Ac1and, Gczira Commissioner. "Handing over notes". May 1940.
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made a distinct statement about the bureaucratic rather than traditional functions of
this body. However, the fact that the choice of Local Authority membership was
made from within the existing body of the sheikhs of khut demonstrates that this
"formally constituted body of notables", was nothing other than a more centralised,
and increasingly government-controlled version of existing power structures.
Theoretically, the Ordinances made an important distinction between the institutions
of local authorities and local courts.f Courts were seen as distinct bodies dealing
purely with judicial processes, while local authorities existed to "maintain order and
further good government". 66 In practice the Gezira Local Authority was a body
imposed on top of existing native authorities, which continued to combine their
existing judicial and administrative authority within the same body. The sheikh of
khut remained the unelected head of this double unit, and he worked with the same
appointed body of omdas and sheikhs that formed the court membership. The
government attempted to distinguish between the judicial and the executive functions
of native administrations through the provision of an extra administrative clerk in
addition to the existing court clerk each administration employed. The fact that each
of these 'khut clerks' underwent training in the merkaz before being sent out to the
native authority only illustrates the increasing intrusion of government authority
within local administration."
Agricultural Dominance
However, although the Local Government Ordinances were an important
government-directed development within the Gezira, agricultural patterns rather than
central theories remained the dominating force upon the development of local
government and other forms of devolution. For reasons of both agricultural
efficiency (as the Syndicate became increasingly reliant upon agricultural devolution)
and the government's desire to wrest control from the Syndicate, it was the Scheme
65 The Local Government (Rural Areas) Ordinance 1937 (section three).
66 Ibid.. (section six).
67 NRO ICi\'sec 57/4/18 BNP Monthly Diaries 1937, November.
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that directed both the rate and the form of administrative devolution. Earlier
attempts to strengthen 'native' authority by keeping agricultural and government
administration separated had failed. In failing to coordinate agricultural and
administrative boundaries, there were no devolved local authorities to check or take
over Syndicate authority, and native authorities were in effect weakened by omodias
being split across several agricultural blocks. 68 Although the agricultural layout had
existed only from the mid-1920s, it had become the dominant spatial influence upon
the region. With canals acting as physical obstacles to an omda's jurisdiction and the
constant presence of one or more block inspectors, an omda's authority was severely
weakened. As Bardsley noted:
Old paths and communications between village and village, and
the villagers with their omda came to an abrupt end, and it is not
unusual for an omda to have to travel three times the distance he
had to formerly to get to a given village"
In an attempt to bolster the power of government-nominated local authorities, the
government from 1936 began to coordinate administrative and agricultural
boundaries. As Mayall stated:
The irrigation unit of the Main Canal, the majors and the minors
are permanent. Thousands of pounds of capital are sunk in
them ... I suggest therefore that we must work in the future to
units based on the canals which are there for all time.7o
In giving priority to the pattern of agricultural organisation and superimposing the
new agricultural boundaries onto administrative units, the dominance of the Scheme
within the Gezira was accepted. It was further consolidated through the organisation
of the salary structure for local government personnel within the Gezira. From the
late 1920s, salaries were paid as a compensation for the lack of ushur available
within the Scheme, and reflected pre-Scheme conditions." In 1937. the opportunity
was taken to rationalise and grade all native authority salaries in line with the new
68 RHA MSS PERHAM 565/3. "Survey of Devolution",
69 NRO BNP 1/112. Bardsley. Governor BNP to MacMichael, Civil Secretary. 6 March 1930.
70 RHA MSS PERHAM 565/3. "Survey of Devolution",
71 Ushur was a crop tax levied throughout northern Sudan. of which 107r was retained hv the sheikh
in recompense for his administrative role. Tenancies were exempt from paying this tax. and therefore,
sheikhs within the Scheme lost the majority of this revenue.
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conditions and responsibilities of Gezira sheikhs. These new responsibilities were
directly associated with the agricultural administration of the Scheme with the grades
of village sheikhs' salaries relating solely to the number of tenants within a sheikh's
village. 72
The dominance of the Scheme upon administration was complete. The Scheme was
not only a monumental physical presence with its canals, fields and British block
inspectors, it also dominated the Gezira in terms of its effect upon the rate and the
form of devolution. However, the Gezira also followed national trends in local
governance. Having moved away from the autocratic policy of indirect rule, the
'tradition' of the meglis was re-branded. Establishing bureaucratic councils, the
government relied upon existing forms of consensual authority to meet the needs of
'modern' society. Although often portrayed as dramatic changes in policy, the result
of the government's political transformation was all too frequently slight. What
changes that did occur were not so much in the structures of authority, but rather in
the degree of governmental penetration into Sudanese communities, as devolutionary
policies actually saw the government gaining greater access to community
governance. Also following the national trend, these early stages of formal
implementation of local government favoured the established elite. However, novel
within the Gezira Scheme, and reflecting the dominance of the Scheme in the area
was the increasing focus of devolution upon one particular section of the community.
With tenants the most visible section of the community in a region focused upon the
Scheme, they became the primary recipients of devolutionary developments at the
expense of non-tenants. This was to become a trend that was to continue as the rate
of devolution increased further throughout the 1940s.
t: NRO lCi,scc 1/17/54. Budget proposals for 1938.28 Septemher 1937.
135
6EXPERIMENTING WITH
MODERNITY
By the early 1940s, the village had been identified as the most important social and
political unit within the Gezira. As a government report stated:
The village group provides an association of people who, in spite of
their mixed origin, are bound together by the close bonds of common
interests, sharing the same lands, markets and water supplies, and the
same religious sects and traditions. In other words each village is in
fact a small republic where social institutions of value can be
maintained and social cohesion encouraged. 1
The experiments within Gondal and Fawar were deemed to be successful, but in the
government's mind had not gone far enough. The 1940s saw an increase in the rate of
devolution within the Gezira Scheme, and although agricultural issues and agricultural
units remained the dominating factors, local government was increasingly incorporated
into the pattern of agricultural devolution. The result was an accelerated rate of local
government within the Gezira Scheme that was unique within the Sudan. However, this
was a form of local government that was particularly controlled by centralised
authorities, with the government co-opting the existing large numbers of block
inspectors to manage village and block level devolution. As well as being uniquely
I NRO 2BNP 50/217. anon .. "Village Councils" I<.J..J.-'!.
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supervised, it was also a form of devolution that favoured tenants over and above non-
tenants. Based on agricultural units, tenants were automatically the preferred candidates
for local council membership, and thus tenants consolidated their existing economic
dominance by controlling local government structures. Tenants embraced the
opportunities that councils offered, using them as important mediatory institutions to
gain access to government resources and to consolidate their position within their own
communities.
Designing a Future
In 1939 the government extended the Syndicate's concession until 1950. However, the
climate of government had changed, and new expectations of the Syndicate's role now
existed. Mayall outlined the attitude of the government when he stated:
The ideal object of government, if she is to be faithful to her
principles of trusteeship should be, before the concession period is
ended, administratively and agriculturally to have trained up a class
of small peasant proprietors, who can, when the control period is
ended, make the best use of the irrigation system.i
By tying the continuation of the Syndicate's concessionary agreement to these aims, the
Syndicate was co-opted into promoting and largely managing future devolutionary
developments. With Gaitskell, who was personally enthusiastic about social
development directing Syndicate management, the task was made considerably easier. 3
The future direction of devolution was outlined in a document called 'Schedule 'X" in
1940, which set forth the government's ideas on the future organisation of the Scheme.
Moving away from an emphasis upon agricultural efficiency, an ideology of holistic
'development' pervaded this document. Agriculturally the cultivation of food and
2 Mayall,Governor BNP, "Memorandum" 15 February 1939, cited in Gaitskell, Gezira. p. 205.
, Gaitskcll, Gezira p. 206.
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fodder crops together with animal husbandry was promoted as being equally important
as the cotton cash crop, while agricultural education was also prioritised." 'Schedule
'X" directly integrated these agricultural measures with administrative devolution. As
with Gondal and Fawar, 'Schedule 'X" promoted the "development of an orderly
organisation of village communities controlled by headmen"; both the existing village
sheikh and an additional agricultural sheikh.5 The notable difference in the new policy
was that the agricultural sheikh would be elected by village tenants, and that these
headmen would be supported and controlled by village councils, with ultimate control
emanating from the sheikh of khut."
However, this policy, while introducing measures of community control was careful not
to undermine the existing status quo. As Mayall stated; "agents for the civic control of
the farmers already exist in the person of the village sheikhs, and there is no intention of
removing them or curtailing their sphere of influence."? Indeed, the cooperation of the
"local hierarchy of Sheikh of Khut, Omda and village Sheikh" was carefully cultivated,
making it "abundantly clear to them that the devolution agents and councils are based on
the village organisation and therefore not independent of their sphere of authority't.f
And while agricultural sheikhs "should be the choice of the village and regard
themselves as agents of the village", they were rarely divorced from the existing
hierarchy, being in some cases the village sheikh himself, and in others one of his
I · 9re atIves.
Despite consolidating the position of the existing administrative elite, village councils
marked a significant change in the way that the government viewed the power structure
within a village. The council drew on the 'tradition' of the meglis, and given official
sanction became an institution recognised and validated by the government. Although
'tradition' was still central to the government's idea of legitimate authority, ideas about
.j NRO 2BNP 50/2/7, 'Schedule 'X", March 1940.
5 Ibid.
ttibid. and NRO lCivsec 57/12/44, BNP Monthly Diaries, March 1940.
7 NRO 2BNP 50/2/7, Mayall, Governor BNP "Explanatory note on Schedule 'X''', 6 March 1940.
H Ibid.
9 1hid .
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what constituted 'tradition', and the conception of legitimate representation were
changing. The introduction of village councils was proposed as a way to integrate the
leadership of the village sheikh with the "strong democratic sense" of Arab
communities.l'' The village sheikh remained a vital figure as the head of the village
council, but he was no longer deemed to be automatically representative of his village.
By working with a council, the sheikh would no longer be the "local autocrat
substituting our British inspector", but would act as "President of the local
cooperative". 11 The village council thus existed to give an official consensual
legitimacy to the actions of the village sheikh. The agricultural sheikh was directly
accountable to the village council, "preventing him becoming a petty bureaucrat and to
remind him constantly that he is the agent of the village", and in this way village
members were officially empowered.V Not only did the village council exist to deal
with all agricultural issues within the village, including fining and evicting 'failing'
tenants, and recommending new tenants, but it also acted on administrative issues such
as sanitary offences. 13 As with the transition of native courts into native authorities,
village councils soon became convenient institutions through which to channel local
government.
However, although increasingly important institutions, village councils were not open to
all villagers and the restriction of membership to tenants or ex-tenants effectively
marginalised all non-tenants. 14 This was in part a reflection of the dominance of
agricultural interests in these devolutionary experiments. However, it also symbolised
the creation of a new badge of elite status. As with other government policies, including
the restriction of exhibit entries in province agricultural shows to tenants, and the
creation of a Tenants' Welfare Fund, tenants were given privileges that were denied to
non-tenants.F In this context a tenancy began to be seen as something more than simply
an economic venture; it also proved an entrance into a world of social and political
10 SAD 418/6/12-35, Gaitskell, "A Proposal for the Future Development of the Gezira Scheme". 193[8].
II Ibid.
12 NRO 2BNP 50/2/7, Mayall, Governor BNP, "Explanatory note on Schedule 'X'''. 6 March 1940.
I.' Ibid.
1-1 Ibid.
15 NRO lCivscc 57/6/26, BNP Monthly Diaries, Decemher 1938. Gaitskell. Gezira. pp. 169-170.
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power. Those without access to tenancies were historically the economically marginal.
and thus the wealth and cultural differences existing in the pre-Scheme Gezira were
institutionalised further, on the basis of tenant 'ownership'.
To prove that it would not harm the Syndicate's cotton growing interests, it was decided
that village councils would be first implemented throughout Hosh Block during 1940,
and its value assessed before further extension. The village councils were effectively
controlled by the block inspector, who as the 'man on the ground' undertook the role of
supervising devolution. It was he that appointed the village councils, and supervised
their duties, thus ironically, just as the government used a language of increased village
control through devolution, so did they come under increasing control from centralised
authorities. 16 The reaction of village communities to the establishment of village
councils was mixed. Out of the thirteen villages in Hosh Block, eight enthusiastically
established councils while the other five were less certain. 17 One year later, having
observed the functioning of the established village councils these five villages also
supported the establishment of village councils." There is little information relating to
these first village councils, however one comment within the records states that tenants
used them as a forum to discuss the similarities of the new devolution Scheme in Hosh
with the Abdel Magid Cotton Scheme on the White Nile, and in particular to question
whether the similarities would extend to the higher cotton payments as received in Abdel
Magid. Keenly aware of systems working elsewhere, tenants' interests were primarily
focused upon the individual economic benefits of the Gezira Scheme. 19
While the village council was overseen by the block inspector, time constraints meant
that he was unable to closely monitor all councils in his block. The solution was to
create an intermediary institution between the block inspector and the village council.
The first block council was established in Hosh in February 1941. Intended as an
advisory body, through which the block inspector might "issue agricultural propaganda",
16 NRO ICivsec 57/12/-+-+. BNP Monthly Diaries, April 1940.
17 Ibid.
IK NRO ICivscc 57/17/63. BNP Monthly Diaries. August 1942.
1<) NRO ICivscc 57/12/-+-+. BNP Monthly Diaries. April 1940.
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one representative of each village council met once a month under the supervision and
chairmanship of the block inspector.i" Making a strong statement that this was not a
'traditional' body, and to avoid jealousies, the block council was chosen arbitrarily by
appointing the oldest member of each village council." Members of this council sat for
only two years before retiring, and altogether a dynamic structure was created
incorporating many previously unknown tenants from across an entire block. With no
'traditional' precedent for communal organisation around the agricultural block unit, the
creation of Hosh block council demonstrated an inventiveness by government, by which
new social structures were created for particular contemporary circumstances.
The remit of the block council allowed for the discussion of "matters of general interest
to the Block".22 As Gaitskell noted:
Just what these matters were was left undefined. Clearly they were
mainly agricultural, but with the new social purpose they soon began
to embrace everything that was not obviously the known province of
some existing department of government or local government. 23
Although with no legislative powers or backing, the government once again found a
functioning community body irresistible, and soon used it for aspects of block
administration. Thus the block council was used as a court of appeal for decisions made
by village councils, and - "to avoid the impression that the agricultural Wakil is a
servant of the administrative native administration on the one hand, or of the Syndicate
on the other" - it was also used as a channel through which agricultural sheikhs were
paid. 24 This veneer of independence was false. With the block inspector in the
permanent position of Chairman, the block council was the most closely monitored body
within the Gezira.
~() NRO 2BNP 42/1/4, BNP Annual Report 1941.
21 NRO lCivsec 57/14/54, BNP Monthly Diaries, February 1941.
~2 Ibid.
B GaitskelI. Gezira p. 210.
24 NRO 2BNP .-f.2/1/.-f.. BNP Annual Report 19.-f.l and NRO lCivsec 57/1.-f./5.-f.. BNP Monthly Diaries,
February I 94 1.
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With the Hosh experiment deemed a success, plans were made in June 1941, to extend
councils into Fawar block and selected villages in Hassaheisa district." The support for
this form of village and block devolution within Gezira communities meant that the
selection of these new councils "presented no difficulty whatsoever and the whole
proceedings went off remarkably smoothly.v" Even with restricted powers, the benefit
of having a recognised community forum was understood throughout many villages.
Villages with 'legitimate', or village-controlled samads did have more power to control
patterns of work, and could thus defend tenant interests in ways that wakil sheikhs
directly controlled by the block inspector could not. Furthermore, with government
backing for councils, villages found that a council proved a way of gaining the direct
attention and resources of the government, when previously they had been reliant upon
the much larger Khut representing their interests. Like courts, councils were important
mediatory institutions; through them, communities could access government-controlled
resources including schools and clinics. In addition, the public face of councils
channelled centralised authority in one direction, effectively limiting the ability of
government and Syndicate to access other areas of community life.
By 1943 there were 35 village councils working with their own agricultural samads,
covering 10% of the Schcme.i" However, as the Second World War continued, the
development of councils was put on hold. With large numbers of British staff recalled
for service, there was greater need to devolve powers but not the time to cultivate
community-based devolution. The solution was to appoint approximately 350 'war-time
samads' to supervise village cultivation. Without village councils, war-time samads
were accountable only to the block inspector, and, like the early experiments did not
extend any power throughout the community. The differences were also apparent in the
personnel chosen as samads. With the Syndicate and the government increasingly
coinciding in their opinion on the need for skill-based and consensual local authority. the
samad working in conjunction with a village council in "the real devolution Scheme"
~'i NRO l Civsec 57/14/54. BNP Monthly Diaries, June 1941.
2h NRO l Civscc 57/14/54. BNP Monthly Diaries. September lY41.
27 GBA (Gezira Board Archive) 700-9 Gaitskell to Williams. Assistant Director of Education. 28 March
194.1.
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preferably had youth and energy, with the council acting as the validating authority
behind him. 28 However, without a council's authority, the existing power and influence
of the samad became the primary consideration. The men chosen by the government
and Syndicate as war-time samads were thus "mostly older men whose money and
family ties had already put them in a position of some authority with their villages", and
over half of them were village sheikhs.i'' Tellingly, Gaitskell noted "they are not at all
the types we would have chosen at our Ieisure'v"
Weeding out Inefficiency
The appointment of war-time samads was seen as a backward step for both the
Syndicate and the government. With the Syndicate short-staffed and unable to drive
forward village devolution, the government decided to concentrate upon reforming the
existing "stagnant" local government as a way to translate the "economic advantages of
the Scheme ... into social progress". 31 In 1942 George Bredin as Governor of the
province, wrote a report in which he stated:
Even the most generous critic would confess that our present local
personnel is inadequate to cope with the peculiar conditions created
by the Gezira cotton Scheme. Many of our Sheikhs and Omdas,
worthy men through they are, belong to a previous generation which
cannot adjust itself to present conditions. In our attempts to bolster
up old institutions we have created a series of oligarchies which are
not efficient because they are based on the hereditary system and
suffer from the disease of nepotism, and because Sheikhs are allowed
~H Ibid.
~l} Ihid.
~() Ihid.
.~I Gaitskell, Getira. p. 21'+.
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to continue in office when it is evident that they are incapable of
carrying out their duties."
Sheikhs and omdas might have been wealthy and influential, but the majority of them
were also illiterate and aging, qualities that were no longer sought in the field of modern,
forward-looking local government.
Throughout 1942, the Gezira District Commissioners drew up a list of local
administration personnel deemed incapable of carrying the growing burden of
administration. In line with the management style of the Syndicate, the government
began to focus upon efficiency within a bureaucratic administration, and looked for
particular skills, including literacy, energy, ability to work with figures and skills of
group management. Pressured resignations "weeded out" inefficient members of local
government, and "a number of ultra conservative and illiterate local authorities were
kindly, but firmly put upon the shelf,.33 Although the move away from existing figures
of authority was broadly national, it was particularly acute within the Gezira, where the
government reacted to the accelerated economic developments of the Scheme. For some,
like Sheikh el Amin Musaad, sheikh of the Halawin Khut from 1917, this pressure to
resign was bitterly fought. 34 However, like the omdas EI Imam Ahmed Dakin of Tekalat
Gubara, and Mohammed Ghanawa of Talbab, most were content to retire from their
duties, especially as the "younger and more progressive individuals" that they were
replaced with, were "in most cases a son or younger relative".35 Thus this reorganisation
tended to replicate the existing structure of authority as being vested within sheikhly
families.
Also in 1942, once the danger of Italian invasion had passed, the 1937 local government
legislation was used to establish khut councils throughout the Gezira under individual
12 G.R.F Bredin, quoted in Gaitskell, Gezira, p. 215.
" RHA MSS Perham 56513, Bredin, Governor BNP to Perham, 1948.
,.I EI Amin Musaad did not voluntarily resign and asked for one more year of office which was refused by
the government. This reluctance to leave his post is perhaps explained by the fact that the government did
not believe he had any suitable relatives, and wished to replace him with an omda from a rival Halaw in
faction. NRO BNP 1130/222. A. Paul, DC North Gezira to Bredin, Governor BNP, 16 December l'l-+'
''i RHA MSS Perham 56513, Bredin, Governor BNP to Perham. 1949. and NRO lCivscc 57/17/61. BNP
Monthly Diaries. June 1942.
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warrants. Based upon the existing native authority unit of the khut, and with the existing
sheikh of khut acting as president, khut councils were advisory bodies only. acting as an
institutional mediator between the khut and the government:
Its duty was to receive and convey government orders, and to make
propaganda in connection with public health, grazing, collection of
crops and distribution of rationed commodities etc,.36
By using the existing structure of the khut unit, the government hoped to retain the
confidence of the existing political and administrative elite while at the same time
making the changes deemed necessary for developments in modern governance. Like
village councils, khut councils were viewed as a means of acting against the potential
autocracy of the 'sheikh', and gaining legitimacy through "providing a better means for
maintaining contact with representative opinion".37 However, with the sheikh of khut
nominating the members of the khut council, the increased representation of khut
councils frequently only confirmed the power a sheikh of khut had, and tended to
replicate the existing administrative power base of omdas and sheikhs.38 However, the
process of change to larger council bodies, together with the new focus upon skills did
provide some new opportunities for those from a non-traditional background. As well as
sheikhs and omdas, the membership of khut councils was reported as including "such
outstanding persons as merchants, farmers, schoolmasters [and] health
represenratives't"
Khut councils discussed a wide range of administrative issues, ranging from sugar
rationing, regulation of animal pounds and village gardens, and were soon initiating
proposals including public health campaigns. 40 However, at the same time as
celebrating the active role of khut councils, the government was also complaining about
their 'inertia' and 'apathy', noting in particular that councils were failing to appreciate
.~(, SAD 517/1 0/18-50, Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, "Report on the Future of the Gezira
Scheme", 1946. p. 38 .
.H NRO ICivsec 57/17/63, BNP Monthly Diaries. May 1942 .
.~K Ihid .
.w SAD 517/1 0/18-50. Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. "Report on the Future of the Gczira
Scheme", p. 38.
-10 NRO ICivsec 57/17/63. BNP Monthly Diaries. October, November 1942.
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the seriousness of the labour crisis in 1942.41 This seeming contradiction suggests that
councils had a particular idea of what role they should play. Sugar rationing. animal
pounds and village gardens were all resources that brought significant benefits to
communities in general and to council members in particular. The control of labour not
only failed to bring significant benefits to council members - who tending to be the
wealthy, were able to personally secure sufficient labour through paying high wages _
but also threatened unwelcome government attention into the economic life of the tenant.
The managerial or landlord mentality of tenants was predicated upon private
accumulation and independent economic action within a tenancy. The external control
of labour threatened the very aspirations of tenants, and was thus avoided by local
government councils.
Able to bring resources and attention to both the community in general and to council
members particularly, councils were seen as a positive resource and factions who failed
to gain representation vociferously complained.Y At the most extreme, council interests
were the personal economic interests of the council members, and the government
reported that "the Halawin Council shows regrettable signs of lapsing into a poor Omdas
Benevolent Society.v'" These actions went against the specific ideas of the role of local
government held by central authorities, in which local authorities acted for the best
interests of the general population. The government, unhappy with such self-serving
authorities took strong actions against offending local authorities. Within the Khawalda
Khut it was found that "many of the tenants in this area have become the victims of
money lenders, and that the local authorities had made no attempt to eradicate this
evil".44 Having failed to act 'appropriately', the government took the "opportunity" to
reorganise the structure of the khut, reducing the number of omodias in the khut from six
to two.
41 NRO 1Civsec 57117/63, BNP Monthly Diaries. December 19..+2 .
.1:' NRO 1Civscc 57117/63. BNP Monthly Diaries, September 19..+2.
4.~ NRO 1Civscc 57117/63. BNP Monthly Diaries, December 1942.
44 NRO 1Civscc 57117/63, BNP Monthly Diaries. September 19..+2
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Rationalising Governance - The Creation of Gisms
Primarily seen as a transitional stage within the development of local government, the
khut council was viewed as an unwieldy unit of government. It was too large to foster
communal spirit and too small to be vested with a budget and financial responsibilities,
and the administrative functions of the khut council were soon transferred onto newly
created gism councils.f The khut was retained, but became a purely judicial unit, with
the sheikh of khut "regarded as a 'stipendiary' magistrate", and president of the local
court. 46 The separation of judicial and administrative authority, which had been
theoretically made within the khut, now became a reality." For the government, the
creation of the gism unit marked a break with all tribal conceptions of power. While it
was a territorial unit, the khut had always been partly conceived in tribal terms with each
khut named after the tribe of its sheikh, and the sheikh of khut being a permanent (and
approximately hereditary) position. With the gism, the government began a process that
self-consciously broke from these 'tribal' forms, creating a modern administrative
bureaucracy.
However, the past remained an important way in which the government legitimised its
administrative developments. The terminology of gism was taken from a territorial unit
of administration used during the Turko-Egyptian period in riverain areas of Sudan.
Larger than a khut, the gism had no tribal connotations, and for this reason had not been
appropriated by the government at an earlier date. In the 1940s however, it was seized
upon by the government as a way in which a bureaucratic territorial structure could be
referenced in terms of tradition and heritage. Through the amalgamation of khuts, five
gisms were created throughout the Gezira Scheme. The single Halawin Khut was
simply transformed into a gism unit on the basis of its "peculiar tenacity with which that
community clings to tribal tradition and their unwillingness to amalgamate with
4) RHA MSS Perham 56513, Bredin, Governor BNP to Perham. 1948.
.jfl Ibid.
47 SAD 517/1 0/18-50, Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. "Report on the Future of the Gczira
Scheme", p. 38.
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neighbouring units". 48 By the end of 1943, after one and a half years of active
reorganisation, the number of units of local government had been reduced from nine to
five and within South Gezira District, the twenty-eight omodias were reduced to
eighteen. The omdas that remained were literate, and all omodia boundaries coincided
with the agricultural block boundaries, with only one omda per block."
The fact that gism councils were not tribally based (other than the Halawin Council
which was an anomaly that the government was able to contain) was a central aspect to
their creation:
[T]he effect of reorganising the local government on a territorial as
opposed to the old tribal basis has, it is hoped, broken down the last
strongholds of feudalism. Today Khawalda, Arakiin and Gaaliin sit
together on the same courts and councils and all are determined to
stand up for the rights and privileges of those sections of the
community which they represent.i"
The non-tribal council was seen to be rational in a way that the former were inherently
not. It was heralded as a grand transformation from a parochial inward and backward
looking body, to one that was objective and distinctly modern. This understanding
ignored all past experience of the Gezira as a territorially defined region, in which
peaceful, cooperative multi-tribal villages had been acknowledged as the norm
throughout the condominium. By believing their own propaganda of Indirect Rule, in
which tribal autocrats had ruled throughout Sudan, British officials considered they were
transforming the Gezira from a feudal and tribal society into a modern 'state'. In fact
the historical lack of active tribalism within the Gezira meant that the transformation
was less dramatic than it has been perceived.
Gisms, headed by a sheikh of gism continued to reference the past through the use of
historical terminology. However, the territorial terminology of the gism reflected the
4H RHA MSS Perham 565n, Bredin, Governor BNP to Perham, 1948.
4'1 NRO ICivscc 57/18/67, BNP Monthly Diaries, November 19..n .
.~o Ihid.
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government's desire to move away from tribal definitions of local authority. Freed from
the tribal model of authority, the government was able to demonstrate considerable
creativity in forming structures of governance suitable for contemporary needs. This
non-traditional model of authority also allowed the government to mould the structure to
particular needs as occurred throughout the Scheme. Thus within the Halawin, the post
remained permanently within the hands of the existing sheikh of khut, whereas in order
to avoid jealousy between the two sheikhs of khut within Hosh Gism it was decided that
each sheikh would act as sheikh of gism on alternate years."
The government's emphasis on democracy and modernisation as distinct from past
tradition was clearly made within a memo to the advisory council in which the
government distanced itself from earlier policies that had supported tribal leaders. In an
only thinly veiled threat, the latter were told that they would only be supported so long
as they evolved in line with modern forms of governance, and would be replaced if they
could not:
Tribal leaders have expressed a certain amount of apprehension lest
the establishment of Local Government Councils should mean an end
of their own authority. They need have no such anxiety ... their
future usefulness will only be limited by their capacity to modernise
their outlook, and to adapt their traditional methods of exercising
hori he reoui f 52aut nty to t q irements 0 progress.
By moving away from believing in the inherent value of tribal tradition, the rhetoric of
the Sudan government instead embraced a range of skills that potentially came from any
background. However, this potential was limited, and as much as this was a threat, it
was also a demonstration of the government's commitment to the established holders of
authority. This was not about replacing the elite, rather it recognised the potential of
established leaders (or their sons) to transform themselves and respond to 'modern'
'\\ NRO ~BNP 11111. H.M.A Sharfi, Executive Officer. Hosh Rural Council, to DC South Gezira, ~o
December 1951.
'\2 Sudan Government. Aspects of Local Government, 194-? p. 2.
1.+9
Experimenting with Modernity
conditions, yet retain the values of a rural conservative background. still favoured by
government.
Although gism councils did not mark the dramatic change from tribal to modem society
that the government perceived, they did bring about considerable changes to the way in
which the population related to the state. In a series of indirect elections, each omodia
nominated four members to the khut council, in effect meaning that every two to three
villages combined to nominate a member, and these newly elected khut councils then
elected members of the new gism councils. Although highly restrictive, this provision of
community control over the form of the institutions of community governance offered
an embryonic form of citizenship. The first elections resulted in a strong degree of
continuity, and "on the whole membership remains much as before", however, despite
the continuity of personnel, the creation of gism councils were seen as something
distinctive by many observers.r' The Advisory Council of Northern Sudan embraced the
creation of the gism council on the basis that "it helps the country to get rid of the old
and hereditary tribalism, and paves the way for those who possess strong character and
qualifications". 54 In particular, the Advisory Council viewed the gism council as a
liberating influence for communities, through which they might "frame the general
instructions governing the rights of individuals and their duties" 55 However, once
again, government control was clearly evident, with the gism council chaired by the
district commissioner.
S~ NRO 1Civsec 57120/75. BNP Monthly Diaries, June 1944.
54 SAD 51711 0118-50. Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. "Report on the Future of the Gczira
Scheme", p. ~8.
S5 Ihid.
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Directing Social Policy
With Gaitskell at the helm, social and political development was on the agenda of the
Syndicate. However, the Syndicate was still a private company answerable to its
shareholders. In 1943, the government realised that "the alignment of the government's
social and the Syndicate's commercial interests was going to be a matter of great
difficulty", and in 1944 the decision was taken to terminate the concessions in 1950, and
to manage the Scheme as a nationalised enterprise.i" The late 1940s was thus a period
concerned with deciding what form the future of the Gezira Scheme would take. The
joint Syndicate and Government directives of 1945 and 1947 were an important
statement about how this future was viewed. Explicit within the directives was the
central role of social development, and the village council was seen as the central agent
of this development. This proposed development responded to the needs of the unique
'sophisticated' nature of the Gezira Scheme, so unlike any other rural area in Sudan. As
deputy Governor D. Hawkesworth stated; ''There is a need to accelerate the development
of local government inside the irrigated area if it is not to lag behind similar
developments in the towns.,,57 Aware of the close social and economic ties between
Gezira inhabitants and urban areas, the region was deemed to have similar
'sophisticated' needs as urban areas. Not just a matter of efficiency, social development
was also seen to compensate for the structural and economic changes imposed upon the
region, to which government officials were still sympathetic. In a climate of growing
criticism levelled at the Scheme from urban Sudanese commentators and fear of unrest
within the Scheme, both social development and greater tenant involvement within the
id d . I 58management of the Scheme was consi ere essential.
The village became an increasingly important unit of local government, and village
councils were extended throughout the Scheme with war-time samads replaced by
56 Henderson (ed.,) The Making of the Modern Sudan, pp. 517-8.
57 NRO 2BNP 1/2/9, D. Hawkesworth, Deputy Governor BNP, "Developments in Local Government in
the Gezira", II April 1946.
5K Henderson (cd.,) The Making of the Modern Sudan. p. 516.
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samads accountable to councils. The belief in the positive value of the village grew at
the same time as did disillusionment with larger units of local government. A number of
cases of fraud and maladministration occurred in the early 1940s, with the Province
monthly diaries of 1943 stating "not a few of the existing omdas, and even those holding
higher positions, have shown themselves self seeking and untrustworthy in the
distribution of cloth, sugar, etc., and in other matters which have been delegated to
them". 59 Other high profile cases included that of the Sheikh of Khut Abdulla
Mohammed Tom who used money out of the local school fund, temporarily entrusted to
his care, to payoff personal debts.i" Such cases led government officials to despair that
"At present, outside that unit, [the village] the quality which enables a people to govern
themselves - that is to say, the instinct of men to put the public interests before their
own - appears to be sadly lacking."?' Villages were viewed as the most productive unit
through which to introduce material benefits and at the same time instil a notion of
'good citizenship' and 'corporate responsibility' .62
The government and Syndicate directives placed the agricultural field staff at the
forefront of developing local government at the village and block level. No longer
dealing with solely agricultural duties, the high numbers of block inspectors having a
direct relationship with local government meant that the Gezira became the most
intensively governed region within the Sudan. Although having no statuary authority,
the government relied upon field staff to act as "the manager of his block, and the
agency responsible for the village councils of his area".63 The directives described the
block inspector as someone who "through his intimate knowledge is in an unrivalled
position to advise the administration and to encourage the people along the path of
progress through the village council.,,64 As 'manager' of the block, the block inspector
appointed members to village councils, thus maintaining a high degree of control and
59 NRO I Civsec 57/18/67, BNP Monthly Diaries, May 1943.
60 NRO 1Civsec 57/20175, BNP Monthly Diaries, September 1944.
61 Ibid.
62 NRO 2BNP 1/2/9, Hawkesworth, Deputy Governor BNP, "Recommendations for the Coordination of
the Policy of Devolution in the Gezira", 6 January 1947.
61 Ibid.
M RHA MSS PERHAM 565/8 "A directive on the policy of devolution in the Gezira issued jointly h~
Governor Blue Nile Province and manager Sudan Plantations Syndicatcv.' May 1947.
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authority over the councils. The central role of the block inspector also reflected the
importance of agriculture as an economic drive to social and political development, and
Hawkesworth stated:
It is recognised that village councils in the Gezira will for many years
have to be subject to direct bureaucratic control, particularly in the
field of agriculture, which is our effective point of attack 10 our
efforts to raise the standards of living among the people."
Despite this control, the responses of village councils were often quite different. The
Katfia-Safia council within the Halawin Gism was a body which used the opportunities
provided by the government as a means to gain personal enrichment. Membership on
councils offered individuals a position within the elite of a community and provided
associated advantages, and in 1944, it was reported that the "poorer tenants were left this
season to shift for themselves, while Council members monopolised the plough bulls
and offered shamelessly high wages for labour.,,66 Elsewhere, councils were used as a
forum for community action aimed at gaining a higher standard of living for the
community as a whole. Within Tayiba block, each village undertook community oaths
to undertake certain measures for the general good of the community. These measures
included setting limits for the price of labour and limiting the amount of 'Mahr' to be
paid at marriages to prevent competitive notions of social status from bankrupting
families. Any person who broke any oath rendered himself liable to pay a fine into the
village funds.l" Within Tayiba Village Council itself, a saving scheme for children was
established, in which tenants agreed to pay their children full rates for cotton picking and
place the money within post office saving schemes. Over three hundred such savings
accounts were opened with the village council acting as guardians of the accounts.f
There were thus differences in the way in which communities used their council
structures, however it should be noted that both the Halawin and the Tayiba councils
()'i NRO 2BNP 1/2/9. Hawkesworth, Deputy Governor BNP, "Recommendations for the Coordination of
the Policy of Devolution in the Gezira", 6 January 1947.
()() NRO ICivscc 57120/75, BNP Monthly Diaries, December J9'+'+.
()7 NRO ICivsec 57/22/84. BNP Monthly Diaries, March 1945.
()K Ibid.
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used them actively, viewing them as a useful forum through which to engage with both
the government and the village community.
Although communities might have been happy to use councils in different ways, the
government was quick to distinguish between positive and negative use of councils, and
while it condemned the Katfia-Safia council, it applauded the role of Tayiba councils.
Tayiba proved the perfect example of village-based progressive action for the benefit of
its citizens, albeit mainly those citizens who were tenants. The activities of the councils
were advertised, and gained significant favourable attention from other villages. The
government reported in 1945 that:
Villagers inside the Scheme continued to press for the setting up of
village councils. The marked success of the village council system in
Tayiba Block has done much to open the eyes of the people to the
advantages and possibilities of the system.i"
The advantages seen by other villages were not the innate advantages of community
action, as no village needed a government-sponsored village council to organise itself.
The advantages came with the degree of mediatory contact with central authorities that a
village council brought. Councils brought favourable attention from the government and
Syndicate, and provided specific advantages. Thus the Tayiba block inspector arranged
for all village council members to visit the cotton ginneries at Meringan so that they
could see what happened to their cotton after it was picked, and the request for a school
by Tayiba village council was quickly approved.I"
By 1947, sixty per cent of the Gezira Scheme was covered by village councils. The
transformation of gism councils into rural district councils in the same year marked
another change in government theory, and a further step away from 'tradition' and
towards 'modernity'. Even the territorial conception of history and tradition of gism-,
was now rejected in favour of a universal, 'modern' institution. The self-governing
credentials of rural districts were consciously promoted, with each council given an
(,l) NRO ICivscc 57/22/84, BNP Monthly Diaries, June 1945.
70 NRO ICivscc 57/22/84, BNP Monthly Diaries. February 19..+5.
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independent budget and considerable financial responsibilities." More radical vet rural
. ,
district councils in the Gezira were elected bodies, and the position of sheikh of gism
who acted as chairman of the council was transformed into a temporary three-year
position." On the understanding that "the permanent appointment of a 'Nazir el Gism'
was antithetic to the new organisation of rural district councils," ideas of tribe were
relegated to the past, and a future of democratic accountability embraced."
Clearly these distinctions were often academic, and the language of tribe and of modern
administration frequently overlapped as in the following description of the Sheikh of
Gism of Hosh Council:
[O]ver and above his duties of tribal Nazir [he] was ipso facto a sort
of executive official arranging collection of all Council revenue and
payment out to the Omdas, Ghaffirs, Schoolmasters etc, their
monthly pays.74
But again the radical nature of the introduction of rural district councils was in fact
limited. Based on the existing gism unit, rural district councils continued to be known
by the name of gism, and the sheikh, although now on a temporary 'contract' was
generally the existing sheikh of gism, and was never appointed from outside the wider
body of shiekhs of khut. Moreover the process of electing rural district council members
failed to make the council significantly more accountable or representative. By making
the block council the electoral college (whose members had themselves been elected by
village councils) the result was a wealthy tenant bias, and the maintenance of the status
quo by which the administrative elite remained dominant.f
This is not to say that it was an entirely static situation, for rural district councils
specifically excluded omdas and other local government employees responsible for
71 RHA MSS PERHAM 565/3 ITEM 1. "Survey of Devolution", Bredin, Governor BNP to Perham.
March 1948.
7~ Ibid.
7' NRO 1Civsec 57/22/84, BNP Monthly Diaries, January 19..+5.
7~ NRO 2BNP 1/1/1. Sharfi. Executive Officer. Hosh Rural Council. to John Phillips. DC South Gezira. 20
December 1951, emphasis added.
75 RHA MSS PERHAM 565/3 ITEM I. "Survey of Devolution". Bredin, Governor BNP to Perham.
March 1948.
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executing the decisions made within rural district councils from sitting on those councils.
This attempt to separate the legislative from the executive had a significant impact on
the membership of gism councils, with the 1947 elections bringing in a large number of
"new men who have as yet little experience in local government though many of them
have ability.?" Only four out of 23 members in the new Centre Council were members
of the former council, and this represented the general trend of all new counci Is.77
Village sheikhs as unpaid members of local government were allowed to become
members, and the biggest change was from omda to village sheikh dominance of the
council, with over half of new members also being village sheikhs. The significance of
these changes were however largely mitigated by the fact that it consistently remained a
tenant controlled institution, with all but one of the twenty-two elected council members
in both the Centre and Southern Rural District Councils being tenants."
Embracing the structures of conciliar local government, tenants within the Gezira
Scheme demonstrated themselves to be modern citizens, comfortable at working with
institutional means of governance. The region itself was described as 'advanced' and
favourably compared with other neighbouring regions such as Managil district bordering
the Gezira Scheme, where "the whole council system is viewed with considerable
distrust by local Omdas who are still the only obvious leaders and mouth-pieces of
public opinion.':" The council structures within the Gezira Scheme should not be seen
as inclusive institutions. Based primarily upon agricultural units and largely organised
by block inspectors, Gezira councils were tenant controlled bodies, and as such were
viewed as an important means to advance tenant interests. Familiar with forms of
centralised authority through their experience of Scheme management, Gezira
inhabitants were able to see the advantages of greater tenant-controlled mediation with
those structures. Furthermore, the Scheme had proved (other than during the depression
years of the early 1930s) an economic asset for most tenants, and the financial benefits
had been reinforced by other government policies that favoured tenants. Tenants thus
7£> NRO 2BNP 1/219. Innes. DC South Gezira to Bredin, Governor BNP, 3 August 19..+7.
77 Ihid.
711 Ihid.
79 NRO 2Civsec 3017/18, BNP Monthly Diaries. December 1947.
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held a generally favourable attitude to government, and welcomed greater interaction as
a way to gain government-controlled resources and to consolidate their dominant
position within the region.
157
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In 1950, the management of the Scheme passed from the hands of the Sudan Plantations
Syndicate and the Kassala Cotton Company, to the government, who created the Gezira
Board to run the Scheme. This process of nationalisation was of course hugely
significant at the level of the national economy, however, in terms of the way in which
tenants experienced agricultural management there was little overt distinction. Gaitskell,
the manager of the Syndicate throughout most of the 1940s, remained as head of the
Gezira Board for the first two years of nationalisation, and most field staff also
remained.' The most significant difference brought by the Gezira Board was the central
role played by social development, whereby a percentage of the Scheme's profits were
directly ploughed back into social projects within the Scheme? However, identifying
the beneficiaries of these developments raised uncomfortable questions. As D.
Hawkesworth asked:
If a percentage of the profits from the Scheme is made available for
amenities such as Recreation, Welfare, Public Health, Forestry,
Education, etc, are these amenities to be shared by all persons living
in the Gezira or are they to be considered primarily as the perquisite
:I
of the tenants only?
1 Gaitskell. Gezira, p. '297.
2 Ibid., pp. 297-302 .
.l NRO 2BNP 501217, D. Hawkesworth "A Note of the relation between the new Gezira Board and the
Local Government Unit of the Gczira area", 12 March 1949.
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The reply he received consolidated the dominant and favoured position of tenants within
the Scheme more than ever before:
It is not the duty of the future Gezira management to administer
general services for the population within the agricultural boundaries.
Its duty is to promote the welfare of the workers, mainly tenants; the
welfare of the general population and the concomitant services
remain the duty of the government."
As Hawkesworth pointed out, this judgement was morally questionable, for although the
Gezira Scheme directly produced much of the national revenue, tenants were already
materially better off than most other rural Sudanese populations, who through taxes had
also contributed to the development of the Scheme. Instead, the justification for
increased social progress lay partly in fears that a failure to do so would be dangerous:
The unassailable argument for a heightened rate of social progress in
the Gezira lies in the fact that material welfare and economic security
have outpaced their human background. If this background is not
made to conform with the material foreground the resultant strains
will wreck the Scheme. This is the humane argument from the lowest
motive. The higher motives are self-evident.5
As Jay O'Brien states; "the decision was made quite explicitly to create an improved
position of privilege for the Gezira tenants", in order to meet rising expectations."
However, this view was predicated on the idea that tenants were the producers of the
wealth that came from the Gezira Scheme. The forgotten population of non-tenants who
conducted the majority of the labour on tenancies contributed directly to national wealth,
and yet failed to be rewarded with improved social services. Tenants through their
control over tenancies dominated not only the institutions of governance. but also the
government's vision of who existed within the Scheme.
~ Ihid .. reply by member of the Gczira Board.
) lhid.
f1 Jay O'Brien "The Social Reproduction of Tenant Cultivators" p. 225.
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Universal Values
With social development at the fore of Gezira Board policy, there were new fears that
too much imposed development would undermine and "swamp" the authority of existing
structures of local government and a rapid expansion of local government authorities
was deemed necessary.' The needs of the Gezira only reflected the general desire to
improve and rationalise local government throughout Sudan. For this purpose, A.H.
Marshall, the city treasurer for Coventry, was commissioned in 1949 to write a report
surveying the structures of local government throughout Sudan and proposing future
developments. The choice of Marshall, a man with experience and knowledge of British
local government, yet with little understanding of the conditions of Sudan, strikingly
illustrates the move towards formal bureaucratic and universally applicable modern
structures. His report, which had an enormous impact throughout Sudan, again
emphasised the "old tradition of group cohesion and of government by consultation", as
the ideal base for "effective local government" and modem democratic procedures. 8
Deploring the way in which tribal hierarchies were still important throughout much of
Sudan, he wanted to establish fully independent and corporate local authority bodies,
separate from both judicial native authorities and from the centralised merkaz' These
all-purpose authorities would gradually take over central government duties within the
locality, creating a strong elected power base at the local level to insulate society against
the convulsions of developing party politics. 10
The 1951 Local Government Ordinance was a direct step towards the implementation of
Marshall's recommendations. It provided for warranted councils that had powers over a
wide range of services, maintained an independent budget, and as corporate bodies were
7 RHA MSS PERHAM 543/5. extract from BNP Annual Report 1949.
8 A.H. Marshall. Report on Local Government in the Sudan (Khartoum. 1949). pp. 4-5.
<j Ibid.. 14-15.
10 Ibid.. p. 14.
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able to enter into contracts, raise loans, hold land and rent buildings. 11 Within the
Gezira, the existing rural district councils were retained, but supervised by a director of
local government they were transformed into ever more bureaucratic formal structures.
In 1952 regulations for council procedure were issued, outlining rules on matters
including the regularity of meetings, the declaration of members' interests and the
required conduct of members during the meetings. Agendas and minutes were now
essential, and members had to follow strict guidelines when proposing subjects or
• 12questions.
Rural district councils were given their own council buildings and independent budgets.
and were staffed with elected members. Increasingly they were taking over many of the
duties of the district commissioners, including the appointment of omdas and sheikhs
within their jurisdiction. Everything pointed towards the growth of power and
independence of local authorities. However, although the powers of councils were
undoubtedly growing, this came without a corresponding increase in autonomy.
Although the district commissioner might have been less directly involved, having given
up the chairmanship of the council to the sheikh of gism, the merkaz retained a tight
control over councils through the figure of the executive officer. With the increasing
array of powers and duties held by the local authority, the executive officer of the
council existed to put into practice the decisions of the authority, and to carry out the day
to day administration of services. He was a Sudanese official, generally seconded from
the merkaz; with the experience of administration enabling him to organise the business
of the authority.
Although the government was convinced of the need for an experienced merka; official
to enable the efficient running of local authorities, they were also aware of the tension he
presented with the ideal of local autonomy. As the district commissioner Balfour Paul
wrote in 1950; "between the Scylla of keeping him [the executive officer] an impotent
II NRO 2BNP 50/3/9. Gaitskell "Directive on relations between Sudan Gczira Board. field and social
development staff and local government in the Gczira". 1.2 December I~50. l _")
12 Sudan Survey Department. Local Government Regulations for COUTlClI Procedure (Khartoum. I »)_1. p.
9.
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servant of his council and the Charybdis of letting him grow into a sub-district
commissioner, will lie a channel difficult to navigate." 13 The difficulties in such
navigation were brought to the fore within the Halawin Rural Council, which did not get
along with the government nominated executive officer, Abdel Moneim Eff.
Mohammed Hilmi. Taking into account the officer's background as a war-time Sudan
Defence Force officer and subsequently a stores and ordinance clerk, the government
starkly defined this conflict as between "a muwallad townee" and the "rustic and
Mahdist Halawin". 14 However, although reflecting some continuing differences
between urban and rural populations, it was also representative of the resentment
towards central intervention by a self-reliant body, used to a largely independent
jurisdiction within their own territory. Although the development of local government
was partly intended to increase the independence of local communities, the permanent
role of the executive officer on Rural Councils frequently brought central government to
rural life in a more obtrusive manner than the supposedly direct rule of a District
Commissioner in a merkaz office many miles away ever did. The close relationship
between local government councils and the merkaz meant that there was a great danger
of seeing them as "nothing more nor less than extensions of the Merkaz".15 Perham
certainly took this view when she described local authorities as "really agents of central
government, administering regulations on behalf of central government and in
collaboration with the staff of the companies". 16
In 1951, the position of the sheikh of gism was reviewed, as it was found that the
increasing role of executive and clerical staff within the council had left the duties and
responsibilities of a sheikh of gism "very vague and practically very difficult to
define." I7 The best definition that H. Sharfi, the Hosh Council executive officer
managed was to describe the sheikh of gism as a "public relations head of the area", and
he argued that within the Hosh Gism this role was very poorly done. In light of this
n NRO 2BNP 1/1/1, Balfour Paul. ADC Hassaheissa to George Sandars, Governor BNP, 8 October 1950.
14 NRO 2BNP 1/1/1, Balfour Paul to Sanders, 25 October 1950.
I~ NRO 2BNP 1/1/1, Balfour Paul to Sanders. 8 October 1950.
III MSS PERHAM 128. "Notes on the Gczira", n.d.
17 NRO 2BNP 1/1/1, Sharfi, Executive Officer, Hosh Rural Council to Phillips. DC South Gc/ ira. 20
December 1951.
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information, Sharfi suggested that the position of Sheikh of Hosh Gism should be
abolished, along with its large salary of £E.629, and that only the unpaid position of
chairman remain. 18 The Governor of Blue Nile Province, William Luce, agreed,
suggesting that the post of sheikh of gism "which was anyway only temporary, has now
outlived its usefulness with the growth of conciliar government." 19 He also felt that the
combination of the paid role of sheikh of gism, together with chairmanship of the
council, as had generally occurred, created a wrong impression, as "the man in the street
thinks that they receive their salary as chairman.t''" The theoretical transition from tribal
to modern forms of local authority was complete.
To solve this discrepancy, the Sheikhs of Hosh and Medina Gisms were abolished on
completion of the holders' present term of office, a situation that the then Sheikh of
Medina Gism, Sayyid Ahmed Yusef Algam accepted as a positive move, removing the
stigma of "salaried chairman". 21 The positions of Sheikh of Gism for Kamlin and
Messellemia Gisms had already lapsed, which left the Halawin Gism as the only area
with a sheikh of gismo However, it was decided, that for this area, "which is the most
tribal and the most backward in the Gezira and where the Council has made the least
progress in public esteem, it is not yet possible to dispense with the post of Nazir el
Gism".22 Thus the government made a direct statement linking tribal structures to
'backwardness' and modern government to progress. While the Gezira had been seen
negatively in the past for its lack of tribal cohesion, it was now seen as a beacon of
progress, sophistication was applauded, and the formerly favoured Halawin fell from
grace.
Councils were ever reminded that the merka: remained the superior authority and the
government's impatience with councils that did not conform to expectations of
efficiency and procedure was at times demonstrated forcefully. By increasing or
reducing the powers of councils or individuals, the government rewarded suitable
IX Ibid.
II) NRO 2BNP 1/1/1. William Lure, Governor BNP to l.W. Robertson, Civil Secretary. J February 1952.
zn Ibid.
21 NRO 2BNP 1/1/1. Phillips, DC South Gezira to Lure. Governor BNP. 24 December )951
Celebrating Modernity
behaviour and punished deviation from the local government ideal. Words like success
and failure were distributed on the grounds of established governmental values. The
building of schools, the planting of trees and the establishment of savings or 'Better
living societies' were all deemed as elements of success while any hint of the elite
looking after themselves or allowing villages to remain 'unsanitary' was condemned.
Thus the councillors in Northern Rural District Council were praised for their interest in
local politics, having "clearly studied the [Marshall] report with care", and for their work
in establishing schools and using the profits from animal pounds." In contrast, other
councils failing to meet government standards of public service had their powers
reduced. That this was an explicit form of punishment was made clear in the case of the
suspension of Mohammed Musaad, chairman of the Hassaheissa Rural Council.
Irregularities in the gism accounts together with his "stupid behaviour over the vice
chairmanship of the Gism Council" led to his suspension from the chairmanship for six
months. It was said that "being an MLA [Member of the Legislative Assembly] had
gone to his head, and it is hoped that this punishment will teach him a salutary lesson.,,2-l
Such reduction of powers brought with it a corresponding increase in government power,
as demonstrated within Abu Usher, when the village council was suspended in 1951 and
was replaced by the lower level council of elders due to continued friction between
parties in the village. Along with this degraded status, the community also lost the right
to nominate a representative to the block council and to have a agricultural sheikh.
Instead the district commissioner and field inspector made the nomination, while the
latter regained direct control of all agricultural management. 25 Direct interference
remained a powerful threat for all councils, who jealously guarded the powers that
councils brought.
~2 NRO 2BNP 11111, Luce, Governor BNP to Robertson. Ci\il Secretary. 3 February 1952.
~, NRO 2Ci\'sec 30/8119, BNP Monthly Diaries. September 1949.
~~ NRO 2BNP 1/\/1. H.G Balfour Paul. ADC Hassaheissa to Sandars. Governor BNP 7 February 1950
~'i NRO 2BNP 501319, Acting Manager. Sudan Gczira Board to Block Inspector Urn Dcparsi, II July
1951.
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Forming Councils
Central to these developments in local government were the ideas of electoral
representation and citizenship. Seen as essential qualities of a modem state. bringing
legitimacy and accountability, citizenship was gained through the active participation of
the population in the structures of governance, either through holding a position in those
structures, or through voting for others. Once achieved, citizenship provided an
individual the attendant rights, protections and duties of state membership." It was now
no longer appropriate for the government to appoint members of councils, and at all
levels councils were elected by their peers.
Communities within the Gezira embraced the opportunities offered by electoral
representation. The benefit of popularly legitimised, rather than government appointed
position was high, theoretically quashing opposition to legitimate authority. However,
as much as this legitimacy was sought to uphold the position of established holders of
government positions, it also provided space for that authority to be legitimately
challenged. Factional politics, ever in existence within communities, only grew within a
climate that encouraged choice. Wider influences of national politics and 'tribe' became
a means of identifying and distinguishing between factions. In reporting on the gism
elections in South Gezira in 1947, DC Innes noted that the rivalry between the Ashigga
and Umma political parties had been evident in several of the blocks surrounding Wad
Medani, with some of the members standing on a central party platform. However, this
influence was seen to be limited to those areas with urban influence, while further away
from Wad Medani, it was said that "tribal rivalries played a larger part". 27 Similar
factional splits were responsible for the sophisticated voting techniques seen in the
Medina Gism council elections of 1950, in which there were "two last-minute tactical
26 Sudan Government. Aspects of local go\'emmeflt. 194-'?
27 NRO 2BNP 1/2/9. Innes. DC South Gczira to Brcdin, Governor BNP. 3 ,\ll~llSI 1t)·H.
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withdrawals of nominations to save splitting the vote. ,,28
The popularity of elections among voters and candidates resulted in a strong defence of
voting rights. When in 1953 the electoral role was admitted to be inaccurate, a "terrific
bombardment of petitions and telegrams" to executive officers and the District
Commissioner resulted." However, although the government admitted its mistake, such
administrative errors were only one element of the limitations in the 'democratic'
procedure which was heavily constrained by the legislation controlling the franchise.
Limiting voting rights to persons that were male, over the age of 25 and who fulfilled
specific property and residence qualifications meant that voting, and thus full citizenship
was a limited privilcge.i" There are no statistics which show the percentage of the
population that this provided with the vote. However, it appears to have consolidated
the dominant position of tenants, who automatically qualified within the property
qualification. As Gaitskell commented "the chief men in [local government] were, of
course also tenants.v" In contrast many labourers, and all women, already marginalised
economically were further officially excluded from the affairs of local government;
neither permitted to sit on councils, nor to have a say on who did.
On occasions, the opportunity to bring changes at elections was used by Gezira
communities, and during the 1953 gism council elections in Messellemia, all seats were
contestcd.Y However, most elections resulted in substantial continuity and unchanged
personnel. In the Hosh Gism elections during 1950, only one previous member was not
returned, while in Hassaheissa in 1953, four out of the seven retiring councillors were
returned unopposed. 33 That the voting public supported the status quo of long-
established families is not to be surprised. Experience and established relationships with
British officials were the credentials needed for effective mediation between
~x NRO 2Civsec 30/8/19. BNP Monthly Diaries. June 1950.
~l} NRO 2Civsec 30/1/3. BNP Monthly Diaries. March 1953 .
.~o Marshall. Report on Local Government in the Sudan. p. 8.
.~I GaitskelJ. Gczira, p. 227 .
.'1 NRO 2Civsec 30/1/3. BNP Monthly Diaries. May 1l)5.l
l\ NRO 2Civsec 30/8/19. BNP Monthly Diaries. June 1950. and NRO 2CivsL'( 30111.1. B:'\P vlonthly
Diaries. May 1953.
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communities and the state, allowing communities to gain access to state resource ..... vet
maintain social space away from central interference. Having built up a power ha-.e over
time, such families were frequently at the centre of all local affairs, political, social and
religious, and were thus at the centre of the cultural map of village and district life. To
make any significant changes to such an established power base would have involved a
degree of social radicalism that did not exist within the Gezira, despite the economic
changes brought by the Scheme.
Despite the threat from the government that they would no longer automatically support
those they saw as traditional leaders, the most obvious conclusion from looking at the
personnel of local government structures in the Gezira, is that there was a large degree
of continuity. The same families that had participated in former manifestations of
administrative leadership, within courts and native administrations, continued to hold
positions and power within the structures of local government and councils. What the
government wanted was stability and political moderation, with a new face of open
engagement. In the best cases, the established families with whom the government had
existing relationships were able to adapt to this new inclusive style of governance.
However, others failed to become more open, and such cases were reported negatively,
such as the leading family of Shukkaba Shaadeen village. Described as a "feudal"
power, the Shaadeen family did "their best to prevent anybody else becoming known to
the authorities", and their influence was described as hanging over the village "like a
shroud".34 In contrast, the same inspector noted the separate village of Wad el Nur
"fortunately lacks a grand and decent family".35
In this environment in which modern skills were celebrated, Sayed Ahmed Yusif .vlgam
was considered by government authorities to be the archetypal new man. Having built
up his wealth through taking on additional tenancies while others resigned during the
depression years, he was appointed to the post of chairman of a local government
counci I despite the fact he "lacked the social background of a traditional trihal
.~4 NRO 2BNP 54/5/14. BltK'1\. Inspector Seed Farm block, "Report on council,". I August 1951.
~" Ihid.
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authority.t''" He moved on to become a member of the Tenants' Representative Body, a
member of the Advisory Council of Northern Sudan, the chief spokesman for the Gezira
within the Legislative Assembly and a member of the first parliament. \Vealth and
personality were the keys to Yusif Algam's rise to power, and his was one of the most
remarkable stories within the Gezira, suggesting the power of wealth in a society that
was increasingly economically oriented. With his modern outlook, active and efficient
nature and influence over others, Yusif Algam was quickly promoted by government.
However, the real key to his success was his ability to combine those qualities of
modernity desired by the government, with traditional values. Yusif Algam set himself
up as a landed sheikh within the Gezira, embracing the outward trappings of 'tradition',
and as such became the ideal sophisticated rural citizen."
Changes were also occurring within the membership of block councils. Although orndas
remained the presidents of these councils, the elections for village representatives began
to result in personnel other than village sheikhs within block councils. In 1950 the
elections within Dolga block
produced some amazing results and a great deal of dead wood was
cut off the council. In several cases bad Sheikhs were not elected
ipso-facto to the block council and in one instance a very young and
38go ahead non-tenant was elected.
"How the mighty are fallen" was how the field inspector of Tebub block reported the
fact that only two out the five village council presidents were elected to the block
council. 39 However, the changes were rarely ideologically significant, and if village
sheikhs were not appointed then it tended to be a member of the sheikhs family that
was. 40 Moreover, with only one non-tenant elected to a block council, the general rule
of tenant-domination of council institutions was proved.
v' Gaitskell, Gezira p. 3m.
,l7 NRO 2BNP 1/1/1, Phillips, DC South Goira to Lucc, Governor BNP. ~-t December 195 I.:
~H NRO 2BNP 50rJ/9. G.B. Tame. Block Inspector. Dnlga block, "Report on Bloc" Council. 17 June
1950. .. . I C "I ""1 J '1'l"OW NRO 2BNP 501:.19. J. Steed. Block Inspector Tebub block. Report all \ 11 a~L' ounci s - unc .'
40 Ihid.
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Thus although there was limited opportunity for new men, the vast majority still came
from the standard channels of wealthy established families. For instance. Sheikh Hassan
Abdel Galil was born into the wealthy Abdel Galil family, landowners of the large
village of the same name, and from which the block took its name. His father was an
omda at the beginning of the Condominium, and he himself took over that position in
the 1930s. As an omda Sheikh Hassan was chairman of the local village court, and
member of the larger sheikh's court. He became active in the block councils when they
were established in the 1940s, and by 1952 he was chairman of the rural district
council." Although it is difficult to ascertain, it is probable that the shift described by
field staff in terms of "youth coming to the helm" only reflected a generational rather
than a more fundamental social change in membership." Members remained wealthy
and influential individuals, and importantly, both to government and to Gezira
communities who wished to use these structures, were willing to work through
government institutions and had the required skills that combined a modern education
with an intimate understanding of Gezira rural life.
Although rural district councils as the working units of local government administration
had received due attention and review through the Marshall report, the smaller units of
village and block councils were still subject to an ill-defined status. Needing a specific
Gezira study to coordinate the activities of the unique village and block councils with
the other forms of local government, a commission was appointed to "review the work
of Omodia and Village Councils in the Gezira and its coordination with activities of
Local Government Authorities and of the Sudan Gezira Board". Sitting on fourteen
meetings between March and June 1950, the commission included central government
officials, agricultural field staff, and members of each local government authority or
distri '1 41i tnct councl . -
41 SAD 428/3/108-147. G.M. Culwick. Letters. series 2. I November 1952. Also sec ~RO ~B~P 25/V7.
EI Gezira, 13 March 1951. .' ". " . ....,.., J . \l/"-l
42 NRO 2BNP 54/5/14. H.B. Collett. Block Inspector. A Galil block. General Report . -- unc -'
4.l G . B d A hive Barakat SPS files General no. 7. "Commission to review the work on Ornodi..eZI ra oar rc 1\ c , .'" .
and Village Councils". 1950.
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The commission concluded that "the past policy of encouraging local self management
and initiative in the agricultural and social fields by the use of village and Omodia
councils was right".44 However, it also highlighted many concerns and emphasised the
need for regularisation of councils "to conform with a more formalised system of local
government.t'Y Undefined powers, lack of revenue and ineffectual ties with existing
local government authorities were all cited as reasons for the failure of village councils
to fulfil the objects required of them. However, despite these evident faults. the
Commission was strongly in favour of increased delegation to village councils as the
front line of community development throughout the Gezira. Opposed to this decision
were the majority of field inspectors, who believed that the omodia or block counci Is
were far more efficient than village councils, stating that "they had had more attention
from the block inspector, and so worked better." 40 The Commission caustically
concluded that "there were other considerations at stake, i.e. the development of
responsibility and self-management at the lowest level.,,47 The value of block councils
was also accepted, however, it was decided that as increasing their jurisdiction would
create conflict with the autonomy of village councils, they should continue in their
solely mediating and advisory role.
Following these recommendations, village councils increasingly became agents of local
government, directly under the jurisdiction of gism or rural district councils. By
November 1950, Kamlin Rural District Council delegated the responsibility for
maintaining village schools and halls to village councils, with the normal upkeep grant
transferred to village councils.f Furthermore, the government ordered that the greatest
part of the assessed value of animal pounds in a village should be retained by the village
council in cases where one existed, but otherwise the full value should go to the gisrn
chest. The object of this system was two-fold; encouraging the establishment of vilIage
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
4f> Ibid.
47 Ibid.
4N NRO 2Civscc 30/8/19. BNP Monthly Diaries. November 1950.
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counci Is where they did not yet exist, and making apparent the authoritv of gisrn
counci Is over the sources of local revenue."
Mediation in a Modern World
In the context of continuing government influence, counci Is and local government
authorities, while valued by communities, were viewed as government institutions. and
were treated accordingly. Viewed as a link with government rather than independent
community agencies, they were only used for a small range of processes. directly related
to government, in particular gaining access to some of the resources offered in the
Gezira Board's social development programs. By participating in a system that the
government was actively encouraging, communities gained government support and
specific benefits. Some of these benefits were financial, such as the animal pound funds.
some were social such as the possibility of gaining schools or clinics. and others were
less tangible such as increasing the influence of communities. Villages responded to the
call for councils, and Hemsely, the field inspector of Istrahna block reported that "every
village, large and small is keen to start a council."so Even those communities that had
been formerly divided were able to recognise the potential of these advantages. and it
was reported in 1950. that after years of factional wrangling the opposing parties within
Basccr village had "at last decided to bury the hatchet and petitioned the block council at
the last meeting to help them form a council in the coming season.T ' I
However, there were clear distinctions between those government projects that were
welcomed by councils and those that were not. Village halls, schools and training farm"
were all embraced, while the attempt to expand recreation faci Iitic- and irnprov c
---- ---------
I" NRO 2BNP 5013/9. Balfour Paul. ADC Haxsahcixsa to Sanderv, Governor BNP. 1~.I·'d)ru~y )l):'\()..
\11 NRO 2BNP 50/V9. F.H.C. Hcmscly. BInd" lnspcrtorl xtrahna block, "Report Oil \ illage <. ouncrl .... Ih
.JUIll: 1950. , ·1 .. 17J~I NRO 2BNP 501319. (i.B. Tame, Block Inspector \)l)l~a Block "Report 011 Village <. ounci .... unc
1950.
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sanitation, were largely rejected A clear distinction was thu- d b h
. ...." rna e etween t e
legitimate and illegitimate concerns for councils and local governrnent.f As a frustrated
Gaitskell stated:
Broadly speaking, the people were uninterested in the more educative
elements in our proposals and in the local build-up on which we set
great store, but supporters of items which affected their own
finances. 53
As gatekeepers between communities and the central state, counciIs acted as much to
keep out unwelcome state interference as to provide a channel for that interference.
Councils expressly limited themselves to the spheres of governmental and agricultural
administration, and were not seen as suitable structures to air general community
tensions, to mediate in internal community disputes, or express deep-seated discontent.
All those needs were met through other structures and means.
However, in acting on 'legitimate' issues, councils responded enthusiastically, and
attempted to gain greater independence from the state. The existence of block council
machinery provided the opportunity for the Istrahna block council to request that it
should be fully responsible for preventing animal damage to cotton, and that the police
should not be involved. It justified such independence saying that they were in a much
better position than the police to know what animals were trespassing" As well a"
practical benefits, this responsibility brought with it considerable rewards of extended
influence and prestige throughout the area. The government wishing to encourage
'positive', community oriented behaviour stated, "In the past cooperation by Local
Authorities has not been good and the Istarahna suggestion is obviously one in the right
direction." 55 The message was clear, cooperation with the government policy of
establishing councils and the trappings of community democracy brought significant
rewards.
S~ SAD 72513/26-50, South Gezira District Annual Report, 1950-51.
).~ Gaitskcll, Gczira. p. 300.
)4 NRO 2Ci\'scc 30/7118, BNP Monthly Diaries, January 19'+6.
\'i Ibid.
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By the nature of their control over issues including business licence" and the distribution
of tenancies, councils were powerful bodies that became a focus of local politics.
Positions on councils were popular, bringing as they did prestige. influence and
opportunities. The field inspector of Wad Sulfab block outlined the attitude of people to
councils when he stated that "in most villages people are very keen to have the honour
of being council members without making much consideration for the responsibilitie-,
imposed on them by such positions.v" Membership was also seen as a valuable wa) for
small factions to gain an official voice and for established leaders to be challenged.
During one such incident, the sheikh of Hag Abdulla Khut, Fahal Ibrahim \\a~
suspended from his position as sheikh of khut pending investigation into petitions
against him. This suspension provided fertile ground for an eruption of local politics in
which an "intensive propaganda campaign" was waged by both his supporters among
whom were the majority of Hag Abdulla merchants, and his opponents, including both
the omda of Hag Abdulla and the sheikh of gism.57 Similarly, the opportunity to elect
the sheikh of the Centre Rural District Council led to "a good deal of legitimate
jockeying for position and support among persons who fancied themselves for the post",
although in the end, only two candidates including the retiring sheikh of gism were
. d 58nominate .
As institutions dominated by tenants, councils were important bodies for the facilitation
of discussion on matters of tenant concern. As such they proved to be of significant
value in coordinating a Gezira-wide policy against 'Westerners'. West Africans and
Western Sudanese formed a major part of the immigrant labouring force on which all
tenants depended to help with the weeding and picking of the cotton crop. Although
dependent, Gezira tenants increasingly came to resent Westerners for their labour
monopoly which was carefully managed by Western sheikhs, and for their control of
tenancies within the Scheme. Many Westerners took the opportunity of the 19.i()"
'I" NRO 2BNP 54/5/14. D. Tarbet. Block Inspector Wad Sulfab Block. "Report on Council-" 1951.
,7 2Ci vscc 30/7/18. BNP Monthl y Diaries. October 19'+7.
'Ill 2Civsl:c 30/7/18. BNP Monthly Diaries. December 19-+7.
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depression to become tenants by taking over the hoshas vacated by existing Gelira
tenants. With profits rising steadily from the late 1930s, these Western tenants became
increasingly resented. Councils, along with newspapers were the major vents for these
frustrations. In March 1945, the two Gezira councils of South Gezira unanimous},
passed a resolution recommending that all Westerners who had more than three previous
convictions for crimes of theft and violence should be repatriated." By Apri I 1949.
rural district councils were expressing concern that Westerners might obtain political
representation in the forthcoming gism elections.Y Although the democratic processes
of local government had been seized with avidity when seen as an opportunity to
advance their own powers, the attempt by Westerners to do the same was met with
strong opposition. At a higher level, elected Gezira representatives were able to use
their influence for the benefit of tenants during the discussion on the Gezira Scheme Bill
in the Legislative Assembly; as a result the bill was considerably altered to meet the
. h f Gezi 61WIS es 0 ezira tenants.
Councils quickly become part of the local apparatus of community governance to he
defended. In 1953, Sheikh Mohammed Abdulla el Wali wrote to the newspaper EI
Gezira, complaining about what he described as the increasing tendency of the Gezira
Board to issue disciplinary action against tenants without consultation with village
councils:
It was the practice during the last years of the Syndicate that no
punishment was inflicted upon a tenant before he was brought before
his village council and given the chance to defend himself. But this
practice is being abandoned nowadays/"
Despite a denial from the Gezira Board, it was admitted that while consultation did take
place, the Board retained control over the ultimate decision. Sheikh el Wali immediately
struck back not only defending what were considered council prerogatives. but calling
w NRO ICivsec 57/22/84, BNP Monthly Diaries. March 19.+).
(,0 NRO 2Civsec ~0/8/l9 BNP Monthly Diaries. April 19'+9. .
(,1 Sudan government. The Executive Council and Legislative Assembly: How it works? HOI\' /1 Ctlll
Develop? Is it Democratic? (Khartoum. 1950). p. 5.
h2 NRO 2BNP 2513/7. £1 Gezira. 15 July 1953.
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for an extension of council powers, for as he succinctly stated "what is the use of the
consultation that can be ignored?,,63
However, while councils might strain at the bonds of central control, the government
had a distinct preference for those bodies that it had greatest control over. In contrast
with the block council that was directly chaired by field inspectors, the village councils
within a block were more distantly supervised and the attitude held towards them
frequently negative. G.B.Tame, block inspector of Dolga block wrote directly to the
Commission reviewing block and village councils in 1950, expressing his conviction
"that undue encouragement of village councils and their direct access to Gism Councils
might lead to the establishment of many little 'Tammany Halls'." He went on to state:
I cannot express too strongly my firm conviction that block councils
should be used as a media for extracting, discussing, filtering and
forwarding both observations, views and information to the Gism
council. In many cases village councils are a collection of
opportunists. For want of a better term block councils might be
considered as a local brains trust."
The Commission itself recognised that "the Omodia council is at present and probably
always will be, a more alive and capable body than the village council. This is because
it has the benefit of the personal interest and inspiration of the block inspector.t''"
Part of the problem was perceived to be a lack of definition of village council duties, and
field inspectors complained of
the plain fact that nobody has any clear conception of what is
required of village councils ... The old authoritative system vested in
sheikhs, omdas, Nazirs etc,. has been broken down or discredited and
nothing but an ill defined paper administration set up in their stead.66
63 NRO 2BNP 25/317, EI Gezira, I September 1953.
M NRO 2BNP 50/3/9, Tame, Block Inspector Dolga Block to Commission of review of block and village
councils, 12 April 1950.
(,,\ NRO 2BNP 50/3/9, Gaitskell "Directive on relations between Sudan Gezira Board, field and social
development staff and local government in the Gezira", 12 December 1950.
66 NRO 2BNP 54/5/1 -+. Block Inspector Feteis Block. "Report on Councils" )0 June 1951.
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Although this was a highly exaggerated view of events, this lack of definition was held
responsible for the 'apathetic' mind set of many councils. As the field inspector of
Nueila Block outlined, "Most councils having applied for a village Hall, School, fruit
garden etc and finding that they have to wait their tum are wondering what else there is
to do,,67 For the field inspector of Feteis Block, the problem went deeper, suggesting
that "Intricate conciliar systems with their still more intricate voting and nomination
arrangements only serve to confuse the local inhabitants, break down old loyalties, and
exacerbate family and tribal feelings.Y'" The village, once seen as the only honest
political unit, was easily demonised once it started flexing its muscles.
Block inspectors turned to block councils as the primary vehicles through which to work
through. With "the cream of the villages in them", and themselves as chairmen, block
councils were seen as enthusiastic, knowledgeable and active bodies. 69 However,
although willing, their lack of statutory executive powers placed tight limitations upon
these councils, against which they strained. Tensions rose over the inability of block
councils to effect decisions made, such as case in which Kumor Block Council had
requested permission to build a flour mill in 1947, and was still waiting for the response
in 1951.70 In attempting to cope with the frustrations arising from their limited power
and in determination to achieve practical results, there were attempts to use block
councils as an executive instrument in local government affairs. Dolga Block Council in
particular "at times due to overkeeness [sic] dealt with matters which were really the
Gism Council's job".71 The council was told that such contestation of the gism
council's authority was not permissible and that the gism council was the only council
with 'sulta' in the area.72 To which rebuke the block council replied that it "had dealt
with village councils and local affairs for some years past in a quicker and more efficient
67 NRO 2BNP 54/5/14, Block Inspector Nueila Block, "Report on Councils" 30 June 1950.
68 NRO 2BNP 54/5/14, Block Inspector Feteis Block, "Report on Councils" 30 January 1951.
69 Gezira Board Archive, Barakat, SPS files, General no. 7. "Commission to review the work on Omodia
and Village Councils". 1950.
70 NRO 2BNP 54/5/14, D. Martin, Block Inspector Kumar block, "Report on Councils" 1951.
71 NRO 2BNP 50/3/9, Tame, Block Inspector Dolga Block "Report on Dolga Block council", 17 June
1950.
72 NRO 2BNP 50/3/9, Dolga Block Council meeting, 17 January 1950.
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manner than the Khut or Gism councils had yet done.,,73 The spectre of custom was
once again raised. However, this was a different world from that of the 1920s, in which
rules and legislation not 'traditional' authority reigned supreme, and Dolga Block
Council was forced to abide by the authority of the gism and to make changes through
recommendations to and electoral representation upon the higher council.
This degree of central control meant that councils failed to be political bodies, and could
not oppose the government in any meaningful manner. Using councils to engage with
the issue of Westerners worked because the government was itself ambivalent on the
immigration issue, and shared generalised preconceptions about the West African
workforce. 74 However, as 'extensions of the merkaz', councils were not able to
challenge the government's management of the Scheme, and in particular were not able
to channel the increasing tensions that were a reaction to the economic control of firstly
the Syndicate and later the Gezira Board. Thus despite the potential of council
infrastructure to mediate and ease tensions, councils played no part in the 1946 tenant
strike, either in organisation or in mediation. Attempts to use councils for more radical
means notably failed. EI Amin Mohammed el Amin, the founder of the Tenants' Union
in 1953, had previously been a member of Hasaheissa Rural District Council, but found
council structures unsuited for his direct challenges to the practices of the Syndicate and
Gezira Board.75 Similarly, a "very extreme left party, led by Mousa Ahmed el Treifi, of
1946 Tenants' Strike notoriety on the other" attempted to engage with public resentment
towards agricultural policy within Medina Village Council, but faced consistent
government opposition and failed to effectively mediate with the government on this
issue." Other bodies would have to be found for such oppositional challenges.
73 NRO 2BNP 50/3/9, Tame, Block Inspector Dolga Block "Report on Dolga block council", 17 June
1950.
74 Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, p. 68.
75 The memoirs of Yusef Mustafa, former secretary of the Tenants' Union. (Private unpublished
manuscript, translated by Deina Idris).
76 NRO 2BNP 54/5/14, W.e. Jamieson. Block Inspector Medina, "Report on Councils", 30 January 1951
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Continuity within Change
Across the Gezira Scheme, a gradual transformation had occurred. From a situation in
which unelected native administrations acted informally to administer aspects of local
government, there developed elected corporate bodies fully responsible for all aspects of
local government. On a superficial level the creation of council structures, with their
associated democracy, bureaucracy and legislation were significant changes. However,
while these changes introduced new bureaucratic methods of working and
communication, there was no radical departure from the past. The strong strands of
continuity in local structures of authority suggest that the abrupt changes in central
policy noted by, among others Khalaf - who identifies significant political results from
the change from policies of 'indirect rule' to that of 'local government' - had less local
impact than imagined, and the changes made were easily absorbed into and by existing
authorities. 77 For instance the political move away from tribal policies was largely
insignificant in an area in which tribal hierarchies had been exaggerated. Government
administrative policies throughout the Condominium relied upon maintaining stability,
and thus frequently only formalised rather than changed the largely non-tribal social and
economic village-based hierarchy that had previously existed. The continuing autocracy
that existed within some councils demonstrated that leaders could apply the outward
appearance of community politics in order to benefit from the new structures of power
and maintain the status quo. Sheikh Gorashi of Sheikh Gorashi Village Council in
Tayiba Block manipulated council infrastructure and government attitudes to councils in
just this manner. As the block inspector reported:
All matters are subordinated to the ruling of the Holy Sheikh Taib
Sheikh Gorashi as might be expected. However, it is an achievement
and a sign of the times that such a thing as a village council has even
77 Khalaf, "British Policy", Chapter five.
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been allowed to function even though it is rather more of a debating
society than a village council."
Councils rarely transformed communities, but were instead an accurate reflection of past
community relationships. Where consensual and community based apparatus had
existed in an informal manner prior to the development of local government machinery,
it continued to do so. Indeed, by highlighting the importance of councils, it is easy to
ignore the degree to which 'council business' had always been managed by communities.
The building of wells and schools, basic administration, public health measures and all
other features of 'local government' had been done conducted locally throughout the
condominium, sometimes by individuals, sometimes by informal community councils.
In 1937, before village councils had been considered, the village of Wali in the Halawin
Khut forwarded a request for government assistance after their well had fallen in. The
petition stated that although they were prepared to pay all expenses, that as tenants they
had no time to do the work themselves.i" The government agreed to this request, and
the work was carried out. The whole process suggests that community discussion,
agreement, interaction with government and a successful outcome could be undertaken
without the machinery of village councils. Neither were communities' slaves to council
structures once they were in place, and older forms of community representation or
action could frequently be turned to. Thus the village of Rof, described as a united
community that entered into the fields of social development enthusiastically, felt
hampered by the slowness of local government machinery, and so raised LE.300
themselves to build a village hall and social club. 8o
At the same time as reinforcing the dominant position of families willing to undergo a
superficial transformation, the effect of creating councils within the Gezira was to
reinforce and formalise the dominant position of the Scheme within the region. The
reorganisation of administrative boundaries to correlate with agricultural boundaries,
78 NRO 2BNP 50/3/9. Tame, Block Inspector Dolga Block "Report on village councils in Doiga Block",
17 June 1950.
79 NRO ICivscc 57/4/18. BNP Monthly Diaries. October 1937.
80 NRO 2BNP 54/5/14, Block Inspector. Remeitab block, "General Report", 30 June 1950.
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and the use of field inspectors as local council chairmen and supervisors meant that the
cotton Scheme became the controlling feature of government-sanctioned authority in the
region. This agricultural focus resulted in the political as well as social and economic
dominance of tenants, who effectively formed a tenant-based citizenry. However,
despite the language of devolution, bureaucratic council structures tended to increase the
presence of the government within Gezira communities. With increased regulation and
with merkaz-trained executive officers, councils became increasingly accountable to not
only their electorate, but also to the government. Familiar with the centralised authority
of the agricultural management, local government councils were accepted with avidity
by communities, but they were used selectively. Seen as a valuable channel of
mediation with the government, councils were notably used to access government-
controlled resources, and could be also be used to effectively limit government
interference within the community. Councils also had their limitations, and in particular
were unable to channel any opposition to the centralised management of the Scheme.
The late 1940s and early 1950s was thus a period in which tenants themselves
experimented with institutions through which they attempted to gain increasing control
over the management of the Scheme.
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8
TENANT ASPIRATIONS
The centrality of the Scheme within the Gezira region has led commentators to
concentrate on its economic impact. The economically defining nature of the term
'tenant' means that tenants have not only been the focus of attention, but have often
been viewed as a homogenous group, both by Condominium officials and subsequent
historians. In particular, potential lines of conflict between tenants and the dominant
partners of Syndicate and government, and between tenants and the additional wage-
earning labour force have been highlighted, and the degree to which tenants were
exploited or exploitative has remained a central question. Salih Abdalla al-Arifi has
described the Gezira tenant as "only a supervisor for agricultural operations", choosing
to manage the agricultural production of his tenancy through the labour of others.' This
conception of a 'landlord' mentality traces the aspiration of tenants to hire labour to a
heritage of unequal access to resources whereby economic elites were able to pass the
burden of physical labour to others through the economic systems of slavery, wage
employment or subletting arrangements. As McLoughlin has stated:
As incomes have risen it has become increasingly possible to finance
those social activities, those aspects of ostentation and conspicuous
consumption which the (pre-Scheme and) present culture considers
intrinsic to self-esteem and social advancement. The most desired
I Salih Abdalla al-Arifi, "Landlordism among small farmers the case of the Gezira Tenant in the Sudan",
Sudan Journal of Economic and Social Studies. I. 2. (1975). pp. 10-14 at p. 13.
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ingredient in this ambition pattern, now as in the past, is relief from
manual agricultural labour.'
In contrast, Barnett, Bernal and Founou-Tchuigoua have emphasised the controlling and
exploitative nature of the Scheme structure, in which tenants gained an income that was
not dissimilar to a wage.' The Scheme was indeed highly controlled, and the lack of
choice relating to farming methods together with close supervision by the field
inspectors lent itself to images of factory production. This idea was already current
during the Condominium, and in 1948, G. Bacon, the inspector of agriculture within
Blue Nile Province suggested that the government "must cease to think of him [the
tenant] as a rustic satisfied in watching the crops grow, and must regard him as a factory
worker and plan his diversions accordingly.?" However this view emphasises the
controlling and alien nature of the Scheme at the expense of the independence that many
tenants were able to demonstrate as the employers of the largest regional agricultural
workforce in Sudan. More importantly, this view contradicts the self-image of tenants,
who did not see themselves as employees, and who valued tenancies for the economic
independence and enhanced 'landlord' status they brought.'
A balance is brought to this debate, if while accepting that all tenants shared the
aspiration of acting as landlords or managers of their tenancy, it is recognised that not all
tenants were able to achieve this outcome. By identifying three main economic groups
of tenants, O'Brien demonstrates the fact that the Scheme, despite original intentions of
creating a single 'peasant-cultivator class', actually replicated pre-existing wealth
inequalities." Thus large land-holding tenants were able to access several tenancies, had
the capital and background to invest in non-agricultural economic concerns and were
2 Peter McLoughlin, "Economic Development and the Heritage of Slavery in the Sudan Republic", Africa:
Journal of the International African Institute, 32,4, (1962), ppo 355-391, at p. 378 .
.~ Barnett, Illusion ofDevelopment. pp. 179-180; Bernal, "Colonial Moral Economy"; Founou-Tchuigoua,
"De-facto Wage Earners in the Gezira", African Development, 3, I, (1978), ppo 25-50.
.j NRO 2BNP 501217, GoH, Bacon, Inspector of Agriculture BNP. "Future of the Gezira Scheme", 25
February 1948.
.~ McLoughlin, "Economic Development".
{, O'Brien. "Social Reproduction", pp. n'+-236.
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able to hire labour and even managers to run a tenancy.' At the other end of the scale
were the tenants without access to external resources, who relied heavily upon their own
labour to manage agricultural production." As the numbers of half-tenancies rapidly
increased from the late 1940s, the ability for all tenants to achieve the established
cultural aspirations of wealth and landlordism became increasingly difficult."
O'Brien's work is important in understanding the differences of experience throughout
the Gezira Scheme. However, all these works fail to go beyond the descriptive nature of
the economic role of tenants in agricultural production. Just as important was the way in
which tenants responded 'politically' to the new conditions of the Scheme. Using
bureaucratic institutions to engage with the Syndicate and the government, tenants
rejected the symbols of tradition so commonly used by other rural groups. Tenant
institutions were used to articulate the aspirations of all tenants, which increasingly
became couched in a language of 'rights', and were crucial in forming a tenant interest
group centred on a common idea of a tenant citizenry. The differences between tenants
were notably played out in the conflicts between the established Tenants' Association
and the emerging and more radical Tenants' Union. However, behind this conflict lay
almost identical aspirations based upon the 'right' to continued individual accumulation,
and the ability to act as 'landlord' that such accumulation represented. Tenants also
used the range of tenant dominated bureaucratic institutions of governance already
existing within the Gezira, to push forward the idea of an elite tenant citizenry, which
was articulated against the non-tenant population in general through an economic
elitism, and against the non-Arab population in particular, in a movement that brought
Sudanese nationalistic attitudes into the specific Gezira Scheme context.
7 Ibid .. pp. 234-235.
K lbid., p. 236.
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Achieving Tenant Aspirations
Despite the simplistic portrayal of the region by early Condominium writers, the Gezira
in common with most northern riverain Sudan had long been a highly sophisticated area
with flourishing trade and agricultural production. It was also a heavily differentiated
society, with a hierarchy reflecting unequal access to economic resources. The Gezira
elite were closely associated with monetary wealth, and this wealth was demonstrated in
the ownership of land and rentier lifestyle. As McCloughlin has stated:
Riverain landowners, and commercial, religious, and political leaders
have supported over a long period a class structure based on various
forms of slave, serf, and bound tenantry workers. Agriculture as such is
honourable, but to perform farm labour is not. Traditionally, to own
land was a prerequisite to independence, integrity, and social
citizenship. To perform menial labour on it precluded all three. 10
If as Vaughan suggests, chiefs (or sheikhs) 'embodied local aspirations and communal
ideals' then the wealth of a community leader in the Gezira region of Sudan represented
the ideal and aspiration of wealth accumulation of Gezira communities. I I Control of
labour was a central requirement of this cultural ideal, for as McCloughlin expanded;
"the number of workers he [the landowner] can hire, is per se, an indication of his
importance't.i'' This control was managed throughout the nineteenth century through the
ownership of slaves, the use of managerial wakils and the "exploitation" of "free
peasants by using a precolonial system known as shavl (credit) to extend their influence
over a community of indebted cultivators". 13
l) Geraldine Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor in the Gezira Scheme", (Barakat, 1975) pp. 46-48.
10 McLoughlin, "Economic Development", p. 358.
11 Olufemi Vaughan, Nigerian Chiefs: Traditional Power in Modern Politics. 1890s- 1990s, (Rochester,
NY., 2000), p. 15.
12 McLoughlin, "Economic Development", p. 380.
13 Sikainga, Slaves into Workers, p. 19; Awad, "The Evolution of Landownership in the Sudan", p. 220;
Spaulding, "Slavery, Land Tenure and Social Class", pp. 8-13; O'Brien, 'The Formation of the
Agricultural Labour Force in Sudan", Review ofAfrican Political Economy. 26, (1983), pp. 15-34, at p.
17.
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This historical aversion to manual labour remained a strong motivation during the
Condominium. Hiring of labour was a common practice among those who owned land,
but finding labourers was frequently difficult, especially in times of good rains, when
grain was plentiful and there was "no particular inducement to work"." Labour had no
intrinsic value in and of itself, and was thus to be avoided save to gain essential
commodities. This attitude towards manual labour was heavily criticised by British
officials, who saw it as a moral failing. Province Governor Dickenson fairly celebrated
the arrival of a year of bad rains in 1905, which drove people to "forget the supposed
indignity, of personal work", despite the fact that "in many cases they [saqias] had to be
abandoned, owing to the damage caused by locusts, and to the inability of the people to
feed themselves until they could reap a crop". 15 The point was in Dickenson's eyes, not
that the attempt failed, "but the endeavour to work them was made, which is an
encouraging feature of the situation.,,16 However, manual labour remained associated
with low status, and attempts to erode the landowning elites control over labour were
deeply resented. The Annual General Reports noted such discontent in relation to the
expected clamp-down on slavery within Sudan:
It is no longer possible to ignore the fact that there is a strong feeling of
discontent among the Arabs directed at the loss of their Sudanese
servants. This undoubtedly hits them very hard, as, apart from domestic
discomfort, it greatly reduces the area which they can bring under
cultivation ... Any feeling which may exist against the government,
where it is not inspired by mere religious fanaticism is due to this cause
17
more than to any other.
Historically only a small percentage of the population had been in the position to hire
labour and accumulate individual wealth, but it was that small elite that defined the
cultural values and aspirations of the wider population. Generally unachievable, the
majority of the population sought to replicate those values to the greatest extent possible,
1-1 SGR 1905. p. 25.
15 Ihid.. p. 25.
16 Ihid. p. 25.
17 SGR 1908. pp. '+87-8.
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through limiting their work time when good crop yields allowed. To this end, Gezira
farmers adopted a flexible economy in which river and rainland agriculture, animal
husbandry and trade allowed families to spread their interests." Thus in years of good
rains, the less intensive work of rain-land agriculture was preferred to that of the highly
labour-intensive river bank saqia cultivation." Inhabitants, familiar with economic risk
assessment evaluated the economic benefits of government-sponsored ventures, such as
loans for saqia irrigation infrastructure, according to calculations regarding the relative
balance between labour time and cost, and overall profit."
These were not inherently conservative calculations demonstrating a distrust of new
opportunities, for as Berry has argued, African farmers generally demonstrated
"eagerness to improve their access to market opportunities. ,,21 However, change had to
prove beneficial to farmers' financial or lifestyle interests, and it was the absence of
guaranteed benefits that meant that Gezira farmers were unwilling to grow the Egyptian
cotton promoted by the British on their non-irrigated rainlands. Considerable local
interest had been demonstrated in the early cotton experiments, but despite enthusiasm
for the finished product with its longer staple, the yields were too unpredictable for it to
become a regular crop. As the government acknowledged, the unwillingness to grow
long-staple cotton was quite reasonable:
As it can at present only be grown on sakia [sic] land, and as it is a crop
that occupies the ground for at least eight months in the year, provides
nothing in the way of forage for cattle, and brings in an insignificant
return at the rates offered by the large cotton brokers, the native
naturally does not see the advantage of growing it.22
In the face of these economic disadvantages, Gezira tenants continually demonstrated a
preference for the short-staple Egyptian varieties that grew more successfully in the dry
climate.
III John Randell, hEI Gedid - A Blue Nile Gezira Village", Sudan Notes and Records, 39, (1958) pp. 25-
39, at p. 30.
l'l SGR 1904, p. 46.
~o Ibid., p. -t6.
21 Berry, No Condition is Permanent, p. -t-t.
~2 SGR 1904, p. 52 and SGR 1906, p. 591.
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If these early attempts to encourage high quality rainland cotton by the general
population failed, then they were not the last. The potential of the fertile Gezira region
had been recognised from the first years of the Condominium, with experiments
conducted in general vegetable crops, as well as the cash crops of sugar cane and
groundnuts.r' However, it was the engineering possibilities of large-scale irrigation,
together with the powerful backing of the cotton lobby that came together to cement the
future of the Gezira Scheme as a centre of cotton production.i" From 1911, a concerted
policy of encouraging cotton growing under irrigated conditions began. In marking this
new era of cotton specialisation, the generalist government experimental farm at Kamlin,
was closed, and a new experimental farm run by the Sudan Plantations Syndicate was
opened at Tayiba, focusing solely on growing irrigated cotton.
Using pump irrigation, the Tayiba station started growing cotton on 3,000 feddans in
1911. The Syndicate used paid labour to farm most of this area, but experiments were
also made with tenant farming on nearly 600 feddans.f Tenancies were rented out
annually for five piastres per feddan, under a tenancy agreement taken directly from the
existing Syndicate's concern at Zeidab in Northern Province, giving each tenant the full
profit return from the crops grown. It was hoped that local cultivators would take up
these tenancies, but none did so, showing caution towards the new enterprise. Instead
tenants were brought to Tayiba from Zeidab, while the local inhabitants "preferred to
wait and see the result of the first year's working before taking a share in the concern
themselves.,,26 After viewing the high profits of 1911, Gezira inhabitants were
convinced of the economic benefits brought by tenancies, and 1912 saw a rush of
applications. With only nineteen tenancies available locally, the competition was fierce
23 SGR 190..+. p. 52 and SGR 1908, p. 494.
c-l Gaitskell, Gezira. chapter 2.
2~SGR1911.
c(, Ibid .. p. 39.
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and applicants came "depositing their money, and sometimes their women's jewellery,
on application, as proof of their anxiety to become tenants."n
Challenging Big Business
A combination of poor rainland harvests and evidence of high profits and yields within
the pilot Scheme convinced many local farmers of the benefits of becoming Scheme
tenants. The profits gained from the sale of cotton allowed existing tenants to hire
labour and act as managers of the plots they rented.r" Viewed as a route to the
fulfilment of existing aspirations, the experimental tenancies were embraced as a method
of enhancing an individual's position. However, this acceptance of the tenancy system
was predicated upon a careful analysis of costs and benefits which had proved to work in
the tenants favour, and did not reflect the power of the government to coerce inhabitants
into a new economic relationship. The economic motivations of tenants were
demonstrated forcibly in 1913, when tenants refused to accept changes in the tenancy
agreement. A third of the way through the 1913 season, the Syndicate announced a new
profit-sharing arrangement, which provided the tenant with a 40% share of the overall
cotton profits instead of the previous annual rent paying agreement. With estimates
predicting a 70% decrease in tenants' profits through this arrangement, many tenants
refused to accept the new profit sharing system.i" In demonstrating their discontent, the
tenants turned to the government, and presented a petition to Dickenson, the Governor of
the province. Signed by over fifty tenants, the petition signalled the tenants' rejection of
the new conditions, which failed to allow tenants to realise the aspirations they had been
led to believe were possible. As Dickenson stated:
[T]he very large majority have expressed a wish to give up their
holdings, and ask for compensation for their out-of-pocket expenses and
27 SGR 1912. p. 45.
2K Ibid., p. 45.
29 SAD 109/11/61, Wingate Papers. 'The refusal of Tayiba tenants to accept the terms of the nc«
conditions" 1913.
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profitless labour on which they have been engaged for the last four or
five months, during which time they might have been working on their
own sakias or preparing or sowing their rain-land.l"
The petition aroused sympathy from provincial government personnel, already
aggrieved that agricultural development was no longer under the control of the
government. Dickenson was able to persuade the Syndicate to offer compensation to
those tenants who wished to leave their tenancies and afraid of losing confidence and
faith among Sudanese population the Syndicate agreed." However, the inability of the
government to make independent political decisions was already clearly apparent.
Committed to a policy of major investment in irrigated cotton, the government was
reliant on the Syndicate to bring both capital and management expertise into the
Scheme, and was also circumscribed by the necessity of making the Gezira Scheme a
profitable venture. Under these conditions it was essential to transform the tenancy
agreement to one more favourable to the Syndicate and government, and thus the
government could offer no more than compensation and platitudes of good will. Despite
being the primary recourse for tenants wishing to engage with the alien structure of the
Tayiba pilot station, the government was in no position to deliver the conditions that
tenants really wanted. This limited success in petitioning the government was to set the
tone for the future relationship between government and tenants.
This incident caused a good deal of anxiety at the time, raising the spectre of a strong
tenant body with an ability to upset central plans. With the future of the Tayiba
experiment in some doubt, it was the famine of 1914 that secured its viability. The
Annual Report for 1914 concluded; "never in the history of the present government has
the financial position of the Province been so bad as during the last year.,,~2 After a
succession of increasingly bad harvests the existing systems of managing risk were
~o Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 SGR 191 ..l, p. 51.
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severely stretched. Under these conditions, the guaranteed irrigated dura crop that was
part of the Tayiba tenancies became a major attraction for tenants, and the tenancy
experiment once again thrived on economic terms dictated by the government and the
Syndicate.
Agricultural experimentation continued while the infrastructure for the main Scheme
was being built. The Barakat pump Scheme, irrigating 2,000 feddans was opened in
1914, in 1921, 19,500 feddans was irrigated at Hag Abdulla and another 30,000 feddans
in 1923-4 from pumps at Wad el Nau. 33 The imposition of the Scheme over the Gezira
plain was thus a gradual process, with a fifth of the total irrigated area experiencing
pump irrigation on the same terms as the full-scale Gezira Scheme, before the opening
of the Sennar Dam. However although gradual, the changes brought by the Scheme
were undoubtedly large and the support of the population could never be taken for
granted. Acquiescence though was crucial, for the Syndicate relied upon tenants for the
cultivation of the cotton crop. The inherent difficulties of convincing the population en-
masse to give up the rights to their land in return for a set rent payment of ten piastres
per feddan, and in addition to work on tenancies according to an imposed tenancy
agreement were compounded by continued propaganda against the Scheme.
The intelligence reports closely identified this propaganda with the Egyptian nationalist
attempts to raise anti-British sentiment within Sudan. Beginning in 1919, and
continuing unabated until the Scheme opened in 1925, a series of pamphlets were
distributed throughout Sudan, which as well as being generally anti-British, highlighted
the Gezira Scheme as a particular example of foreign exploitation and oppression.
Described as a government plot to hand the nation's wealth to British capitalists at the
expense of the Sudanese population, the latter were urged to boycott the Scheme.:
q
In
addition to genuine fears about what the Scheme would mean to the population, this
propaganda created a degree of unrest, and in the early 1920s it was feared that a boycott
D Gaitskell, Gezira. pp. 72. 90 .
.l.J National Archi vc, Sudan Intelligence Reports WOIl 06/6226, November 1919, no.30-l-: March 1920,
no.308; May 1921. no.322: October 1923, no.35l: August 192-L no.361; April 1925. no.369.
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was likely.35 Aware of "a good deal of criticism of the Scheme among the people", a
belated information campaign was established by the Government. 36 Tours were made
to villages within the proposed Scheme area by government officials, who provided
information on the future structure of the Scheme. Eric Hussey, asked to participate on
such a tour, described the primary concern of prospective tenants as being a fear of
losing a food supply. Once personally reassured that a dura crop was part of the tenancy
rotation "full co-operation was willingly promised and given".3?
Embracing the Scheme
In promoting the Scheme, the government was eager to gam the support of local
administrative leaders, hoping that their support would be a positive influence on the rest
of the population. Government staff devoted large amounts of time to courting
influential figures within the Gezira population at tea parties and other gatherings, and,
despite the egalitarian language surrounding the Scheme, aimed to give such leaders a
vested interest in the success of the Gezira Schemer" In particular, large landowners
and those considered influential were given more than the standard one tenancy, and
were allowed to nominate cultivators for several others, thus giving them practical
control over extended areas. By shoring up the economic position of influential figures,
the Scheme consolidated existing inequalities and guaranteed a position of influence for
the existing elite,
This pragmatic approach of co-opting the elite, extended to national figures of influence;
namely the three religious leaders; Sayed Ali Mirghani, Yusef el Hindi, and Sayed
Abdel Rahman el Mahdi. As policy makers stated in 1923, "It is obviously desirable
.~5 Eric Hussey Tropical Africa 1908-19./4: Memoirs ofa Period (London. 1959), p. )0.
.~h NRO lCivsec 57/33/126, L.F. Nalder DC Khartoum Province to R. Wedd, Advocate General. 24
September 1924 .
.~7 Hussey Tropical Africa p. 30-31.
~K SAD 531/2. Robertson, :\DC Rufaa to his mother. 2) January 1923.
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that the several leaders in question should have a personal interest in the success of the
Scherne.?" The only difficulty was in finding land of good enough quality to ensure
that these religious leaders could in no way fail, and might thus be tied to the
government in desiring the continued success and stability of the Scheme." The
courting of the administrative elite was a success. In response to the negati ve
propaganda against the Scheme, a petition was signed by the omdas, notables and
merchants of Kamlin district, pledging their support:
In conclusion, we desire to associate ourselves with the noble Sir
Sayed Ali-el-Mirghani, EI Sayed Abd-el-Rahman-el-Mahdi, EI
Sherif Ali-el-Hindi and the other members of the Sudanese
delegation, in all representations they have made on behalf of the
Sudanese nation and in favour of the Makwar dam."
The landowning and administrative elite might have gained particular benefits from
complying with the new economic order, but the general advantages of the Scheme were
not lost on the rest of the population. That an outside agency was willing to plough
large amounts of capital into land currently productive only in years of good rains
appeared a good offer to those without capital themselves. Particularly in the northern
areas of the Scheme, where annual rainfall was very low, the Scheme brought huge areas
of previously marginal land under cultivation, and for those with little or no land of their
own, the Scheme offered immediate access to the standard 40 feddan tenancy, with both
the increased status and profit potential that tenant farming offered. The success of the
experimental areas also seemed to prove the infallibility of the Scheme in providing
guaranteed profits, offering the real possibility that all tenants might live a lifestyle
previously reserved for the landowning elite.
Several aspects of continuity also contributed to the acceptance of the Scheme, and
although undoubtedly creating a novel, highly structured economic environment, the
W NRO BNP 1/39/297, H. Fraser, Director of Lands to Huddleston, Governor BNP, 12 April (923.
40 NRO BNP 11391297, Huddleston, Governor BNP, to Fraser. Director of Lands. 10 June (l)2.~.
41 Tcrjc Tvedt, The River Nile ill the Age of the British: Political Ecology and the Quest for Economic
POII'l'r (London, 2004) p. 109.
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Scheme also included some elements familiar to the population. Georges Brausch in
examining some of these trends describes the Gezira as an adaptable and extemall Y
oriented society in the centre of trade routes and in touch with urban centres and modem
ideas.42 A long history of private land ownership and complex pre-Scheme relations
between landlords, sharecroppers, tenants, and smallholders, together with multiple
forms of profit-sharing accounting, gave precedent for the profit-sharing organisation of
the Scheme. Moreover, the close and binding relationship between moneylenders and
tenants frequently resulted in interference and supervision from the moneylender in the
farming techniques of his debtor, to guarantee his investment was sound.':' Such a
background of supervised farming helped ease local farmers into the new structures of
the Scheme. However, these factors also bring into relief the changes of both scale and
inflexibility that the Scheme brought. Although predicated on economic patterns
roughly familiar to prospective tenants, the Scheme fixed the social and economic
boundaries in ways that was completely new. Choice was profoundly limited, both in
terms of participating within the Scheme (unless willing to move from the area) and in
the terms and conditions of work and profit-sharing, which were all set by the two
undisguised dominant partners in the triumvirate partnership between government,
Syndicate and tenants.
This lack of tenant choice was to become increasingly contentious as the material wealth
promised by the Scheme failed to be consistently delivered. However, in the first years
of the Scheme enthusiasm was high, and J. Robertson, wrote that "the people all seem
most contented", while those outside the Scheme complained that they were not
included." This positive outlook of tenants, belying all government fears, continued
through the 1920s as crop yields and cotton prices remained high. In 1928, as the
Scheme continued to expand it was reported that "The Scheme is as popular and
prosperous as ever and there are three times the numbers of applicants for the new
. '1 bl ,,45tenancies avai a e.
-12 G. Brausch, "Change and Continuity".
-I~ Ibid .• and M. Willrnington, "Aspects of Moneylending" .
.j.j SAD 531/2. Robertson. ADC Rufa'a to his mother, 27 February 1923.
45 NRO BNP 1/27/201, BNP Annual Report. 1928.
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The most controversial outcome of the Scheme's immediate success and popularity was
the almost universal move by tenants to employ labour to work on a tenancy rather than
do the work themselves. This trend was viewed with disfavour by the government and
Syndicate, who ignoring all past habits of labour employment and slave use within the
Gezira area, had placed at the core of the Scheme's 'ideals' the notion of self-sufficient
tenant proprietors working their own land in family units. Gaitskell summed up the
thinking behind the Scheme when he stated:
The original intention for the country was the building up of an
industrious cultivator type of peasantry. The unit of labour was to be
a man and his family working with him. The standard Syndicate
loans were based on this assumption and were only intended to cover
the cost of outside assistance in seasons when this was imperative.
They were never intended to cover the whole cost of cultivation."
When tenants persistently refused to play the role of obedient labourers laid out for
them, the authorities were quick to condemn; "So far from creating an industrious
cultivator class we are gradually establishing a collection of idle rich".47 Judged against
the Western European work ethic that colonial officials brought with them, Gezira
tenants were viewed as lazy and self-serving, although as Keletso Atkins has
demonstrated, laziness is a cultural construct that does not take into consideration
distinctive indigenous versions of a work ethic."
However, it was the ability to hire labour that ensured the Scheme's popularity. As
Gaitskell observed in 1928; "The coveted position of a tenant is of one who can hire
other people to do his work.,,49 The opportunity of becoming the managers or de-facto
landlords of a tenancy and employing others to do the agricultural labour allowed
tenants to emulate the landowning elites, and thus coincided with the long-term
aspirations of the Gezira population. This aspiration was so strong that tenants were
46 Sad 418/V~-9,Gaitskell, to Poyntz-Wright, Manager Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 14 March 192R.
47 Ibid.
4H Atkins, The Moon is Dead', p. 119.
49 SAD 4181313-9. Gaitskell to Poyntz-Wright. Manager Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 14 March 1t)2S.
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willing to go into debt in order to finance the employment of labour. The belief that the
Scheme was a guarantee of continued profits created an economic confidence that
encouraged a lifestyle of debt in a search for the money needed to employ labour. With
the aim of achieving the 'landlord' lifestyle seemingly within reach, the province annual
report of 1929 recorded that most tenants were in debt:
I should say that at the present time the tenant who is not in debt to
some merchant or other provides the exception to the rule. At the
moment the Arab tenant will not do any work at all as long as he has the
money, or can borrow the money, to pay somebody else to do it.5o
Despite the dangers attached to such a policy, the 'landlord' aspiration was strong
enough for many tenants to take economic risks, suggesting that the popularity of the
Scheme among tenants was closely related to the ability to hire labour and divorce
themselves from the role of labourer.
It was therefore through passing the burden of work to others, and maintaining a
personal distance from manual labour, that tenants accepted the conditions under which
tenancies were worked. Looking back to the first years of the Scheme, Reginald Davies,
Secretary for Economic Development, reported that:
No one - and to be quite honest, I think, the sheikhs least of all -
gave a thought to restriction of liberty or loss of other amenities. The
plenitude of money covered everything and influenced even those
old timers who really valued their land and had made quite a good
thing out of their normal rain cultivation and their herds... All were
able to hire 'wakils' and sufficient labour to do the work and stand
the buffeting - with a very comfortable margin of profit left over."
Tenant aspirations focused on the profit needed to allow them to work as landlords
rather than as labourers. By rejecting the role of labourer, and aspiring instead to a
rentier status, tenants used the Scheme in a rather different manner to that proposed by
50 NRO 2BNP 42/1/1. BNP Annual Report. 1929.
51 NRO BNP 1/401301. Reginald Davies, Secretary for Economic Development to Acland, DC Gczira. 31
December 1936.
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the government and Syndicate. These differences, already marked in the first years of
the Condominium, were to become an increasing focus of political tension in the 1940s.
The End of the Honeymoon
The enthusiasm of the 1920s ended dramatically in 1930 as a diseased cotton crop
coincided with the world depression to see profits plummet.Y After receiving an
average of fE.55 cotton profit per tenancy in 1929, three out of the four seasons from
1930-1933 saw tenants bearing a financial loss on their cotton sales." It was not until
1945, that profits returned to the 1929 lcvel.i" Tenants faced further pressures, as
measures to reduce crop diseases resulted in greater work for tenants. The change from
a three to a four-course rotation meant that a tenant's crops, always planted in 'numbers'
containing the same crop, were increasingly geographically dispersed. On top of the
extra travelling time, an order demanding that cotton plants be pulled out of the ground
after harvesting was unpopular, demanding greater time and effort from tenants for the
same net profit.55 The result was that tenants were less able to hire labour, at the same
time as needing more of it. With both the local and national economy relying almost
entirely upon cotton production, the failings of the fixed and inflexible approach taken
by the controlling partners had become clear. But despite this, no efforts were made to
broaden crop production.
Within these limitations there were several types of survival strategy employed by
tenants throughout the depression. Central to most tenants' survival techniques was
recourse to debt, a strategy that had long existed within the Gezira area, but which
escalated throughout the 1930s as tenants were forced to borrow money to finance
~~ Gaitskell, Getira, p. 1.+ I.
'i.~ Ihid .. p. 270.
~.j Ihid .. p. 270.
'i'i NRO BNP 1/38/293 Acland. Gczira Commissioner. "Handing over notes", 1940.
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cultivations that were running at a loss.56 Tenants also looked beyond the boundaries of
the Scheme for means of income generation. 'Multioccupationality was a feature of
many African economies, and O'Brien has identified its importance within Gezira
tenants' economic strategies.i" Depending on a tenant's access to capital there were
various approaches to working outside the tenancy. Those with financial capital sought
to invest in additional business and trading ventures, with small shops and transport
enterprises being most common. For instance, Yusif Hag el Zein, the wakil sheikh of
Radma village, owned a lorry by which he conducted trade with urban centres and
offered a transport service, and in addition lent money to many of the tenants in the
region.i" Others had access to either river or rain land outside of the Scheme that could
be farmed and had animals that could be taken to grass lands.59 For those whose only
capital was their own labour, profit might be made by selling their labour within an
urban context, while employing cheaper labour to work their tenancy."
The ultimate response to the unprofitable nature of tenancies was for tenants to abandon
them. As early as 1929, a large number of tenants resigned in Ghobshan block in the
south of the Scheme when profits were declared." This response was to increase over
the following years and became so widespread that by the end of the 1934 season, there
was a shortage of 2,000 tenants across the Scheme. This situation reflected not only the
unpopularity of unprofitable cotton farming, but also the decreasing benefits supplied by
the dura crop for although recognised as the main inducement for tenants, in 1929 it was
concluded that "durra takes more out of soil value than can be justified by any durra
cultivation which is surplus to the domestic needs of the tenant", and the feddanage of
durra was reduced.v' With increasing numbers of tenants unable to hire labour and few
willing or able to conduct the intensive year-round labour needed for cotton cultivation
5fi NRO BNP 1/281208, e.G. Davies, DC Gezira, "Handing over notes", October 1936.
57 O'Brien, "The Social Reproduction of Tenant Cultivators", p. 228.
5R NRO BNP 1140/301, Group Inspector, Centre Group, "Report on Report on Yusif Hag el Zein". 18
November 1936.
59 Interview with Khalid Dafalla Mohammed Fadl, Hosh village, 31 January 2003.
fiO Tony Barnett and Abbas Abdelkarim, Sudan: The Getira Scheme and Agricultuml Transition (London.
1991)p.33.
(,\ NRO 2BNP .+2/1 /I. BNP Annual Report. 1929.
h~ Ibid.
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themselves, river and rain cultivation proved an attractive alternative.I" Although by
resigning, a farmer faced the danger of losing his rights to any future profits in the
Scheme, many saw no hope of a financial revi val.
However, "the providential failure of the rams outside the Scheme" reversed this
situation reinforcing the benefits of any kind of grain crop, even if cotton profits were
still very low. 64 Competition for tenancies was again at a height, and at the end of 1935,
each 'takshifa' or allocation of tenancies within new extensions was "besieged by
hundreds clamouring for howashas't.f Some of these applicants were those who had
previously resigned, many, but not all of whom were given a new tenancy. Tenancies
during the 1930s were thus used as one weapon in the Gezira population's economic
arsenal, in a manner similar to the pre-Scheme uses of rain and river farming. When
cotton profits or poor rains were predicted, tenancies were taken up enthusiastically.
When they were not and the ability to attain the aspirations of landlordism was
threatened, the value of tenancies became marginal, and the risks of non-irrigated
farming often became preferable to the potential debt and hard work of tenant farming.
Options were kept open when possible by utilising other methods of income earning to
spread a tenant's interests. Those who could, kept a tenancy while focusing their
energies on other more profitable resources, while others left, and attempted to regain a
tenancy when economically viable.
For those intent on maintaining a tenancy throughout the depression years, there were
other survival strategies. Capital, in the form of land was frequently sold. In part this
was considered a safe venture as the use of land was not directly related to its ownership.
By selling his land, a tenant lost its rental earnings, but did not lose his position as
tenant, the right to which was predicated upon keeping to the terms of the tenancy
agreement. However, the frequent sales of land were viewed by the government as
contrary to the creation of a stable peasant proletariat. Despite government concerns,
fi.l SAD 641/5, John Longe, ADC Hassaheissa, "Handing Over Notes. North Gczira", 19J..1.
r,.J NRO BNP 1/401301, Hillard. DC North Gezira, to Young, Governor BNP. 15 December 19j5.
(,) NRO BNP 1/401301. Bolton. DC Gezira, to Young, Governor BNP. 22 December 19j5.
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land sales reached astonishing figures, with nearly 35,000 feddans transferring hands in
1936, and slightly over that amount sold in 1937, the first years for which figures are
available.P? The analysis of land sales showed that "poverty" and the need to hire
essential picking labour were the overriding reasons for the sales, being the professed
motivations for 248 out of the 349 sales in North Gezira during May 1938.67
If there were many that suffered from the depression, succumbing to large debts, and
alienating themselves from the land, there were also those who benefited. During the
1930s, opportunities for enrichment abounded for those with capital and the willingness
to risk that the depression would only be temporary. Among the latter, Yusif Algam
gained the wealth that was to propel him to political standing by taking up tenancies in
the early 1930s that no one else was willing to farm. Others with access to capital, either
through substantial land holdings that brought in an annual rent, or other interests and
investments, found that money lending was highly profitable. The majority of the land
that poorer tenants were forced to sell was bought by richer tenants, who thus gained
access to the rental value of that land." Despite the egalitarian ideals at the heart of the
government's vision of the Scheme, the wealth gap, based upon existing economic
inequalities grew substantially. By the 1940s these economic divisions were clearly
visible to government staff, who noted of the Halawin area:
Wealth is very unevenly divided and is inclined to accumulate
gradually in the hands of a few hundred well to do people belonging
to the upper hierarchy. Especially this is true of land, and every year
sees the growth of a landless class, who if they are not tenants 'pro
tern' are being reduced from the status of small holders to that of
hired labourers.69
Despite the Scheme's egalitarian philosophy and its distinction from other colonial
cotton Schemes that relied upon directly co-opting elites to manage cotton production,
66 NRO ICivsec 57/24/93, BNP Annual Report 1937.
67 NRO ICivsec 57/6/26, BNP Monthly Diaries. May 1938.
6K NRO BNP 1/38/293. Acland. Gezira Commissioner, "Handing over notes", May 19.+0.
69 NRO BNP 1/30/222. anon. "Administrative Note on the Halawin", 14 November 19.+.+. This theme of a
developing underclass has been explored by Barnett and Abdelkarirn. Sudan: The Gezira Scheme. p. '+4.
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the Gezira Scheme did favour the wealthier members of society. and overtly
disadvantaged the poorest by reducing their economic options to that of agricultural
labourer.
Rising Discontent
The depressed conditions of the 1930s raised grievances that had been suppressed during
times of plenty. This rising discontent found an outlet partly in passive protest, but
complaints were also taken directly to the Syndicate and government. Informal
criticisms of the Scheme were frequently made to government officials expressing
concerns about the "comparative inaccessibility of the accounts, and the supposed
pocketing of their profits by the government and the SPS, when the tenant had next to
none".70 This expression of a lack of tenant trust in the alien agencies of Syndicate and
government was to become a recurring theme in the relationship between tenants and the
other partners. In December 1933, the first "definite petition against Gezira Scheme
conditions" reached the government from the village of Hillet el Mekheirif.71 The 23
tenants complained "that owing to the reduction in the advances made to tenants by the
Syndicate, and the fact that their durra crop this year was an almost total loss, they
would find some difficulty in providing adequately for themselves and their families
until the end of this season.,,72
Based upon the established village unit and using established forms of mediation with
the government, the Mekheirif petition also demonstrated the united action of certain
village members through their common relationship to the means of production. The
complaints focused on the lack of profit brought by a tenancy, which "might cover the
bare cost of the essential durra alone, but would not run to the purchase of clothes or
70 NRO BNP 1/1/2, Minute on a digression at DC's meeting. on subject of "Native Opinion on the Gczira
Scheme", ~O September 1930.
71 NRO 2BNP 5017/28, Note by r.o Davies. Gezira commissioner. n.d.
t: Ihid.
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sugar or anything else that made life worth living.,,73 Clarke drew attention to this
economic focus of tenants:
I must emphasise that all tenants' complaints are voiced against their
financial position. The first five years of excessive profits and the
last four years of excessive stringency have blinded the people to the
political and social defects of the Gezira Scheme which, to my mind,
are of equal, if not greater, permanent importance.i"
Clarke was correct in his assessment of tenants' complaints, but his own focus on social
conditions blinded him to the real concerns of tenants. It was not that tenants' were
unaware of the social defects of the Scheme. It was rather that they did not see them as
a problem. Aiming to be the employers of labour, the difficult working conditions were
ideally passed on to others and thus the focus of tenants remained on economic profit
from a tenancy in order to finance the employment of labour. Tenants accepted and
promulgated a system of social inequity in order that they might be at the apex of
society, and thus the social conditions of the Gezira Scheme actually fitted with tenant
ambitions. Aspiring to be landlords and managers rather than labourers, grievances
focused primarily upon the absence of profit during the 1930s, which worked to prevent
the full realisation of landlord aspirations.
The Syndicate management insisted that the Mekheirif petition and other complaints
overstated true grievances, and did not represent the general opinion that those within
the Gezira were better off than those outside.75 Gillan and Fass, as Civil and Financial
secretaries respectively, outlined official government opinion as being that the Scheme
had brought an overall prosperity; that they were not responsible for world cotton prices,
and that the durra crop in normal years was a good safeguard from famine." With the
central government having no revenue alternatives, it was reliant upon the Scheme, and
its continuing financial viability. Similarly, the Syndicate was driven by a need to
satisfy stakeholders and produce a profit. Under these conditions, the attempts by
n NRO 2BNP 50/7/28, Note by e.G Davies, Gezira commissioner. n.d.
74 NRO 2BNP 50/7/28, Clarke. Governor BNP to MacMichael. Civil Secretary, 3 I December 193,
75 Ibid.
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Sudanese to realise their grievances through official channels failed. However, tenant
grievances did worry local officials on two accounts. Firstly. the propensity for tenants
to withdraw from tenancies threatened the very existence of the Scheme, upon which the
government was reliant for national revenue. Secondly, there was a real fear of social
unrest arising from unresolved grievances. Discussing the potential impact of the
Mekheirif petition, Clarke concluded:
There is probably little risk of serious trouble at the moment but what
I would say is that the Gezira at the moment seems to present
extremely fertile soil for a political agitator or religious fanatic."
While such grievances and protest were kept on the scale of the individual or village, the
government did not unduly worry. However, this intensely localised response to the
Scheme was challenged by a series of articles published in el Nil, the leading Mahdist
national newspaper in May 1937.
Written anonymously, the articles presented tenants as oppressed by the two stronger
partners in the Scheme and highlighted the economic and social inequities within the
Scheme. They also propagated what were considered to be tenant concerns to the tenant
body itself. Manipulating the power of print journalism, the articles portrayed an
'imagined community' of tenants to an as then disparate readership, and offered a tenant
identity based on a common experience." The articles described the tenants as a unified
whole, being oppressed by the other partners, and it was stated that "the tenant suffers a
very miserable living... because of the unfair agreement made between him, the
Syndicate and the government, which stands as a bar to his happiness.t" The Tenants'
Reserve Fund was highlighted as an example of this oppression, not only because
tenants were kept ignorant of its details, but because this fund was kept on a communal
basis. This collectivisation was described as "a loss of rights to the poor tenant who gets
76 NRO 2BNP 50/7/28 Notes from a meeting of Clarke. Governor BNP. Gillan. Civil Secretary and Fa.......
Financial Secretary. 12 January 193-.+,
77 NRO 2BNP 50/7/28. Clarke. Governor BNP to MacMichacl. Civil Secretary. 31 December 19_r~,
7K The power of media to construct community identity has been explored hy Benedict Ander...on.
Imagined Communities.
7'J GBA 700-2. £1 Nil, 21 May 1917.
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no benefit at all from his work".80 Other articles focused on the lack of transparency in
accounting and the abuses of power conducted by Syndicate inspectors. These were all
concerns that tenants had themselves raised independently in a localised manner, but for
the first time they were expressed as being of interest to the entire tenant body
throughout the Gezira. Predicting the rise of an anti-government and anti-Syndicate
tenant-based movement, the author wrote:
I believe one day will come when the Syndicate will find itself
confronted by a different type of tenant, much different from that tenant
who suffered humiliation for so long. It will find itself face to face with
a tenant who will ask for full account of his crop, who objects to the
storing of cotton, rejects the idea of profits and appreciations and who
understands that he is not supposed to consider the Syndicate as a form
of government inside the government."
These were prophetic words, but they came nearly ten years too early.
Despite government worries that the articles could spark agitation throughout the Gezira
there was little overt reaction to the articles and the imagined community did not
immediately appear in practice.V In part, this reflected the lack of united common
interest between tenants that could not be overcome by a few articles. Older identities
based upon villages, lineages and religious tariqas, worked with the existing economic
distinctions and superimposed agricultural divisions to maintain a localised and
disparate tenant focus. Moreover, the wider nationalistic motivations of the writer were
not lost on tenants. It was clear by the fact that there were two articles complaining
about the lack of educated Sudanese within the Syndicate bureaucracy, that the author
was not only concerned in fighting the tenants' corner. By appealing to tenants and to
employees of the Syndicate on the basis of a common oppression, the articles attempted
to gain a support base for developing nationalistic politics. However, if there was little
sympathy between tenants at this date, there was even less between tenants and other
KO Ihid .. 25 May 1937.
KI lbid., 24 May 1937.
K~ NRO ICivsec 50/14/59. Mayall. Governor BNP. to Gillan. Civil Secretary. 10 April )l)'X.
203
Tenant Aspirations
workers, with tenants as a self-identified rural 'landed' elite of employers, distancing
themselves from an urban workforce of employees. The articles predictably failed to
draw these groups any closer. Instead, by focusing on issues such as Syndicate clerks,
and social conditions - which never loomed large in tenant complaints at any date - the
articles misjudged the true concerns of tenants. Indeed, in response to the articles, a
number of tenants actively defended the Scheme, and under the heading 'A retraction:
The Gezira Scheme - expert tenants praise it', an "old and respected tenant" contradicted
many of the descriptions of oppression within the articles.P
A few years earlier, and it is possible that individual tenant grievances may have
coalesced under the prompting of a wider identity. However, in 1937, the Scheme was
entering a period of increasing prosperity that once again provided tenants with the
means to achieve their basic aspirations and made the control of a tenancy a worthwhi Ie
prospect. For the first time during the 1930s the demand for tenancies exceeded supply,
despite the opening of new extensions." Also in that year the cotton profits led to "a
very perceptible easing of the debt position.t''" In 1939, it was reported that "a general
air of prosperity and contentment prevails throughout the irrigated area," and this air of
stability remained throughout the Second World War. 86
Contentment was thus directly related to profit margms, which in turn was directly
related to the ability to hire labour. Tenants embraced the Scheme because it fitted with
the established 'ambition pattern' of the Gezira region. It was seen as a way to increase
a tenant's independence, and was not seen as the controlling machine that it has since
been described. The opportunities offered by the Gezira Scheme allowed tenants to
aspire to be the managers of labour, and ultimately to be absentee landlords, delegating
management to an appointed wakil. Control over labour was central to this enthusiasm
and subsequent tenant identity, because the hiring of labour symbolised a tenant's
freedom from manual labour, and provided him with increased social status. The
X~ GBA 700-2, £1 Nil, 23 September 1937.
X~ NRO I Civsec 57/24/93, BNP Annual Report. 1937.
X'i Ihid.
Xf, NRO I Civsec 57/1 0/39, BNP Monthly Diaries, July 1939.
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complaints about the Scheme were therefore directly concerned with access to the
wealth needed to hire labour. The social inequities of the Scheme thus played no part in
the reaction of tenants to the Scheme, other than reinforcing their position as a labour-
employing elite.
9TENANT CITIZEN - WORKER
SUBJECT
If tenants accepted the conditions of the scheme, then they did so on the understanding
that it would benefit them in allowing them to achieve their aspirations of accumulating
individual wealth and becoming the managers rather than the workers of land. The
Gezira Scheme allowed tenants to become the employers of labour, and thus to
distinguish themselves from the non-tenant labouring population. With the ability to
hire labour an underlying reason for the success of the Scheme, the distinction between
tenant and labour became a prime articulation of tenant identity. Tenants saw
themselves as the primary citizens in society. In contrast, labourers were the subjects
within an essentially unequal society. Not working in the fields was not just a matter of
individual pride for tenants, but also part of a wider self-image, providing tenants with
social status and rights unavailable to workers. At once despising those who worked
upon the land, and resentful of their own reliance upon labour, particular antagonism
was directed towards those who demonstrated united strength. The feelings towards
labour in general were thus intensified and took a distinctive turn towards the Western or
Takari population. Taking the cue from wider national antagonism towards those
immigrants from west of Sudan's borders, the anti-Western sentiment in the Gezira
combined with wider feelings about maintaining the dominant status of tenants, to
~()6
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reinforce an elite tenant status based upon economic dominance and an ethnic Arab
identity.
Organising Labour
Wealth had always been an important provider of status within the Gezira, and although
not always consistent, tenancies generally brought in wealth. Even if this was only in
the form of cash advances paid by the Syndicate for the purpose of continuing
production, this cash, which was controlled by tenants, provided them with status by
giving them the means to hire labour and purchase material goods.' By the 1940s the
wealth brought in by a tenancy was once again significant. In 1947, a standard tenancy
made an average net profit of £E.96, and profit margins increased steadily, reaching an
astonishing peak in 1951, whereupon a single tenancy made an average profit of fE.800
from cotton.' With labouring rates failing to match the increase in profits, and with the
high cotton profits coinciding with a series of failed harvests outside of the irrigated
areas, the gulf between tenant and labourer increased exponentially. Tenants therefore
had the double advantage of high cotton profits and "the only dura in the district" which
they refused to sell "at anything less than high prices".' This situation created a stark
contrast between tenants who were "perplexed about what to do with their money", and
non-tenants in the vicinity of the scheme suffering under near famine conditions.'
The dominance of tenants extended beyond the economic return of tenancies. As early
as 1927 it was recognised that the administrative and wealthy elite were closely tied to
the Scheme with "nearly every sheikh ... a tenant"." With the administrative elite almost
I Considered a source of profit, advances were acknowledged as being a primary motivation for
maintaining tenancies throughout the depression years; NRO 2BNP 50/7/28, Note by e.G. Davies, Gezira
Commissioner, 1933.
2 Gaitskell, Gezira, pp. 270, 317 .
.~ NRO 2Civsec 30/8/19, BNP Monthly Diaries, November and December 19.+9.
4 NRO 2Civsec 30/8/19, BNP Monthly Diaries, November 1949 and NRO 2CivsCL' 30/8/19, BNP Monthly
Diaries. January 1950.
~ NRO BNP 1/1/1, A,S. Redfern, Gezira Commissioner to Huddleston. Governor BNP. II February 1927.
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universally holding tenancies, tenants controlled institutional liaison with government,
as well as having access to other economic and social capital. Thus Ahmed Hamad el
Nil, sheikh of Manaseer village, owned one thousand feddans of land, controlled four
tenancies, ran a shop, was the president of the village council, and a member of the local
court, the Tenants Representative Body, and the Gezira Local Committee." Similarly,
Sheikh Hassan Abdel Galil, controlled two tenancies, and in addition was the chair of
the Rural District Council, owned a shop, and gained significant local social standing
through teaching at a religious school.' With virtually all dominant positions held by
those with vested interests in tenancies, tenant interests extended into all government
related institutions, and the social and political as well as economic dominance of
tenants was secured.
Tenant dominance was furthered by the government's focus upon tenants, and their
blindness towards non-tenants. The unique ideology of the Gezira scheme required a
unique relationship between government and tenant population that was founded upon a
notion of exclusivity, compensation and ultimately elevated status. The novel
organisation of the scheme focused all attention on the tenant as producer. As the
important third partner of the unique Scheme, tenants were not only highly visible, but
with the government being reliant upon the output of each tenancy for their own
revenue, they held a powerful position. Tenants became 'the people of the Gezira', and
gained rights and privileges denied to other inhabitants of the area. In contrast, non-
tenants were barely visible other than being part of the wider 'labour problem', and with
labour management outside of the government's direct control, labourers did not feature
highly in government interactions. The absence of non-tenants within the British
understanding of the Gezira was reflected in a tendency to use the terminology of tenant
and local inhabitant interchangeably. For instance during the opening ceremony of the
Sennar Dam in 1925, there was much discussion about the benefits the scheme would
bring to the 'natives' of the Gezira - by which it was meant tenants. As Archer wrote:
() NRO 2BNP 25/317, £1 Gezira. 6 December 1951.
7 Ibid .. 15 March 1951.
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To the local native, the Gezira Scheme spells not only an assured
livelihood, but comparative affluence... His rights in land are
safeguarded, his income is multiplied many times over. 8
The privileging of tenants as 'the people/citizens' of the Gezira became overt in the
government's policy towards agricultural shows within the Gezira. By confining exhibit
entries to tenants only, a clear statement was made about the unique and privileged
status that tenants had within the Gezira area. No longer simply confusing tenants with
all Gezira inhabitants, tenants were now marked out as distinct from non-tenants and as
the true citizens of the region, while non-tenants were alienated from this position and
denied the same rights.
The relative degree of this social and institutional tenant dominance is highlighted when
a comparison of tenant and non-tenant numbers are made. In 1935, a survey of ten
villages concluded that forty percent of adult males did not hold tenancies." Cui wick in
1952 surveyed a further three villages, in which only forty five percent of men were
classified as tenants." These statistics demonstrate the existence of a large population,
indeed perhaps a majority of non-tenants within the Gezira region, that had little or no
institutional representation. Cui wick also shows that with some exceptions, these non-
tenants tended to be poorer and unskilled, with the majority selling their labour for
wages. The rising gap in wealth between tenants and non-tenants, together with the
conflation of elite socio-political interests with articulated tenant interests created a
tenant identity. Based on common tenant interests, formulated around a shared
relationship to the means of production, tenants set themselves apart from non-tenants.
This elevated status of tenants was recognised and sought after by non-tenants. Of the
293 men without tenancies in the ten villages surveyed in 1935, only eleven percent
proclaimed that they had no interest in gaining a tenancy. I I Most desired a tenancy if
not directly for its potential profit, then for its ability to enhance status, for it was openly
K Sir G. Archer, Governor General "Benefits of the Sennar Dam and the Gezira Irrigation Scheme",
:Vrican World, Special Sudan number, January 1926, p. 3.
'1'NRO BNP 1/401301. Bolton, DC South Gezira to Young, Governor BNP, 30 December 19~5.
10 Culwick, "1\ Study of the Human Factor", p. 49.
II NRO BNP 1/40/301. Bolton, DC South Gezira to Young, Governor BNP, 30 December 19,)
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recognised that being a tenant was "infinitely better than being a resident labourer. .,12
This desirability of tenancies worked to maintain the exclusive status of tenants.
This gap between tenant and labourer was accentuated by economic conditions in the
late Condominium period, but was also deliberately supported by tenants. With the
personal accumulation of wealth and status acting as primary motivations, tenants
sought to separate themselves from labourers and other manual workers, and to attain as
much individual wealth as possible. To this end, tenants demonstrated considerable lack
of interest in the government's vision of the "national good", consistently rejecting
requests to curb tenant spending in order to prevent dangerously high rates of inflation. 13
Tenants with seemingly ever increasing levels of profits saw little reason not to spend
their own money on status-enhancing personal consumption, and such an individual
outlook was further reflected in the unwillingness to spend any money arising from the
Scheme on general social services within the Gezira.!" Overall, tenants held no wider
sympathy for 'workers', and strikes such as the general strike of March 1952, were
regarded with "a blend of apathy and disapproval" by tenants. IS
Labour relations were a central element in the articulation of this economic and social
dominance, particularly as the control of labour was one of the few areas of economic
life in which tenants were independent from government and management controls.
Despite the high degree of control by the Syndicate over the agricultural standards on a
tenancy, neither the Syndicate nor the government made any attempt to regulate how
that work was done. With the Scheme originally established around the idea of family
labour, the Syndicate had no relationship with non-tenant labourers. However, as family
labour soon demonstrated itself to be insufficient and as tenants demonstrated their
preference for hiring others to perform manual labour, networks of labour organisation
were developed by tenants. So effective were these unofficial forms of recruitment. that
although plans were made to create a labour office in the Gezira, it was concluded that
12 BNP 1/40/301, Hillard, DC North Gezira to Young, Governor BNP, 15 December Jlns.
U NRO BNP 1/431316, sixth meeting TRB. 20 July 1948.
1-1 NRO Newspaper Archive, el Amin Mohammed el Amin, £1 Nil, ~ 1 October 1953.
15 NRO 2Civsec 30/113. BNP Monthly Diaries, March 1952.
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as "the tenants themselves had a widespread organisation for getting labour in, that to try
to superimpose a government organisation would only lead to confusion.t"
The vast majority of labour was hired temporarily on a wage basis from a variety of
labour pools. Permanent settled communities of non-tenant indigenous villagers and
West Africans provided year round labour, which was supplemented in the peak cotton-
picking season by migrant Westerners and family parties from neighbouring White Nile
and Blue Nile regions. I? In attracting the latter, communities established relationships
with village outside of the Scheme to ensure inward seasonal migration. Many villages
had someone who acted as a labour 'expert', who cultivated contacts with villages
outside of the scheme and arranged for the transport of these labourers.l ' For example,
it was reported that "certain village sheikhs in Messellemia group are paying up to £E.5
in advance to agents at Managil who hope to produce picking labour in abundance in
January.t'" In addition to wages, these relationships with Sudanese villages were
predicated upon a series of economic inducements and ties. Tenants might offer
attractive advances, pay for transport costs, provide housing and bonuses and in addition
bind pickers to themselves through additional loans and the resulting debt. 2o
Ethnic Marginalisation
The direct relationship between tenants and labourers allowed tenants to place
themselves in the superior position of managers and to identify and to marginalise others
as workers and labourers. This distinction between tenants and labourers was a
powerful element of tenant identity; however notions of cultural and ethnic dominance,
based on an Arab identity were also central to power relationships within the Gezira
Scheme. Because of the dominant position of tenants within the Gezira, and because of
16 NRO BNP 1/381293, Acland, Gezira Commissioner. Handing (her Notes, May 19'+0.
17 Culwick, "Study of the Human Factor", p. }O.+.
III O'Brien, 'The Formation of the Agricultural Labour Force in Sudan", p. 21.
1l ) NRO lCivscc 57/4/18, BNP Monthly Diaries 1937, November.
~tl Culwick, "Study of the Human Factor", p. 167-172.
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their heavy reliance upon West African labour, the articulation of this Arab dominance
was frequently played out within the agricultural sphere, but reflected a wider nationalist
movement.r' The combination of economic and ethnic tensions symbolised by Western
labourers in the Gezira created a situation by which they were actively marginalised on
the grounds of both class and ethnicity. As Bruce Berman states; "ethnicity has been the
fundamental context and idiom of class formation and struggle in Africa.v" Tenants not
only saw Westerners as labourers - a position that tenants themselves had rejected as
beneath them - there were strong overtones of seeing Westerners as racially and
culturally inferior.
The importance of Arab descent in central northern Sudan has been succinctly outlined
by Neil McHugh in his account of the development of genealogical mythologies in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.v' McHugh states that the term Arab is "expressive
of a single language, a single charter myth or historical ideology"." In this context, the
term 'Arab' was a powerful identity; at once unifying and excluding sections of society.
With Arab descent prior to the nineteenth century equated with Islamic identity;
claiming descent from an Arabian ancestor gave an individual full citizenship rights."
The alienated 'other', defined by their non-Arab identity became economically
vulnerable, historically forming the vast majority of agricultural and domestic slaves."
'Arabness', closely linked with economic dominance, was thus a pre-existing social
identity within the Gezira region that was easily reactivated in response to a new influx
of Western migration. Inherently distrusted and alienated, even as they became key
figures in the Scheme's economy, Hassoun writes of the prevailing "haughty and
contemptuous attitude towards all negroid peoples, chiefly stigmatized by lack of
command of Arabic, and by black colour" within the Gezira." Seen as having the
~I Abd al-Rahim Tayyib, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan.
~2 Bruce Berman, "Ethnicity. Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism",
African Affairs. 97, 388, (1998) 305-3'+I. at p. 331.
~. McHugh, Holvmen. pp. 9-10.
'-1 bid ')
- I 1 ., p. ~.
''i bid ..,
- I 1 .• p. ~.
2/1 Sikainga. Slaves into Workers. pp. xii-xiii. .. .. '
27 Isam Ahmed Hassoun. '''West~m' Migration and Settlement III the Gczira .Sudan .\o(n and Records.
37, (1952) pp. 60-112, at p. 72,
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characteristics of slave or ex-slave populations, West Africans were treated as culturallv.
economically and socially inferior. This was an attitude summed up in the Gezira
proverb "the British had taken away the slaves, but God had provided the Fellata", 2~
The terminology used by tenants in referring to labourers is important in understanding
attitudes to labour. Albeit, all labourers were viewed as being socially inferior to tenants
and other non-labourers, non-Arab labourers were yet further down the social ladder.
Labourers were described as either "Arabs", meaning they were from the Blue and
White Nile Provinces, and part of the same 'ethnic' identity as tenants themselves, or
they were "Fellata'', encompassing all migrants from west of Kordofan province
including Nigeria, French Equatoria and Darfur. The fact that the term Fellata began life
as a generic descriptive term, but had became a term of abuse by the late Condominium
period is indicative of increasing tenant antagonism towards Western labourers, seen as
a threat to tenant status. In post Condominium Sudan, many of those (particularly from
northern Nigeria) known by the pejorative term 'Fellata', began to use the neutral term
'Takari' as a form of self-description for groups facing similar economic and social
prejudice.i" Unwilling to ascribe such a degree of identity formation to the
Condominium, my use of the term 'Westerner' attempts to avoid the derogatory
connotations associated with the term Fellata, while maintaining its generic overtones
that symbolised tenant attitude to non-Arab labour.
Labour Communities
There has been a long history of West African migration into and through Sudan. and
the "Western Invasion" of the twentieth century arose out of earlier migration and
pilgrimage patterns. J.S Birks describes pilgrimage routes operating across northern
Africa before 1600, while Duffield suggests that West African settlement'> existed within
~x Daly. Imperial Sudan. p. 191.
29 Duffield. Muiurno, p. 46.
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Sudan's present day boundaries from the end of the seventeenth century." However.
what had been "sporadic movements" up until the end of the nineteenth century. became
large scale migration in the twentieth." With colonialism in many West African states
leading to political, social and economic upheaval, emigration rates increased.
Following the pilgrimage route to Mecca that traversed Sudan, many Westerners took
advantage of Sudan's social stability and economic opportunities on a permanent or
semi-permanent basis.32 Government attitudes towards this Western population were
ambivalent. The Westerner symbolised both "a constant source of trouble". and a
"solution to the problem of increasing the population of the Gezira which the proposed
development of this tract of country by irrigation works necessitates.t"
It was the necessity of gauung labour, firstly for the construction of the canal
infrastructure, and then for cotton cultivation that swung the balance in the Westerners'
favour. With sparsely populated areas of the Gezira struggling to find tenants for all
tenancies, there were large areas that had little non-tenant population to work as
labourers at the peak weeding and picking seasons. Thus the blocks of Galil and
Sadalla; where "most of the inhabitants are tenants and there is next to no local labour"
struggled greatly during the 1937 picking season." In addition to these peak periods.
the desire of tenants to hire labour rather than do the manual work of a tenancy meant
that labour was constantly needed. The government deplored this situation. describing
Nueila Block as "a notorious sink of iniquity [in which] tenants unable to hire. are with
difficulty persuaded to harvest their crops.?" However, despite not liking tenants'
reliance on hired labour, British officials involved in the scheme soon accepted the
situation, and external sources of labour were indirectly encouraged. Thus as early as
1926, Willis was able to override his concerns about wandering Westerners in hi"
,0 J S B' k A 'ross the Savannas to Mecca: The Overland Pilgrimage Route from H'est\(rica (London.
.. Ir S, (
1978) p. 9. Mark Duffield, Maiurno. p. 16, Sec also H~sso~n. '''\\'cstem.' \lIgrat~on". p... ~8. ..
~I C. Bawa Yarnba, Permanent Pilgrims: The Role of Pilgrimage III the lives (If \~e.\( Ajrican Muslims III
Sudan (London. 1995) p. 4.
_,2 Hassoun, "'Western' Migration", pp. 61-67. . . . .
:n NRO BNP 1131/224. C.A. Willis, Assistant Director of Intelligence tt) R ~ ,. :'elldcll. CIVIl ~l·\.'rl·tJ.r~. ~()
March 1919. and E. Hussey. Inspcctor Scnnar, "Report on the Fellata Question, January I\) I,
~4 NRO 1Civsec 57/4/18 BNP Monthly Diaries. February 1937.
l~ NRO ICivscc 57/17/63 BNP Monthly Diaries. November 194~
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recognition of the need for labour on the cotton fields of the Gezira, Kassala and Tokar
when he stated "it would be injudicious as well as impracticable to interfere with the free
flow of labour to and from these centres.t'"
With the government reliant upon the scheme for national revenue, efficiency within the
scheme was essential. Acknowledging the need for large numbers of labourers,
Westerners were directly encouraged, with a policy that settled westerners in labour
villages in areas in which local labour was short:
They are usually given an area of irrigated dhurra [sic] for themselves
outside the ordinary rotation. A few of the inhabitants may have
tenancies, and not only do the permanent inhabitants form a labour
reserve, but the villages act as a point of attraction for other westerners
when there is a particular demand for labour.r"
As early as the 1933-4 season there were eight thousand Westerners living permanently
in specifically Western settlements across the Scheme, plus others living within Arab
villages, for whom there are no statistics.Y These figures rose significantly during peak
picking and weeding seasons. In 1940 there were an estimated 62,000 migrant Western
labourers within the scheme, out of a total Scheme population of 380,000.39
However, Arab labour from the White Nile and from the eastern bank of the Blue Nile
remained the dominant source of seasonal labour.4o The great advantage of this labour
supply was that it was settled in its own villages with its own agricultural economy,
whose slack season coincided with the busiest period of the agricultural year in the
Gezira - the picking of the cotton between December and April. Arab labourers carne
into the scheme with their families and left immediately after picking, and were seen as
quiet and orderly. However, the Arab labourer also had certain disadvantages. Being
dependent on wage labour only at periods when rain crops failed, Arab labour was
3£> SAD 21213. C.A. Willis. Director of Intelligence. "Report on Pilgrimage and Slaver) ". \926. p. I J.
,~7 NRO BNP 1/38/293. Acland, Gczira Commissioner. "Handing Over Notes", \1.;~\ \9..+1: .
38 NRO BNP 1/43/318. Clarke. Governor BNP to N. Macleod. Senior Medical Ollll'cr. \\ ad Medani. 19
May 1933. ,"
YJ NRO BNP 1/38/293. Acland, Gczira Commissioner. "Handing Over Notes . \ by 1940.
-II} The highest recorded percentage of \\'L'"lern labour was 4l)lfi in 19..+0, :--':RO B:--':P II'SI2 ll" Acland.
Gczira Commissioner. "Handing (her Notes". i\ lay 1940.
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notoriously unreliable. There were frequent labour shortages in years of good rains,
such as in 1937, when "south of Rufa' a the crops were excellent and people are picking
only for luxuries"." A further disadvantage of Arab labour was their tendency to travel
with their animals, for which the tenants had to provide fodder, and suffered the risk of
crop damage. However, it was in the comparison with the labouring abilities of the
Westerner that Arab labourer really suffered, and a marked change in favour of Western
labour occurred in the early years of the scheme:
When the westerner first came here, three years ago, he was decidedly
unpopular with the Arab cultivator, owing to his tendencies to
drunkenness and brawls. Whether he has improved in his habits
recently, I do not know, and in fact I rather doubt it, but there is no
question that the cultivator now prefers Western labour. One tenant
mentioned that he would sooner have one Borgu than five Arabs. The
reason for this preference is that the westerner, as a rule, works harder.
Few Arabs work after 1Dam, while the westerner will work up until 2pm
or 3pm.42
Such stereotypes were based on significant differences between labouring communities,
based partly on the differing economic motivations of the labouring communities. The
monetary wage-paying economy of the Gezira Scheme created the right incentives for
the migrant Westerner. Without land, money was a Westerner's primary form of capital,
and he was dependent upon gaining a wage to finance all his living costs. Viewing
manual labour as a temporary engagement Westerners worked hard because, in a
predominantly piece-work economy, that was the best means of gaining the capital
needed to invest in non-labouring occupations. In a community in which "no stigma
was attached to hard agricultural labour and a high value was placed on maintaining
local autonomy", Westerners worked intensively to maximise wage income..n In
contrast, seasonal Arab labourers only supplemented their income through wage labour,
and were not entirely reliant upon gaining wages. With the same cultural attitudes
4\ NRO ICivscc 57/-+/18, BNP Monthly Diaries. February 19~7.
4~ NRO 2BNP -+2/1/1, BNP Annual Report 1929.
4~ O'Brien, "The Political Economy of Serni-Proletarianisation" p. 138.
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towards manual labour as tenants, Arab families came as cotton pickers in order to
supplement their subsistence agricultural economies. As 0' Brien has argued, they "did
not seek to maximise income from their available time and energy for work, but adjusted
the duration and intensity of the working day to the conflicting requirements of their
standards of dignity and desirable levels of consumption.v'" In a simplified statement,
Crawford summed up the prevailing attitude when he stated; "the Westerner works
because he wants money, the Arab works only when he is hungry".45
Not only did the Westerner work longer hours, but he was considered more efficient per
hour, and better suited to some demanding tasks than Arabs.46 In particular the West
African hoe, the kadanka was more effective than the indigenous tool, the malod" Not
only more able, the Westerner showed greater labour flexibility and was available at
weeding season, when Arabs were working on their own lands. Western settlers were
therefore encouraged by many villages as a means of securing permanent access to
labour, offering sufficient year-round labour, and acting as a point of attraction for other
Western migrants. The pattern of recruiting and settling Western labour was as O'Brien
has stated generally "haphazard", and tended to grow from informal personal
relationships." Such was the case of the unnamed Western settlement studied by
Culwick and her assistant Ali Suliman which had been founded in 1937 by three
brothers who had been travelling to Mecca with their father. When their father died
while crossing Sudan, the brothers arrived in the Gezira as migrant labourers. After a
year spent working in a village where relatives were based, two of the brothers found
work in the current village. They decided to stay, and formed stable work relations with
the tenants of the village. They created a new settlement alongside the village, with the
eldest brother as sheikh, which then grew as other migrants from the brothers' home
district were directed to this new settlement."
44 Ibid., See also CuIwick, "Study of the Human Factor", p. 168.
45 Crawford, quoted in Hassoun, '''Western' Migration", p. 87.
46 Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor", pp. 173-4.
47 Hassoun, "<Westem' Migration", p. 87.
48 O'Brien, "The Political Economy of Serni-Proletarianisation", p. 128.
49 Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor", appendix III. "A Nigerian Village in the Gezira" Nur.Eff. Ali
Suliman, p.2.
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With Western settlements built upon tribal, geographical and kinship ties. they were
close, homogenous communities with "clear hierarchical structures, based around the
sheikh".50 One of the central roles of the Western sheikh was in acting as labour broker
in the economic liaisons between Arab tenants and Western labourers. Suliman
described the scene in the village at sunset as tenants arrived to make the following days
labour arrangements; "The Rausa, I noticed, never gave their final word without
consulting the Sheikh.,,51 In contrast with the individual actions of each tenant
brokering his own daily labour, the centralised action of the Western community gave
them considerable economic strength. In addition to this economic role, the sheikh acted
as a religious figurehead. In Yamba's thesis of permanent pilgrimage, a strong case is
made for a unique pilgrim identity among many Westerners within the Gezira.s2 Despite
the fact that many never reached the destination of Mecca, but instead settled
permanently within the Gezira, there remained the self perception of being upon a
religious journey. It was important therefore that the journey reflected the religiosity of
the pilgrim, frequently measured in terms of the religious authority of the sheikh of the
settlement to which the pilgrim/migrant attached himself. Unsurprisingly this religious
authority was closely linked to a sheikh's economic abilities. The more able to gain
favourable economic terms in wages or sharecropping opportunities, the more grace or
'baraka' the sheikh was perceived to have, the more followers he was able to attract to
his village and the more powerful a position he was able to command.i"
With distinct cultures and languages, there were significant barriers to full integration of
Westerners within the Gezira, which their association with manual labour only further
entrenched. Thus although Western settlements were organised around existing Gezira
villages, they remained quite separate communities. Culwick's description of Western
communities as 'shadows' of Arab villages relays some of their distinctiveness and the
marginal status in which they existed: "Villages A and B had well defined Fellata
su Yamba, Permanent Pilgrims. pp. 71, 73.
~l Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor", appendix III. "A Nigerian Village in the Gezira" Nur.Eff, Ali
Suliman, p. 5.
~2 Yarnba, Permanent Pilgrims.
~~ Ibid., p. 73.
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appendages, C had only two or three Fellata families clinging to its outskirts.r" The
settlement of Suliman's investigations was typical in being "not more than 100 yards
away and economically closely related to it, [the Arab village] but socially living in a
world or its own.,,55 Tukls were still constructed from grass, unlike the brick favoured in
Arab villages, and generally Western settlements lacked the services expected in Arab
villages such as wells, and instead depended on canals for their water.i"
The Power of the Westerner
Despite their social alienation, the constant need and desire for labour within the Scheme
generated a degree of power for Western communities. In effect, a Western community
attached to a Gezira village had a monopoly over local labour. The knowledge of this
monopoly was aptly portrayed by Suliman, who described the labourers in the Western
settlement as "movling] proudly with their hoes dangling from their shoulders, realising
the urgent need for them."s7 As early as 1929, the province annual report complained
that "one of their [Westerners] defects is that in areas of shortage of labour they are apt
to make labour rings and go on strike."s8 The power of collective Western labour grew
and their ability to set high rates of pay became increasingly resented by tenants.
However, such monopolies were hard to break. The tenants within Suliman's village
had indeed attempted to attract other casual labourers at a lower rate of pay, but had
failed to undermine the collective position of the settled Western villagers. In defence of
their monopoly the Western villagers sabotaged the work done by the new labourers,
and at the same time, when talking to the latter, exaggerated their own pay, so that the
casual labourers felt cheated and disappeared, leaving the tenants "once more at the
q GBA 400-21. Culwick, "Interim Report on Social Research in the Gezira". 10 July 1953. emphasis
added.
'i'i Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor", p. 31.
'i6 Ihid., appendix III. "A Nigerian Village in the Gezira" Nur.Eff. Ali Suliman, p. 2.
'i7 Ibid., p. I.
'iK NRO 2BNP "+2/1/1, BNP Annual Report 1929.
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mercy of the Hausa".59 Of course, such hard bargaining could only occur in times of
labour shortage, however, the evidence points to an almost permanent labour crisis. In
his handing-over notes, Acland wrote; "since I have been in Medani, except for the 1940
season, some anxiety has been shown by the companies at the beginning of the season
that labour might be short, and was late coming in.,,60
As labourers, Westerners were distrusted, alienated and resented by tenants:
Politically resentful of its presence, economically still more resentful of
the tenancies it [the Westerner] has acquired, they yet suffer great
agitation at any suggestion that they might have to do without its [the
Western community] services.61
In particular, the practice of tulba - whereby Syndicate inspectors dissatisfied by the
work done on a tenancy might directly recruit labour (most commonly Westerners) to
complete the job - at top-level wages which were then charged to the tenant - was
greatly begrudged.V In addition, Arab non-tenants resented the willingness of
Westerners to work for lower wages, which brought down all labour costs.I" However,
it was when Westerners became a significant percentage of tenants that resentment
really grew.
During the depression era of the early 1930s, when tenants resigned, it was only by
offering vacant tenancies to Westerners that the Syndicate was able to keep the Scheme
operating at full capacity. Westerners were highly popular as tenants among Syndicate
staff during the depression and by July 1931, in just the one block of Kab el Jidad, there
were 136 Western tenants, representing a trend of 'Westernisation' across the Scheme. 64
Westerners were more willing to work on their own tenancies, and to the high standards
that the Syndicate set, and so were frequently put forward as preferential tenants,
W Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor", appendix III, "A Nigerian Village in the Gezira" Nur.Elf.
Ali Sulirnan, p. 5.
IlO NRO BNP 1/38/293, Acland, Gezira Commissioner, "Handing Over Notes", May 1940.
61 Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor", p.ll.
6~ O'Brien, "The Political Economy of Serni-Proletarianisation", p. 130.
Il~ Hassoun, "<Westem' Migration", p. 88.
M NRO BNP I/·Bn 18, Crawford, Commissioner of the Gezira area to Clarke. Governor BNP 6 February
193~.
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replacing Arab tenants evicted for poor work. 65 Whether posted as primary or
preferential tenants, by 1937, over four thousand, or 19% of tenants were registered
under the title of 'Western' .66 Popular with the Syndicate, the encroachment of the
Western tenant was resented by Gezira inhabitants, who saw the Scheme as rightfully
theirs. In discussing a northern extension of the scheme, Longe wrote:
After the first year of cultivation many local people were ejected as
failures and westerners were brought in to take their place, and there for
the most part they remain to the natural chagrin of the natives, who feel
that though they have failed once they deserve another chancc"
Local objections were rife, but the government fully supported this use of Westerners
and stated that they were willing to use their effective control over tenant controlled
local government institutions to see "that no objections or hindrances are put in the way
by the local native authorities.,,68
As tenants, Westerners also had certain advantages including preferential calls on fellow
Western labour, which worked actively against the interests of other Gezira tenants.
Western settlements built on ties of kinship or tribal affiliation created bonds of
obligation that Western tenants were able to benefit from. In most Western settlements
the sheikh was a tenant, but numbers of up to eight tenants in a Western village were
common.I" The existence of Western tenants in these numbers created labour problems
for Arab tenants. During the labour crisis of 1937, the government reported "there is
one large Fellata settlement of about 200 persons in Galil Block but as the Fellata have
nine tenancies of their own they naturally pick their own cotton first.,,7o The lack of
stigma attached to labour was a further advantage for Westerners, allowing them to
significantly cut down the labour costs upon their own tenancy. As opposed to most
Gezira tenants, who, when their landlord aspirations were not being met felt 'pushed'
from their tenancies, the Western labourer saw the tenancy as an opportunity. The same
65 SAD 641/5, Longe, ADC Hassaheissa, "Handing Over Notes, North Gezira" 1934.
f>f> NRO ICivsec 57/24/93, BNP Annual Report 1937.
«t SAD 641/5 Longe, ADC Hassaheissa, "Handing Over Notes. North Gezira' 1934.
f>1I NRO BNP 1/43/318, Crawford, Commissioner of the Gezira area to Clarke, Governor BNP, 6 February
1932.
f>9 Hassoun, "<Western' Migration", p. 97.
70 NRO 1Civsec 57/4/18, BNP Monthl y Diaries February 1937.
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attitude allowed Westerners to abandon their tenancies when more profitable labouring
opportunities occurred. In 1937 a number of 'desertions' were reported, in which
Western tenants were attracted away by reports of big money in Eritrea."
This business sense allowed Westerners as both tenants and labourers to make
considerable profits.72 At periods in the depression, when tenants were making a loss,
labourers were still profiting from their daily wages. As tenants too, Westerners had
significant financial advantage through means of the cultural acceptability of personal
labour. As G. Brausch has stated, "Often the material standing of the Fellata tenant is
higher than that of the Arab tenants, who persists in thinking of himself as a landowner
who must maintain a certain sophisticated standard of life.,,73 This ability to retain
higher profits then allowed a number of Westerners to invest in other business
occupations; in particular, the transport business, and the financing of canteens." Other
examples of Westerners in the Gezira turning away from the traditional role of labourer
into positions of greater authority can be found in their increasing employment as
Syndicate ghaffirs, farm managers or temporary tenants.P Westerners also attempted to
gain significant administrative and 'political' power within the region, with "large
numbers of western candidates" standing for council elections."
The image of Westerners as victims of colonial capitalist methods of production thus
needs to be reassessed. During much of the Condominium, Western communities while
marginalised and stigmatised by the dominant tenant-Arab community, were also able to
use their cultural and economic position to significant profitable effect. With a strong
collective identity and organised in hierarchical settlements under a dominant sheikh,
Westerners were able to organise, compete for and often monopolise the labour market.
As tenants they were able to gain preferential usage of this labour supply, and profits
71 NRO ICivsec 57/4/18, BNP Monthly Diaries May 1937.
7~ Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor", appendix III, "A Nigerian Village in the Gezira" Nur.Eff. Ali
Suliman.
D Brausch, "Change and Continuity", p. 353.
74 Hassoun, '''Western' Migration", p. 103.
7.~ Yarnba. Permanent Pilgrims, p. 73 and SAD 641/5, Longe, ADC Hassaheissa, "Handing Over Notes.
North Gczira" 19J4.
76 NRO 2Civsec 30/8/19. BNP Monthly Diaries June 1950.
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were ploughed into new economic ventures outside the Scheme. However, these
extensions of interest were as much indicative of burgeoning divisions within Western
communities, as they were representative of new forms of power. Although some
Westerners - in particular those that had founded villages and received tenancies in the
early 1930s - did achieve significant benefits from their participation in the Gezira
Scheme, there were many others who did not. Later arrivals found opportunities more
limited, and were mostly co-opted into schemes that benefited the small emerging
Western elite. This may be seen as the beginning of the economic gulf within the
Western community that Duffield describes in the post-colonial setting, which gave the
long-established Westerner a "politico-economic advantage" over the newcomer."
The Anti-Western Movement
However, tenants were not inclined to make such distinctions. Feeling themselves at the
mercy of organised pools of Western labour, resenting the loss of tenancies and fearing
an increase in Western influence at the level of local government, tenant antipathy
towards Westerners gradually coalesced into an articulate movement against Westerners
within the Gezira. As ideas of Sudanese nationalism and tenant interests became
increasingly sophisticated, Western communities found themselves under attack on both
economic and ethnic grounds. In part these attacks were physical, and the frustrations
felt by both Arab and Western communities at times erupted into violence." However.
the greater danger to the position of Westerners came from pressure from Arab
dominated institutions. As early as 1942, Congress submitted a memo to the
government, requesting among other matters, a law defining Sudanese nationality, by
which Western migrants and their descendents might be distinguished from the rest of
the Sudanese population and thus denied citizenship.i'' Taking more direct action
against Westerners, the Rural District Council of South Gezira district in 19.+5
77 Duffield, "Change among West African Settlers", pp. 50-51.
n See for example NRO 2Civsec 30/7/18, BNP Monthly Diaries September \9-lX.
7') Daly, Imperial Sudan, pp. 157-8.
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"unanimously passed a resolution recommending that all Westerners who have more
than three previous convictions for crimes of theft and violence should be repatriated.t''"
Soon more extreme VOIces were heard, advocating total Sudanese self-reliance and
describing foreign labour as an evil to be avoided. In 1946, the Special Committee for
the Future of the Gezira Scheme put forward its vision of an Arab-controlled Scheme,
concluding that; "Provided a reasonable attempt is made to tap and organise Sudanese
labour, no foreign labour will be needed for picking in the Gezira irrigated area ".81
Instead, Western labour was called to be replaced by Sudanese workers, thus keeping the
financial benefits of the scheme among Sudanese nationals. Reasons for the anti-
Western sentiment as provided by the committee's report included Westerners non-
assimilation, the disease allegedly brought by foreign labour and their being a menace to
public security.V The report also blamed foreign labour for driving down the living
standards of Arabs and for discouraging Sudanese women from working in the fields
due to the inappropriateness of women working alongside strangers. Although
renowned as hard workers, Westerners were also frequently regarded "as being stupid,
pugnacious and ridden with disease.,,83
Hassoun suggests that such anti-Western sentiments were widely held within the Gezira
and that "almost the entire bulk of the Gezira natives ... thought they could but benefit
greatly and prosper if the Westerners were to be rooted out from the Scheme.,,84 Claims
made against Westerners included those of Mirghani Eff. Dafalla, a clerk in a block
office, who in 1947 described Westerners as "impos[ing] their rates on the tenants and
rob[bing] them willingly of their money ... they are sly and liable of doing unlawful
things."85 Based upon eternal fears of 'the stranger', Anti-Western sentiment was felt
broadly throughout the Arab population in central Sudan and in 1948, the government
bowed to nationalist pressure and passed the Sudanese nationality law. With the law
XO NRO lCivsec 57/22/84, BNP Monthly Diaries March 1945.
Xl SAD 517110, "Report of the Special Committee of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan.
appointed in 1944 to report on the future of the Gezira after 1950". italics in original.
x_ Ibid.
x.~ Duffield. Maiurno, p. 2.
X.J Hassoun, '''Western' Migration", p. 82.
1I5 Sudan Gezira Board Archive (SGB) 700-2. El Shabab, Issue 16. 10 August 1947.
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defining as Sudanese only those who were born (or were descendents of those born) in
Sudan prior to the establishment of the Condominium, all first generation migrants, and
the majority of those descended from migrants were effectively denied citizenship.
In the Gezira, this wider anti-immigrant stance was consistently judged in terms of the
economic role of Westerners within the Scheme. Holding valuable tenancies and
forming labour monopolies, Westerners were seen as a threat to the aspirations of the
indigenous Gezira population. Despite having previously encouraged the use of
Westerners, the government and the Syndicate used the occasion of the passing of the
nationality law to ease growing tensions between Arabs and Westerners in the Scheme.
By imposing restrictions on the ownership of tenancies by newly defined non-Sudanese
nationals the government reaffirmed the dominant position of Arab tenants in the Gezira
Scheme. As Gaitskell wrote:
Now that locals are urgently asking for hoshas again, we have
decided that a westerner cannot pass down his tenancy to a son or
relative, but that when he dies, or is evicted due to inefficiency, he
will be replaced by a loca1.86
The ethnic dominance of Arab tenant-citizens was in this way enforced. Concerned
primarily with their own status, Arab tenants were able to protect their own economic
interests by engaging with a wider national antipathy to foreigners. Richard Rathbone
describes a similar development of an ethnically defined citizenship in Akyem
Abuakwa, Ghana, where in response to the perceived economic threat of 'foreign' cocoa
farmers, the basis of citizenship changed from control over land, to definitions of
ethnicity. 87 With control over Gezira tenancies effectively defined by ethnicity, the
association of tenancies with an Arab ethnic identity was complete.
However, ethnic dominance was only one element of tenant identity, which focused
primarily upon the difference between labouring and tenant populations - of which the
Westerner was only the most visible element. As tenancies became increasingly
Kf> SGB 700-2. £1 Rai el Aam, 2 July 1948. See also, Hassoun, "<Westem' Migration", p. 100.
K? Richard Rathbone, "Defining Akyemfo: the Construction of Citizenship in Akyern Abuakwa. Ghana.
1700-1900", Africa. 66, (1996), pp. 506-525.
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profitable throughout the I 940s, they also became more desirable. Tenants were able to
fulfil Gezira-wide aspirations of wealth accumulation and retirement from manual
labour, and in doing so distanced themselves from the majority of non-tenants who
struggled in an economic climate of rising inflation. In the search for rising status.
tenants needed to define themselves in relation to a population that was of comparably
lower status. Labourers and Westerners provided the perfect foil to tenant elitism, fitting
into an existing economic and ethnic model of Arab landowning dominance.
With tenant identity revolving around their ethnic and economic distinctiveness, tenants
claimed a privileged status for all tenants and reinforced northern Sudanese conceptions
of an ideal socio-economic system based on "elite and non-elite, of upper and lower
classes".88 By linking the idea of tenant identity with citizenship, tenants distinguished
themselves from non-tenants, and implied their superiority. When Hassan Abdel Galil
wrote to "defend the Gezira citizen as law-abiding, moral and religious, and as working
hard for the benefit of the country as a whole," he was writing specifically about the
Gezira tenant. 89 When Babikr Izeirig spoke of the "duty of citizens", he was talking
specifically about the duties of tenants.t" With franchise requirements in operation,
many non-tenants lacked the rights of full citizenship, automatically gained by tenants.
In this way, predicated upon economic interests, and tenant identity, non-tenants were in
effect marginalised. This dominance was not purely articulated in terms of tenant status,
but it was ultimately firmly entwined. Tenancies became directly associated with a
superior status, and true citizenship, a status that was reinforced by the association of
franchise rights with tenancy status, and tenant control of regional institutions.
Illl Mcl.oughlin, "The Heritage of Slavery" p. 387.
Ill) NRO 2BNP 251317. £1 Getira Digest. 16 December. 1951. emphasis added.
l)() NRO Newspaper Archive, £1 Nil. 8 December. 1953. emphasis added.
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The Scheme had since its inception been viewed as a route to enhanced social and
economic status, but it was not until the late 1940s, that a pan-Gezira tenant identity was
actively articulated. It was during the last decade of the Condominium that tenants
became increasingly aware of their combined aspirations based around individual
accumulation. Despite the economic and social distinctions within the tenant body, a
common self-image of tenants as an elite rentier class meant that tenants united in order
to defend this common aspiration. Through organised social protest and institutional
bodies, tenants defended their 'right' to continued accumulation. This economic focus,
and the fact that tenants used means of engaging with the government that were not
unlike other labour movements, has led various commentators to draw links between
tenant and labour organisations. In particular, Tim Niblock took at face value the
contacts between tenants' organisations and workers' unions, as portraying "the unity of
struggle between peasants and workers".' However, tenants had a fundamentally
different self-identity from that of other Sudanese 'workers', and these parallels are not
helpful in understanding the distinctiveness of tenant motivations. Instead of opposing
the government, tenants put considerable effort into working alongside the government.
Direct engagement with government authority was embraced. as tenants aimed to
achieve a state of government by and for the tenant body, in which tenants-citizen"
I Niblock, Class and Power. p. l.2 ..L
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retained their social and economic elite status. But despite these common aspirations,
the differing ability of tenants to achieve those aspirations (enhanced by the relative
depression of 1952-3 that particularly hit smaller tenancies), divided tenant opinion as to
the best method of achieving tenant aspirations and ultimately weakened the institutional
base of tenant
Striking Interests
The Scheme remained economically and socially stable until the summer of 1946, when
a six week strike by tenants threatened the very existence of the Scheme, and marked a
turning point in tenant relations with the government and Syndicate. At the end of June
1946, tenants on local government councils reacted angrily to a rumour that the Tenants'
Reserve Fund was to be spent on regional social amenities.i The Reserve Fund had been
established in 1932, after the devastating failure of the cotton crop, and was made up of
a portion of each tenant's annual profit pooled as a communal investment to safeguard
against future years of low profits.' Upset by the idea of the communal use of individual
profits to provide community amenities for all - including those non-tenants who had
not contributed to the Reserve Fund - tenant consternation spread. The government
attempted to nullify tenant anger by informing councils that the money was actually
being taken from the Tenants' Welfare Fund, which was a different fund made up of
repaid tenant debts from the season of 1930-31, and given back by the government as an
endowment trust fund in 1940 specifically for social development in the Gezira.'
Appeased in this respect, attention then shifted to the control of the Reserve Fund.
Having previously played no active part in the management of the Scheme, tenants were
astonished to learn that the Reserve Fund actually contained 1.3 miIlion pounds.
2 GBA, 100-6, Robertson, Civil Secretary, "Note on the present Situation in the Gezira", 1 August 1946.
~ Gaitskell, Geiira, chapter 12.
.j Gaitskell, Gezira. pp. 169-170. and GB.·\. 100-6. Robertson. Civil Secretary "Note on the present
situation in the Gezira", 1 August 1946.
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Demands were immediately made for its distribution, on the basis that it was money that
belonged to the tenants, as part of their annual profits, and was not the government's or
the Syndicate's to retain. In the face of government prevarication, unrest grew, and by
mid-July, a strike - in which tenants refused to sow cotton - had spread across 7S7c of
the Scheme.' Grievances felt at the contrast between the amount of money within the
fund and the financial hardships that tenants had undergone during the 1930s, coalesced
into a tenant-wide movement that ended only when the government agreed to make
individual payments from the Reserve Fund.6
However, if the grievances were genuine and widely felt, organisation was needed to
turn them into a Gezira-wide, long-term strike. Seized upon by pro-Arab nationalist
political leaders, this organisation was provided by the Ashigga party, and the Ashigga
dominated Graduates Congress. Established in 1938 to give expression to educated
opinion, Congress was by the mid-1940s, split upon sectarian lines between the Umma
and Ashigga parties, with the latter using the Congress as a vehicle for propagating
opposition to the colonial government.' Using Congress as a political base, the Ashigga
party led an underground campaign of propaganda and intimidation to fuel and maintain
the strike and it was noted that during the strike, "nearly every merchant's shop in the
Gezira villages was an agency for Ashigga propaganda.t" By organising intimidation
gangs and pamphlet distributions, Congress involved themselves in tenant concerns and
attempted to gain a support base among the tenant population." The tenant leaders of the
strike were thus predominantly Ashigga supporters and the political-religious bias of the
Ashigga party meant that tenants from across the social and economic spectrum worked
together to defend the right of all tenants to retain control over their individual profits.
Established mediators played a central part in the organisation of the strike, thus Fahal
Ibrahim, Sheikh of Hag Abdullah Khut who was a member of the Ashigga party, was
accused of playing a double game in which he urged tenants to strike while seeming to
~ GBA, 100-6, Civil Secretary, "Note on the Present Situation in the Gezira", I August 1946.
h Ibid.
7 Daly, Imperial Sudan. pp. 163-168.
R NRO 2BNP 50/8131. A.P. Cullen. Governor BNP to A. Beaton. acting Civil Secretary. 21 December
1953.
<) Niblock. Class and Power, p. 12.~.
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support the government." Forces of mediation outside of the established administrative
channels were also actively used, with the holy man and rich tenant of the village of
Shadley in Hag Abdullah block visiting Khartoum in order to protest on the behalf of all
11 A hitenants. s igga supporters among the rank and file of tenants also proved to be
influential in maintaining the strike, including the "unpleasant tough looking young
types" who informed the Syndicate inspector Thewlis Johnson that "if they had said they
wouldn't work no-one was to!,,12
It is this role of the Ashigga party in helping to organise a tenant strike that has led
Anthony Cheeseboro to conclude that there existed "a growing sense of common interest
among the various sections of the northern Sudanese population", which led to "joint
political action between the tenants and the effendiyia".':' However such an opinion is a
simplistic analysis of a single event, and overlooks the great political and motivational
differences between the urban political and the tenant movements. Indeed, Congress
support of the strike, although largely responsible for its effectiveness, threatened to
create a rupture within the tenant body. It was only through effective intimidation
tactics that the strike was maintained so effectively, and officials estimated that up to 80
per cent of tenants wished to return to work. 14 In particular, the Halawin, renowned for
their "excitable temper", but also for their allegiance to the Ashigga's political
opposition - Sayyid Rahman el Mahdi and the Umma party - did not participate in the
ik 15stn e.
However, despite these signs of disunity, the strike clearly unsettled the government and
Syndicate, and caught them utterly unprepared. There were fears within the
government that "if once they gave way it was the end of the Gezira Scheme and as such
the end of the largest part of the revenue of the Sudan.,,16 To this end government
negotiations were reluctant, and in desiring a show of strength, the government aimed to
10 SAD, 751/8, Winifred Johnson, Diary entry, 12 July 1946.
11 SAD. 751/8, Johnson, Diary entry, 23 July 1946.
12 SAD. 751/8, Johnson, Diary entry, 2-1- July 19-1-6.
13 Cheeseboro, "Administration and Change". p. 48.
lot SAD. 751/8. Johnson, Diary entry. 28 July 1946.
15 GBA. 100-6. Robertson. Civil Secretary "Note on the present situation in the Gczira", I .\ugu .... t 1946.
16 SAD. 751/8, Johnson. Diary entry. 9 July 1946.
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give away as little as possible." Beneath this show however, the fears were very real.
Riots were expected, yet the police inspector of Wad Medani admitted that he did not
have the men or equipment to handle such a situation." It was these fears of social
disruption, together with the necessity of the Gezira Scheme to bring in national
revenue, and the consequent desperation to get the cotton crop sowed, that underscored
the government's decision to hastily establish the Gezira Special Committee - a
committee of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan - to investigate conditions
throughout the Scheme. By agreeing to the Committee's recommendations of
distributing £400,000 of the Reserve Fund to tenants before the end of the year, the
government hoped to be seen as following a moderate, pro-tenant and Sudanese-backed
solution."
Many tenants received the news of this agreement with relief, and cotton sowing quickly
began.i'' However, the real impact of the strike was to be long term. Stripped of its
political backing, the strike may be seen as a single-issue protest by tenants demanding
access to reserve fund holdings. At no point did tenants request anything other than the
immediate distribution of the fund, and once that goal was achieved, the strike ended.
Despite the eventual alienation of many non-Ashigga supporters, the financial
grievances motivating the strike appear to have been common to all tenants. What the
strike did was illustrate the universality of tenant ambitions to accumulate individual
wealth and achieve rentier status. In addition it demonstrated the power of united tenant
action in defending these aspirations, and the willingness of tenants to align themselves
temporarily with wider a political agenda in pursuit of their own interests. This was to
be a knowledge that was to fuel later manifestations of tenant attempts to control the
management of the Scheme.
17 GBA, 100-6 ''Tenants Strike" 19.+6.
18 SAD, 751/8, Johnson, Diary entry, 26 July 19.+6.
I'J GBA. 100-6. Robertson, Civil Secretary "Note on the present situation in the Gczira". I August 19.+6.
cll GBA, 100-6, J.W. Cummins. Financial department to Gaitskcll. 15 August 19.+6.
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Developing Institutions
A direct outcome of the strike was the creation of the Tenants' Representative Body
(TRB) in 1947, born from the government's belated understanding of the need for
greater communication with tenants. Although only holding an advisory position, the
TRB was in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the government after the strike, and as
Niblock has suggested, it "played, with some effectiveness, the role which had been
allotted to it: defending the tenants' immediate interests and constituted a channel of
communications between the board and the tenants.?" As Gary Bains has demonstrated
within the context of South Africa, advisory bodies, despite lacking electoral legitimacy,
and being limited in directing policy, were still embraced by indigenous organisations
for the opportunities they provided in allowing communities to further their aims. 22 The
government was forced to capitulate to several demands made by the body, and despite
the concerns of the government, the TRB successfully managed to gain access to the
reserve fund on subsequent occasions.t' However, despite this success in accessing the
reserve fund, the TRB remained an organisation essentially alien to most tenants, and
was closely controlled by government. Meetings were held in the Governor's office, the
deputy Governor acted as chairman, and there were just 40 members, (each representing
350-1300 tenants) with no intermediate bodies through which representatives might
communicate with the tenant body.i"
It has been suggested that the supervision by British block inspectors of the indirect
elections to the TRB created a "pliable leadership't.v' Certainly most representatives
were from the existing administrative elite, recreating a body that the government was
familiar and comfortable working with. Thus the omda, Yusef Abdulla Sha' , in addition
21 Niblock, Class and Power. p. 123.
22 Gary Bains "The Contradictions of Community Politics: the African petty bourgeoisie and the NI:\l.
Brighton Advisory Body, c.1937-1952", Journal ofAfrican History: 35. I. ~1994), pp. 79-97. ~t p. 97.
23 Despite the "great reservations".of Br~din as Governor of Blue NIle P~O\'Ince, £E.300,OOO tro~ the
Reserve Fund was paid to tenants In April 19..+8. NRO BNP 1/"+3/316, 5 rnccung TRB. 12 April 19..+8.
2~ NRO 2BNP 50/8/31. C.W. Beer. Chairman TRB. "Note on the second draft of the Sll~~l:sll:d
constitution of the Gczira Tenants' Association," 1..+ December 1951.
2) Niblock, Class and POH'er. p. 12..+.
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to his roles on village, block, and rural district councils, also became a tenant
representative." Most representatives were wealthy, and many had sideline commercial
undertakings; for example Sheikh Ahmed Babikir Izeirig, a leading member of the TRB
and later president of the Tenants' Association, in addition to managing his tenancy was
involved in commerce and owned a coffee-shop in Khartoum." With a 'safe' and non-
radical institution in existence, the government initially saw the TRB as a body through
which information might be presented to tenants, in the belief that once tenants
understood the reasons behind government actions, criticism would disappear.
Representatives were encouraged to debate issues of little overall importance such as the
dates on which the payment of profits and appreciations might be made. In contrast,
they were not consulted on what those payments might be, or upon other issues central
to tenant concerns such as the marketing of cotton or the core relationship between
tenants and management. 28
Despite these limitations, the TRB was an institution that formed an umbrella for
formerly disparate tenants, under which the existing aspirations of tenants were able to
coalesce. The development of a tenant institution forcibly demonstrated that each tenant
held the same relationship to the means of production, framing the interests of the
individual tenant as being the universal concerns of every tenant. From the very
beginning of its existence, economic concerns were the focus of representatives' work,
and the grievances over the Reserve Fund formed the central issue of early meetings.
The core disagreement was over the communal nature of the Reserve Fund. Tenants
were opposed to the idea that an individual's profit went directly into a communal fund,
and supported any tenant in need, regardless of the amount that tenant had himself put
into the fund. Tenants instead aimed at a system of individual accounting, but were
constantly refuted by a government that believed in the necessity of general tenant
security." While the government saw a single tenant body, tenants themselves saw a
26 NRO 2BNP 2513/7. El Getira Digest. ~ I March 1951.
27 Niblock, Class and Power, pp. 12~. ~ 13.
2H NRO BNP U·B/316. Second meeting of the TRB. IS July !Y.+7, and sixth meeting of the TRB. 20 July
1948.
2l)NROBNP 1/I'+/316,MeetingsoftheTRB.~May19'+7,15July 19'+7, 1.+ January 19.+8. The
government and Syndicate belief in the necessity of communal security had been prex iously outlined h)
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collection of individuals all with the aim of securing their aspiration of personal
accumulation.
Crucial for the institutional representation of a tenant identity was the decision by the
TRB to be politically neutral. Aware of their own interests, their independent strength,
and the divisive effects of national politics upon the tenant body, early attempts by
Ashigga members to push the Representative Body in the direction of national political
concerns failed.3o This decision paved the way for the development of a strong
economic interest group that could represent all tenants, and not be way-laid by political
machinations inimical to tenant economic interests. This is not to say that tenants did
not continue to have political affiliations, and did not use them to further their own
interests - particularly in the sphere of local government - but that it was the common
economic aspiration of all tenants that formed the basis of the TRB.
The development of institutional maturity was also an important outcome of the
representative body. Mimicking the developments in local government, the TRB
became increasingly confident about presenting tenant interests in an institutional
manner, becoming an essential channel of mediation. In the first years of the body,
representatives were willing to accept government leadership on all matters other than
that of the Reserve Fund. Even in 1949, the government suggestion that the tenants
appoint their own secretary received an unfavourable reaction, with members stating "all
the information required by them was in Government hands and the Government staff
could conduct TRB affairs more satisfactorily"." However, from this hesitant
conservatism grew a confident body, and from making tentative or unrealistic
suggestions, representatives became competent debaters, becoming active partners in the
Scheme. By the 1950s the TRB had consolidated the notion of specifically tenant
interests, and established the idea of tenant involvement within management. The
economic concerns of tenants - while still the primary focus - had become more
Gaitskell; SAD ..l1813/31-35, Gaitskell, "Distribution of Profits and Expenses in the Gezira Scheme". 20
November 1937.
.lO Niblock, Class and Power, p. 123.
.ll NRO BNP 1/..l3/316. Ninth meeting of the TRB. ..l May 14..l9.
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sophisticated, and tenants were requesting not only access to the Reserve Fund. but also
wider involvement in the aspects of management such as cotton grading and storing, that
directly impacted on individual tenant profits.32
In contrast to the rebuffed government attempts of 1949 to increase the autonomy of the
TRB, the move to create an independent Tenants' Association in 1952. was greeted with
enthusiasm by tenants and their representatives.t' In the context of the national move to
self-governance, it was imperative that the TRB was reorganised to be more independent
and in greater contact with all tenants." With its own financial structure and offices, the
creation of the Tenants' Association was part of the government's wider policy of
training Sudanese in the values of modern democracy. In addition it was a tactical move
linking the government with tenant interests before a more radical force did. Instead of
each block nominating one representative, the new Tenants' Association was based on a
more complex hierarchy intended to put each tenant into closer touch with the
Association. Each of the forty-four blocks had a block committee of up to forty
members. From each block committee, three members were nominated onto one of five
group committees, which in turn nominated six members to sit on the High Council of
the Tenants' Association. Hoping that most issues would have been thoroughly debated
within the lower committees and much business already completed, the High Council
was intended to be much more of a formal business committee than the previous TRB. 35
However, while the government wished to increase representation and accountability of
the tenants' institution in the aim of creating a fairer and more equitable society, tenants
used the institutional machinery available to them in the cause of inequality and the right
to accumulation for some.
Like the TRB, the creation of the Tenants' Association was led by the government and it
remained intimately connected with the existing agricultural units of Scheme
management. However, membership of the new Tenants' Association was voluntary.
_n NRO BNP 1/43/317, Nineteenth meeting of the TRB, 24 October 1951.
D NRO 2BNP 50/8/31, Beer. Chairman TRB. "Note on the second draft of the suggcstcJ constitution of
the Gezira Tenants . Association", 14 December 1951.
~4 Ibid.
" Ibid.
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Unlike the TRB which automatically represented all tenants, the Tenants' Association
was made up of those tenants who actively joined it. This was a move seen to be
necessary in a climate of choice - in which imposed institutions were open to attack -
but potentially dangerous, for it was recognised that such a body "may be more readily
challenged by tenants who disagree with decisions reached'v" Nonetheless tenant
enthusiasm for the Tenants' Association was immediately forthcoming, with only 14 out
of 823 samadias not putting forward a representative in 1952.37 Such popularity ensured
the validity of a tenant representative body, and established the Tenants' Association as
an institution accountable to a tenant body that was literate in electoral techniques.
However, despite such enthusiasm for a new body, the Tenants' Association was not a
radical departure from the TRB, with most members of the former body retaking their
seats within the Tenants' Association." The Association also demonstrated a
willingness to bow to the government's advice, despite its stated independence. In the
summer of 1952, the Association agreed to follow the government's advice to postpone
the balance of payments in order to try to control rising inflation. The pro-government
local newspaper El Gezira, gave full support to the Association and its defensive actions,
describing representatives as "wise" and willing to "shoulder its responsibilities" .39
However, this action went against the immediate financial interests of tenants, and the
degree to which the Tenants' Association was willing to back the decisions of the
government opened them up to criticism from more radical sections of the tenant body.
~(l NRO 2BNP 50/8131, Gaitskell to Luce, Governor BNP, 26 March 1952.
1,7 NRO 2BNP 50/813 1, Beer. Chairman TRB to Musaad, Tenant advisor. 5 April 1952.
1,K Niblock, Class and Power, p. 12"+.
w NRO 2BNP 251317. £1 Gezira Digest, 1 June 1952.
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The Development of Tenant Radicalism
As early as February 1952, there had been attempts by the labour movement to influence
the tenant body and make it part of the wider workers' movement. In an open letter
urging tenants to establish a powerful tenants' union through which tenants could secure
their 'rights', the Sudan Workers Trades Union Federation (SWTUF) attempted to open
tenants' eyes to the injustice and exploitation that they faced:
Cultivators and especially those who grow cotton are the most
important source of wealth of the British capitalists. For this reason,
the imperialists exerted much effort to separate them from the rest of
their comrades who used to struggle against imperialist exploitation.
At present the workers know only very little about the cultivators
daily life, but they are aware that they are living in hell. Cultivators
toil all the year round and yet find themselves heavily indebted and
burdened with fines. They deliver their crops but do not know the
price with which they were sold. It is true that Gezira tenants have
certain organisations such as village councils and block councils, but
the workers refused to join similar councils in the past as they had
been well aware of the dangers which these councils might bring to
their movement. The workers have struggled until they succeeded in
forming their own councils.l"
Having to make a choice between attempting to secure the support of either tenants or of
agricultural labourers, the SWTUF chose the tenants as the strongest potential allies,
with the most weight to bring about changes. Accepting the self-image of tenants as the
most important group within the region, the labour movement, like the government
before them, ignored the dispersed and unorganised agricultural labour working
throughout the Gezira Scheme. However, in focusing upon tenants, the labour
.to NRO 2BNP 50/8/31, "The Sudan Trade Union Federation appeals to the cultivators". extract from Sawt
el Sudan, 28 February 1952. For further information on the development of workers' movements
throughout Condominium Sudan, see Saad ed din Fawzi. The Labour Movement in the Sill/an. 11.)·j(1-/955
(Oxford, 1957), and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga City ofSteel and Fire - A Social History otAtbara. Sudan's
Railway TOII'll. /906-/984 (Oxford, 2002).
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movement failed to understand the real aspirations of tenants as being solely focused
upon individual accumulation, assuming tenant activism to be reflective of anti-
government sentiment.
Predictably there was little response to this invitation. Tenants with their employer self-
image, saw their status and their interests as quite distinct from (and above) those of
workers. However, the development of workers' movements and anti-colonial politics
did have an influence within the Gezira, and the anti-government rhetoric did gradually
permeate into the language of tenant groups wishing to oppose the Tenants' Association.
For although all tenants might have shared the same aspirations, they did not all share
the same ability to attain those aspirations, and the Tenants' Association became viewed
by some as a barrier for the universal economic progress of tenants. This in part
reflected a new economic reality within the Gezira, as the economic differences always
in existence throughout the Scheme were accentuated by the increasing numbers of half
tenancies given to tenants. With the Scheme once again profitable and popular, demand
once again exceeded supply and what has been termed a "crisis of tenant reproduction"
emerged as tenants were unable to pass tenancies to all heirs."! The Syndicate attempted
to solve this problem by making the half-tenancy a viable unit, and by 1952, forty per
cent of all tenancies were half tenancies.Y However, although giving more people the
status of tenant, the half-tenancy was not able to provide the same standard of living that
people had come to expect from a full tenancy. Culwick found that per feddan, more
people relied upon the profits of a half tenancy than upon a full tenancy, thus the profits
were spread more thinly.i:' Overall, those tenants with just a half tenancy were relatively
poorer than those with access to a standard tenancy or more."
With those holding half tenancies being less likely to have access to other sources of
income, a group of tenants emerged who found it difficult to achieve their aspirations.
and saw the entrenched interests of the Tenants' Association and the government as
-II O'Brien, "Social Reproduction", pp. 22~-·+'
-I~ GBA 400-21, G.M. CuIwick. "Interim Report on Social Research in the Gezira", July 1951.
-I~ Culwick, "A Study of the Human Factor". pp. 46-48.
-1-1 Ibid., pp. '+6-'+8.
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standing in their way. Yusef Mustafa and el Amin Mohammed el Amin were just such
half-tenancy holders at the centre of one discontented group of tenants. Introduced to
each other by Sheikh Mohammed Ahmed Abu Agla, who was politically active in the
nationalistic movement, Mustafa and el Amin established a "friendship and religious
brotherhood" within the Sammania tradition.f Attracting young educated tenants to
their membership, they would discuss "tenants' problems" after religious lessons."
When in June of 1953 the communist party approached this group, the mutual benefits
were obvious. With the money and organisational experience of the communist party
behind them EI Amin Mohammed El Amin and his followers soon rose to prominence,
and the communist party had a route to the elusive support of Gezira tenants."
In close contact with urban ideas and politics, the communist party appealed particularly
to those groups that were rnarginalised." Within the Gezira Scheme, it was those
tenants unable to attain the universal financial and lifestyle aspirations of tenants who
were attracted by the communist party rhetoric, establishing a movement that arose from
a communist party background but aimed to achieve particular tenant interests. In June
1952, it was reported that the "painting of communist slogans on walls has spread to
Wad Medani and Hassaheissa".49 The politics of communism might well have appealed,
especially to the young and economically marginal, of which there were increasing
numbers in the Gezira Scheme. However, as with the strike, so in the 1950s was it
found that the involvement of a political party in the tenant movement proved to be
divisive and inimical to universal tenant interests.
Taking advantage of the voluntary nature of tenant membership within the Tenants'
Association, which provided space for competing representative bodies, el Arnin's group
prepared the ground for opposing the Association. Throughout the summer of 1953.
pamphlets and small meetings organised by EI Amin and his supporters criticised the
45 The memoirs of Yusef Mustafa. former secretary of the Tenants' Union.
4(, Ibid.
47 Ibid.
4K For more information on the establishment of the communist party in Sudan. Sec Mohammed Nuri cl-
Amin, 'The Sudanese Communist Movement, The First Five Years", Middle East Studies. \O1.~2 ..~.
(1996) 22-40. \'01.32. ~. (1996) 251-203. \'01.33. I, (1997) 128-151.
49 NRO 2Civsec 301113. BNP Monthly Diaries 1952, June.
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Tenants' Association as stooges of the government. By September, large groups of
tenants were articulating their unease with Gezira Board management. by organising
petitions and refusing to accept the second payment of the annual profit - deemed
insufficient - and instead demanding a larger payment from the reserve fund.5o
Employing a rhetoric of exploitation as a means of encouraging discontented tenant
support, the Tenants' Union was born. It was not that tenants had suddenly changed
their self-identity from tenant-elite to oppressed victim, rather that despite the rhetoric. it
was felt that the interests of the tenant-elite might be best served by the Tenants' Union.
In addition to portraying tenants as the victims of colonial oppression, the Tenants'
Union also pledged to hold the government to account and increase the profits gained by
tenants. It was the failure of the Tenants' Association to fulfil these tenant aspirations
that attracted tenants to an alternative body that promised to do so.
An Institutional Duel
Babikr Izeirig, chairman of the Tenants' Association publicly defended the Association
against the allegations of the Tenants' Union in the national press. A series of articles
followed in EI Nil, with both bodies demonstrating to tenants and government, their
claims to be the legitimate representatives of tenants. The Association made its claims
on the basis of experience and wisdom, while the Union focused on the degree of
informal public support it had. In addition to the claims of legitimacy, both bodies made
claims and counter claims about their ability to hold the government to account. While
the Association was derided by the Union as being government agents preventing
"serious work on the part of the poor, wronged, innocent tenants to get back their
50 NRO 2BNP 50/8131. lzeirig, Chairman Tenants' Association to Financial Controller Gczira Board 12
Septemhcr 1953.
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rights'f ', EI Amin and the Union were described as "communists [who] want to waste
the tenants' money so that they can drive them from their homes". 52
On the 6_7th November 1953, the Union took advantage of increasing instability and
unease with the Tenants' Association to publicly present themselves as a fully-fledged
viable institution at a specially mediated 'Tenants' Conference'. Attended by over one
thousand individually invited tenants, the Union demonstrated its ability to manipulate
the power of display to great effect, gaining the attention of tenants and the government
alike. The Union used the conference to elect a new tenant body committee and to
demand that the Tenants' Association hand over all assets and accept the authority of the
Union.53 As the Gezira Digest reported; "The movement may be sound, or unsound,
wise, or unwise, but it has surely won the support of a big mass of the tenants.":" On the
29th November, demonstrations took place at all Gezira Board offices, at which petitions
were handed to block inspectors demanding recognition of the new committee and on
the l" December up to 8,000 people marched to Barakat and Wad Medani with petitions
supporting the Union.55 The government refused to acknowledge its authority, but with
the confidence of the Union at a height the Union declared "we have used all the
peaceful methods possible to support and aid the Tenants' Union, and we now have no
other choice but to walk on the other path".56 In mid-December, the Union threatened
the heart of the Scheme when EI Amin organised a ten-day boycott of the Gezira Board,
and the government realised that they had reached crisis point.
Taking the offer of an informal committee of notables from Wad Medani to mediate
between the two bodies, the government attempted to regain control of the situation.
This committee concluded that the Tenants' Association no longer had the full support
51 NRO Newpaper Archive, EI Amin Mohammed EI Amin, "An answer to Izeirig's notice" reprinted in £1
Nil, 21 October 1953 .
.'i2 NRO Newpaper Archive, Sheikh Babikr Izeirig, 'To the tenants of the Gezira Scheme" £1 Nil, 8
December 1953.
5.~ NRO 2BNP 50/8/31, Cullen, Governor BNP, "Note on the Gezira tenants' affairs", December 1953
q GBA, £1 Gezira Digest, I November 1953.
55 NRO 2BNP 50/8131, Cullen, Governor BNP. "Note on the Gczira tenants' affairs", December 1953.
50 NRO Newpaper Archive. cl Arnin Mohammed el Arnin "Notice fro III the executive council (\1 the
Tenants' Union", el Nil, 15 December 1953.
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of the tenant body, and that stability would only arise by holding new elections. allowing
tenants to create a new representative body." This was a decision fullv endorsed bv the
. .
government who wished to have an effective representative body to work with. The
opposition to elections by both the Union and the Association suggests that neither were
convinced of a favourable electoral result. However, the campaign by the Union had
been deeply influential. After an election campaign in which the accusations and
allegations continued, a representative body composed of a majority of members from
the Tenants' Union was created in March 1954. 58
In looking back from August 1954, the regional newspaper El Gezira concluded:
It is undoubtedly true that the Gezira Scheme has experienced a state
of instability during the last ten months - a state which the Scheme
and its tenants had not undergone throughout the previous 30 years.i"
The bitter election campaign demonstrated the central importance of a tenant institution
to the tenant body. Fought on a platform of economic concerns, tenants attempted to
mould the experience of governance to their own personal economic advantage. In part.
this focus on tenant representative bodies was a reaction to the failure of councils to
engage with financial matters relating to the Scheme. As 'extensions of the merka:,
councils were not able to challenge the government's management of the Scheme, and in
particular were not able to channel the increasing tensions that were a reaction to the
economic control of firstly the Syndicate and later the Gezira Board. Attempts to
express tenant concerns through councils generally failed. EI Amin Mohammed EI
Amin, in his former guise as a member of Hassaheissa Rural District Council, criticised
the practices of the Syndicate and the Gezira Board, particularly their interference with
the Tenants' Representative Body.'" However, this criticism had little or no impact, and
EI Amin remained a marginal figure until the Union established him as a popular leader
of tenants. A tenant-controlled institution thus provided a focal point for tenant
'07 NRO 2BNP 50/813 I. Cullen, Governor BNP, to Beaton. acting Civil Secretary. 21 December 1951.
.'oK GBA. £1 Gezira. 15 March 1954.
59 GBA. SPS file 'general'. £1 Gezira. 15 August Il)54.
flO The memoirs of Yuscf Mustafa, former secretary of the Tcnant-.' Union.
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aspirations, and a lever with which to control the unique tenant experience of
governance, in a way in which local government councils could and did not.
The development of tenant institutions charts changing tenant perceptions of themselves
and their position within society, and also their united power and their desire to control
the government. The TRB was very much a government institution, but it did provide
the environment for the development of a consciousness of united tenant interests based
around individual accumulation, and provided a practice ground for the future tenant
relationship with government. The creation of the Tenants' Association marked a
significant step towards an independent tenant body, and attempted to push forward
tenant interests in the face of government opposition. However, it was the Union.
campaigning on a promise to control the government and bend them to tenant interests -
an electoral platform that clearly resonated with tenants - that marked the culmination of
tenant consciousness about their interests. The development of a powerful independent
tenant interest group was a clear attempt by tenants to reorganise and control their
experience of governance and improve their financial interests.
The increasing intensity of both nationalist politics and workers' movements were
highly influential to these developments. Radical language and ideologies were easily
accessible and offered a ready-made template of exploitation and rights that could easily
be imprinted upon the Gezira Scheme by anyone with those with grievances, no matter
how inappropriately. In 1953 grievances abounded, as tenants, accustomed to a rising
standard of living, felt the effects of a relative economic downturn. With profit levels
from cotton sales rising throughout the 1940s, an astonishing peak was reached in 1951.
whereupon a single tenancy made an average of £E.800 from cotton, a dramatic increase
from £E.49 in 1946, and even more so from the debts of the early 1930s. 6 1 Such high
profits had the consequences of creating a tenant spending-spree, and during the season
of 1951-2, conspicuous spending and liberal borrowing were frequent expressions of
tenant identity. Flying became a common form of transport to Mecca. and ta\is
61 Gaitskell. Gezira. pp. 270.317.
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abounded within the Scheme.62 The result of such an uncontrolled influx of money was
rampant inflation, and when profits fell, which they did in 1952 to fE.300, and again in
1953 to fE.200, tenants found themselves faced with spiralling inflation and nsma
....
debt."
Having attained their aspirations in these two spectacular seasons, tenants desired to
maintain the lifestyle they had now experienced. With aspirations increasingly couched
as rights, this situation of exaggerated financial misery was a crucial pre-condition for
tenant demands for increased control over the central government structures affecting
their financial lives. As Culwick stated:
The sudden and temporary flood of money had done much to
establish more strongly than ever their ideal of themselves as
managing, not working, a tenancy and it correspondingly intensified
their disgruntlement as the prospect of attainment receded."
Sheikh el Wali, a prominent contributor to the EI Gezira newspaper, succinctly outlined
the impact of what he described as a financial crisis of bankruptcy; "this has
undoubtedly affected them [tenants] psychologically ... they are now ready to tax any of
their representatives with carelessness and neglect of duty.,,6s When the depression of
the 1930s hit the Scheme, tenants had been unorganised. In 1953 there was an
established tenant consciousness, a framework of tenant institutions, and an inherent
confidence among tenants, that allowed tenants to articulate their discontent. The
grievances concerning the failure of aspirations may have been similar to those of the
1930s, however, the methods of articulating those grievances had become formalised
and bureaucratised.
The pressures upon the Tenants' Association, from an increasingly discontented and
financially strained tenant body, and an increasingly assertive opposition movement
were fierce. The Association responded by increasing its own asserti veness and drawing
1>2 Gaitskell, Gezira. pp. 317-318.
(,~ Ibid .. p. 3 I8.
M Culwick, "Study of the Human Factor", p. 162.
(,~ GBA, £1 Gezira, Sheikh cl Wali "Gczira tenants' financial crisis". I November 1~53.
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attention to its own demands for improving the financial position of tenants, and at the
same time distancing itself from the emerging Union. The differences between the two
bodies claiming control of the representative body are easily seen; the Union used a
language borrowed from the workers' movements, of exploitation and oppression, while
the Association used a paternalistic language of co-existing rights and duties, holding
themselves up as independent community leaders looking after tenant interests/" These
different approaches attracted different members and supporters, and the growth of the
Union emphasised differences within the tenant body. The Association, with its
representatives largely from the established and wealthy administrative elite appealed to
those benefiting from the status quo, while the Union generally attracted those
economically more marginal, those with half-tenancies and the young who were open to
influence from urban and workers' movements, and whose aspirations, albeit the same
as more wealthy tenants were not being met. These differences were summed up by
Thomas Mynors, deputy Governor, who described the members of the Tenants' Union
on a demonstration, as "rather young and scruffily dressed as compared with the older
and better dressed Tenants' Association body".67
Articulating 'Rights'
However, these differences can be overstated, and should not hide the overriding
similarities between the bodies. Though these differences might point to different
visions of future tenant control of the Scheme's governance, crucially both bodies shared
the aspirations of individual accumulation and of an elite tenant citizenry, in which
tenants gained increasing control over their own financial concerns. This was a shared
vision of governance by and for tenants. Despite the emergence of two opposing
factions, the events of 1953 primarily represented a search by tenants to find the best
66 NRO Newspaper Archive, £1 Nil, el Arnin Mohammed el Amin, 21 October 1953; £1 Nil, Sheikh Abu el
Hassan el Mahmoud, ..j. November 1953.
67 NRO 2BNP 50/8131, Thomas Mynors, Deputy Governor BNP, "Gezira Tenants' Organisations",
December 1953.
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representatives to further an existing conception of tenant interests. Thus the core of the
dispute was the debate over the ability of the representatives to control the governance
of the Scheme. As the Association frequently pointed out, the demands made by the
Union were not new, but were exactly the same as those that the Association had been
working towards since its inception." It was the perceived inability of the Tenants'
Association to fulfil these demands, and demonstrate full control over the structures of
governance that gave rise to the opportunity to replace the Association. The coherence
of these demands despite the differences in rhetoric is striking, suggesting the existence
of an unquestioned moral economy existing around a series of tenants' rights.
Tenants broadly accepted the Scheme's structure, and the changes that it had brought but
they did so on the understanding that in return, it would provide them with increasing
financial returns and a rising standard of living. The central role of government was also
embraced on the premise that government existed to serve the interests of tenants.
Tenant aspirations remained focused on individual financial benefits, and a tenant body
had to represent these interests. The concept of individual rights, so frequently upheld
as a virtue to be encouraged and protected by the British in Africa, was appropriated by
tenants as a central focus of tenant identity and unity. The language of specifically
tenant rights became a commonly used rhetorical tool beginning in the 1946 strike when
"angry crowds of tenants several hundreds strong besieged the Mudiria clamouring for
'their rights",.69 By 1953, the word was littered through the newspaper articles, with the
Association arguing that they were "doing a brilliant job as a supervisor of tenant's
rights", and the Union declaring that they would help the "poor wronged innocent
[tenants] get back their rights.,,7o These 'rights' were articulated within fourteen
demands, used by both the Association and the Union, which focused on a tenant moral
economy of individual financial accumulation. Eleven of the demands were directly
related to an increased financial return for each individual tenant, two were about
general standard of living in communities as a whole, and one was about reasserting the
6X NRO Newspaper Archive, El Nil, Ahmed Babikr Izeirig, "Note to the Sudanese people and specifically
the farmers of the Gezira", 17 October 1953.
69 NRO 2Civsec 3017/18. BNP Monthly Diaries, June, 1946.
70 NRO Newspaper Archive. El Nil, Sheikh Abu Al Hassan Abd Almahrnoud, ~ May 1953; £1 Nil. El
Amin Mohammed EI Arnin, 21 October 1953.
Establishing a Tenant-Citizenship
fundamental relationship between tenants and the structures of governance in order to
more easily obtain the other 13 demands."
A clear distrust of an alien government to look after the best interests of tenants was
articulated through the demands for legal advisors, and participation on management
boards. However, despite this distrust, it was also accepted that the most productive way
of influencing and ultimately controlling the government was by becoming part of the
structures of governance. By participating within the legitimate spheres of governance,
tenants could provide themselves with a platform from which to hold the government to
account. Therefore, the Union, despite its attack upon the Association, only attempted to
undermine its right to hold the position of representative body, and did not attack the
idea of there being such a body. Instead, both bodies drew on the new debates about
governance being developed at local and national levels of Sudanese society, and
adopted a language of legitimacy and accountability.
By following the model of existing bureaucratic institutions (but adapted to further
specific tenant interests) tenant institutions eschewed notions of traditional authority,
commonly used in other areas of Africa as a way of making statements of power.
Neither a language nor the symbols of traditional authority were co-opted by tenants as a
way of demonstrating their unity and their power base. Seeing themselves as at the
forefront of a modern society, modernity was embraced within the rhetoric and
structures of tenant organisation in the pursuit of a culturally consistent aim of individual
accumulation and rentiership, Fulfilling British ideas about the lack of tradition and
traditional authority within the Gezira, and responding to the imposition of a 'modem'
capitalist, export oriented economy, tenants chose to defend their economic interests in
ways that mirrored the modern structure imposed upon them. Citizenship was a central
idea in this self-representation of tenants. With the Gezira Scheme providing the
majority of the nation's revenue, tenants saw themselves as invaluable and among the
most important citizens of the nation.
71 NRO 2BNP 50/8/31, Cullen, Governor BNP, "Note on the Gezira tenants' affairs", December 195_~.
See appendix for the full list of tenant demands.
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It was therefore on the ability to hold government to account on issues pertaining to the
common demands of tenants, that the claimants to the representative body were judged,
and not their political or ideological affiliations - a matter perceived to be the
jurisdiction of national politics. It was on this ability that both the Union and
Association made their claims and counterclaims. The Association presented itself as a
trustworthy body with knowledge of and an established working relationship with the
government.f The Union claimed that the Association had failed to deliver, and that
they, with their powerful backing and determination to deliver tenants' rights were the
most appropriate body to successfully achieve the aims of tenants." With tenants
looking for the 'best' institution for increasing tenant power vis-a-vis the government,
the Union gained the majority of tenants' votes in the election held at the beginning of
March 1954.74 Frustrated with the Association for not delivering quickly enough,
tenants decided to give the Union the opportunity to show themselves more able to
secure the financial aspirations of all Gezira tenants.
However, once in power, the Union too failed to deliver, and despite the wish of tenants
to create a body that could control the government, the government remained strong.
The fundamental differences between a tenant body that prioritised their own financial
needs and a government-management that desired to maintain efficiency and national
revenue were never going to be easy to negotiate. The aggressive demands, language
and tactics used by the Union; including frequent visits to Khartoum in order to make
complaints about the "stubbornness" of the Gezira Board, demands to annul all
evictions, and the threat of a further strike at sowing time until all demands were met,
only fuelled the tensions with government.P On the other side, the government having
acted as the guardians of Africans' individual rights found it difficult when Africans
appropriated these same ideas for their own purposes.
72 NRO Newspaper Archive, El Nil, Sheikh Abu el Hassan el Mahmoud, "To the tenants of the Gezira
Scheme" 4 November 1953.
7~ NRO Newspaper Archive, El Nil, "Press release by the organisers of the preparatory council for the
tenants' conference". 21 October 1953.
74 GBA El Gerira, 15 March 1954.
75 NRO Newspaper Archive. EI Nil. "Notice from the Gezira Board", 28 July 19).+.
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It was tenant dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Union that brought about its
downfall. By June of 1954, just a few months into the Union's leadership, support was
beginning to wane. Meetings arranged by the Union were poorly attended, accusations
of intimidation tactics increased, and the knowledge that EI Amin refuted the need for a
vote of confidence was greeted with dismay." Having wanted a strong body to
effectively mediate with government and achieve the demands of tenants, it was soon
realised that the ideology and rhetoric of the Union was ultimately inimical to tenant
interests. In 1954, the Union attempted to make constitutional changes that included
opening membership to non-tenants in order to consolidate its strength." This along
with a more general failure to secure the demands of tenants proved to be the major
downfall of the Union, as the economic and ethnic dominance of tenants was seen to be
undermined by this proposal. With a more thorough awareness of tenant motivations
and aspirations, Mekki Abbas, then managing director of the Gezira Board was able to
shake off the threat of a strike in 1955 by offering each tenant £E20, with promise of a
further £E 10, to all tenants undertaking a promise not to strike. Aware of the primacy of
financial issues, the government successfully undermined the authority of the Union by
providing tenants with just that which the Union had been unable to negotiate.
Humiliated and defeated, the Tenants' Union was forced aside in the 1956 elections, and
saw the personnel of the weakened Tenants' Association return to power until 1963
when EI Amin re-emerged to take the Union into the Numeiri years."
The strike of 1946 was the first expression of a united tenant identity based around
common economic demands, and proved the value of Gezira-wide organisation.
Leading directly to the creation of a tenant institution, tenants embraced the institutional
model as a way of continuing to organise and represent tenants and their interests.
Despite the rivalry of the Tenants' Association and the Tenants' Union from 1953. this
institutional framework was at no time challenged. Instead, it was the ability to be
76 NRO 2BNP 50/8131, Khartoum 'centroff' to Mynors, Governor BNP. 22 June 195'+. and GB.-\. £1
Gezira, 15 July 5'+.
77 Gaitskcll, Getira. p. 307.
7K Barnett, The Gezira Scheme, p. 140.
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'modern' and be part of 'modern' government that was a central claim of both the
Union's and the Association's claims for legitimacy. Tenants, seeing themselves as
members of an elite citizenship desired to be part of the government, and claimed
control over their own experience of government. This was a very particular tenant
identity, based on a self-perception of being an economic and cultural elite with the
'right' to control and access the profits of the Gezira Scheme. Although tenants did
maintain links with urban centres, this was an identity that excluded all non-tenants,
whether labourer or 'effendia'.
Although use had been made of other, more direct methods of holding the government to
account (most notably strike action), the development of bureaucratic accountable
structures throughout national and local government cultures provided an impetus for
using similar machinery in the attempt to wrest control over the tenant experience of
governance within the Gezira Scheme. Behind the rivalry between the Tenants'
Association and the Tenants' Union, which reflected the existence of unequal control
over resources within the tenant body, lay a consensus of opinion on the need to develop
a parallel bureaucratic structure that benefited tenants' interests. Despite the varieties in
social and economic status among tenants, the common interests of all tenants based on
financial aspirations were behind both the Union's and the Association's claims. Based
on a perceived notion of tenants' 'rights' - particularly the right to accumulate
individual profit - seen to be abused by an unaccountable alien government, a tenants'
representative body was valued for its ability to bring the government to account and
achieve a set of 'demands', crystallised within both bodies' rhetoric. Although the
conflict between the Union and the Association, as articulated within the series of
newspaper articles revealed the differences between both bodies, they appealed to the
support of tenants on very similar terms. The fact that the tenant body was willing to
support the institution perceived as most able to hold the government to account, despite
the use of inappropriate rhetoric, further suggests that they did not view ideology as
important to the function of the representative body. Rather the legitimacy of the body
was judged on its ability to meet the demands of tenant aspirations.
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The campaigns of the Association and Union did have their successes. Tenants not only
gained immediate financial benefits through payments out of the Reserve Fund, but also
saw a more fundamental shift in their relationship with government, as demands for
representation on marketing boards, the opening of world markets and a special status
for Gezira tenants within the Sudan were met. However, the government was
uncompromising on issues affecting the overall efficiency of the Scheme, and on
occasions forcibly demonstrated its overarching power. After some years of threatening
the government's hold over the governing structures of the Gezira Scheme, the power of
tenant institutions rapidly declined as competition and public campaigning split the
electorate and created a spiral of ever increasing and unrealised claims. As the
Condominium ended, the government was able to reassert its own position in the climate
of internal tenant conflict. Despite the support of the tenants for a representative
institution able to bring the government to account, both the Association and the Union
set themselves up to fail by basing their legitimacy on demands that were ultimately
impossible to fulfil. In part a response to the divergent interests within the tenant body,
the one demand that gained the united support of tenants - that of continued individual
accumulation - was always going to be unsupportable, and, being based on international
econorruc conditions, was ultimately uncontrollable by any government or interest
group.
CONCLUSION
To be a tenant or not to be a tenant is a matter of great practical
moment, to be a land-owner or not to be a land-owner under the
conditions created by the Scheme to day is of secondary importance
economically.'
Making landowning largely irrelevant, the Gezira Scheme effectively broadened the
basis of elite status. However, this study shows that crucially, this wider tenant elite
retained the same values and aspirations of pre-existing landowners and the Scheme was
successful because it was easily moulded to fit with the existing values of Gezira
communities. Individualistic and financially driven, new tenants saw in the Scheme's
structure the potential to achieve the lifestyle previously reserved for a small landowning
elite. In particular, the high profits associated with tenancies allowed a tenant to employ
labourers and act as landlord at the apex of a hierarchical society in the same way that
landowners once had.
In contrast with this continuity of social values, the government's imagination of Gezira
society and values was uncertain and changing. Failing to understand the hierarchical
complexity of the society over which they ruled, British officials used the opportunity
provided by the creation of the Gezira Scheme to superimpose their own version of an
ideal peasant-proprietor society. Highly reliant upon a work ethic that valued personal
1 Culwick, :\ Study of the Human Factor. p. 56
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manual labour, the British imagination of the Gezira Scheme failed to correlate with the
highly competitive and status-driven aspirations of Gezira communities. Instead, the
new tenant elite was able to manipulate the government's flawed imagination to pursue
their own existing aspirations, using the very structures imposed by the government to
reach quite distinctive ends. The Scheme was embraced by the Gezira population, but
they did so not on the terms hoped by the government, but purely on the basis of the
financial capital associated with tenancies which was used to attain a lifestyle free from
manual labour. It was for this financial capital that tenants were attracted to the Scheme,
and it was in defence of this capital that tenants fought for perceived rights.
In 1913, several dozen tenants petitioned the government to prevent changes in the
experimental Scheme structure that were going to reduce tenants' financial earnings.
Forty years later several thousand tenants petitioned the government to meet a series of
demands regarding the financial position of tenants. Despite the enormous change in the
scale of tenant campaigning, the issues at the heart of the relationship between tenants
and the Gezira Scheme remained unchanged throughout the Condominium period.
Although neither campaign was particularly successful, both attempts to assert tenant-
led policies demonstrate the centrality of financial profits to tenants' acceptance of the
Scheme, and their willingness to engage with the state in defending their financial
position. However, whereas in the earlier period tenants simply presented a petition to
the province Governor, by the 1950s, tenant campaigning involved institutions,
meetings, marches, the use of placards, as well as visits and petitions to representatives
of provincial and central government. In part this change represented the change of
scale of the tenant body. However, more than anything else, it represented a new-found
confidence of the tenant body to use the very forms of governance promoted by the
government in an attempt to meet their own distinctive demands.
These later attempts by tenants to mould their own experience of governance to suit their
united interests reflected the experience tenants had gained of using mediating
institutions throughout the Condominium. Government devolution policies, while in
fact highly centralising, had from the 1920s introduced formal bureaucratic judicial and
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administrative institutions into local communities, providing them with essential
experience of 'modern' governance. Within the Gezira, these policies of devolution
were directly influenced by the Gezira Scheme. It was because of the needs of
agricultural organisation that devolution was introduced at a faster rate within the Gezira
region, and institutions of local governance remained tightly wedded to agricultural
requirements. This close relationship of state-sanctioned institutions and the Gezira
Scheme meant that tenants became the main focus of the state and the main beneficiaries
of devolution policies. Not only had the Scheme offered the financial opportunities for a
broad swathe of the Gezira population to become economically dominant, but this
economic dominance was directly translated into social and political dominance through
tenant control of local government institutions. As tenant status became equated with
automatic and elevated citizenship, so the new institutions of government were
embraced as a way of achieving common tenant aspirations. This was governance for
and by tenants reflecting the unique relationship that tenants had with the state. As the
self-appointed apex of a hierarchy, tenants defined themselves in relation to non-tenants.
In particular, tenants defined themselves ethnically as Arab in reaction to the perceived
economic threat of non-Arab Westerners.
However, while tenants saw their participation within the Gezira Scheme as a means to
enhance their economic and social status and were eager to define their aspirations as
rights, these aspirations all too often proved to be unobtainable. The profits of the early
1950s soon proved to be unsustainable and the following decline, together with the
steady increase of half tenancies meant that by no means all tenants could attain the
standard of living and status of pre-Scheme elites. The few exceptions such as Yusef
Algam who used his first tenancy as a stepping stone to move from relative obscurity to
gain a leading position within the Gezira tended to prove the general rule that social,
economic and political power was retained within the same few families. Those with
existing capital were at a distinct advantage within the Scheme and it was on this basis
that there occurred a split in the tenant body; a split that was premised upon the differing
abilities of tenants to attain the same aspirations.
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In political as well as economic spheres, existing figures of authority tended to remain
dominant throughout this period. The effect of government policies of centralisation
was to create an administrative elite that gained a significant degree of power, but never
became the sole agents of authority that they were often imagined to be by the
government. Throughout the Condominium, Gezira communities proved remarkably
able to adapt the new forms of central governance to suit their own purposes. This was a
society that was highly experienced in mediating with a central state through identified
gatekeepers. Thus the government's attempt to centralise authority in the figures of
administrative experts, while more thorough than previous regimes, was far from being a
new phenomena. At no point was the concept of centralised administrative authority
undermined, for although individuals and lineages might compete for control over
centralised positions, the benefits that this mediation brought to the community were
understood. In part providing communities with resources and useful channels of
communication, the devolution of local government also worked to contain the state.
For although the state became increasingly controlling, it also became focussed upon
just one part of a community, creating space elsewhere for communities to act without
state controls. In this way, while courts and councils were quickly appropriated to deal
with issues related to the Gezira Scheme, they were never used to discuss inter-
community affairs. It must be assumed that those disputes and concerns were settled
within authority structures that continued to exist alongside government-controlled
institutions. As much as the government took a pick and mix approach to the forms of
authority they chose to officially support, so communities took the same approach to the
ways in which they used those official structures.
The Gezira region found the changes brought by the Condominium government far
easier to adapt to than the government did. Throughout most of the Condominium
period, the government struggled with the notion of modernity, and the Gezira Scheme
was viewed as a necessary aberration to a traditional ideal. It was not until the final
years of the Condominium that the Scheme was celebrated for symbolising the perfect
symbiosis of modern governance and rural values. In contrast. the population of the
Gezira demonstrated self confidence and consistency, always willing to use modern
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structures to attain their existing cultural values. Thus it was that the changes that
occurred within government thinking were more dramatic than any that occurred upon
the ground. Gezira society remained fluid and adaptable while at the same time
retaining its core values. Such a conclusion flies in the face of perceived wisdom that
has seen the physical structures of the Scheme, with its intense supervision as altering
the very fabric of society. However, the Scheme was not a totalising institution and nor
were tenants an exploited community or victims of colonial financial policy. although
they may well be described as exploiters of a wider labour force. Rather, the weakness
of the government, symbolised by their lack of effective knowledge of the Gezira
community must be stressed. For while as Sara Berry argues, colonial states set the
context for struggles over access to resources, "governments' actions neither determined
nor controlled their outcomes.t" Instead, tenants became the primary actors within the
Scheme's structure. It was they that after weighing up the evidence decided to involve
themselves in the Scheme, and it was they that took an active and positive role in
controlling their own experience of the Scheme by embracing the government and the
Scheme itself. With the government reliant upon tenant organisation of labour, the
tenant body was in a strong position to dictate the terms of the Scheme's organisation.
Powerful, and with a strong self-identity based upon economic position and ethnic
background, the tenant body can be seen as one distinctive part of the wider formation of
a northern riverain Sudanese Arab elite that became consolidated throughout the
Condominium. 3
The Gezira Scheme was (and is) undeniably a spectacular economic undertaking, which
had the potential to revolutionise not only the physical landscape, but existing social and
economic patterns. The fact that it did not, and that pre-existing cultural values and
community authority structures remained in place, is a reflection of the fact that there
was considerable ability for the Scheme to be moulded to fit those established values
and cultural aspirations. The Gezira region had of course changed significantly under
Condominium rule. It had become an important part of the world economy, and wa-,
~ S. Berry, No Condition is Permanent, p. 101
) See for example. Sharkey. Living WiTh Colonialism, pp. 21-20,
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spatially, politically, and administratively dominated by the Scheme. However. these
changes were of degree rather than of type. For centuries the Gezira had been engaged
in the wider economy and in multiple forms of economic enterprise, including profit-
sharing farming schemes, thus leading to continuities that have often been overlooked.
In fact the greatest changes that occurred were located within the rhetoric of the
government rather than in the social structures of Gezira society. Moreover, the Scheme
failed to impact directly on the lives of tenants in the ways that have often been
presupposed. By employing labour, tenants were able to express a cultural ideal and at
the same time shield themselves from the excesses of the state. Distancing themselves
from manual labour and engaging in disparate trading and commercial concerns, tenants
acted in pursuit of long-established ideals of status and behaviour.
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The Fourteen Tenant demands
1. Execution of the principle of partnership between the tenants, the Sudan
Gezira Board and government
2. Increasing the tenants' share of profits from the sale of cotton
3. Participation by the tenants in the 'cotton sales committee'
4. Appointment of an advisor to the tenants on legal and economic affairs
5. Appointment of cotton classifiers on behalf of the tenants
6. Opening of world markets to Gezira cotton
7. Abolition of restriction of (Nile) water and extension of the scheme
8. Guaranteed water for lubia
9. Development of fruit and vegetable gardens in all villages
10. Development of social services and alternative husbandry schemes
11. Compensation to tenants for disease damage to cotton
12. Reduction in tenants' financial obligations
13. Cancellation of 'Income tax' on tenants
14. Payment of instalments from the reserve fund
NRO 2BNP 50/8/31. A.P. Cullen. "Note on the Gezira tenants' affairs", December 1953.
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